87 N.Y.S. 185 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1904
The plaintiff, a national banking association, brought this action in equity, in .'the nature of a bill of interpleader, in order that it might pay into court the amount of a deposit of $7,067.32, carried on its books to the credit of the “ Supreme Council of the. Order of Chosen Friends Relief Fund.” The plaintiff asked that upon payment it be discharged from further liability and that the defendants settle among themselves their conflicting claims to the fund. The relief sought upon the part of the plaintiff was granted, and upon payment of the money into court the plaintiff was dismissed from the action by an interlocutory judgment entered therein. The appellant claimed a lien upon the fund to the extent of $1,800 by virtue of an attachment levied thereon. The respondents claim the entire fund by virtue of their appointment as receivers of the corporation to which the fund belonged. The issues raised by the conflicting claims of the defendants were thereafter tried, and resulted in a judgment in favor of the receivers. The facts are undisputed, and so far as material are as follows: The Supreme Council of the
Upon the death of Mrs. Vandervoort the appellant Brown became entitled to receive from the corporation the amount represented by the beneficiary certificate. The claim thereunder having been approved by the corporation it became a liquidated claim for that amount and Mrs. Brown thereupon became a creditor of the corporation; the obligation resting upon it was to pay the claim, and failing in that it was guilty of a breach of contract and Mrs. Brown became vested with a cause of action against the corporation upon such breach, (Matter of Equitable Assn., 61 Hun, 299; Strasser v. Staats, 59 id. 143; Anderson v. S. C. of O. of C. F., 135 N. Y. 107.) This is the recognized rule of law in the State where the corporation was created. (Elkhart Mutual Aid, Benevolent & Belief Assn. v. Houghton, 103 Ind. 286.) Being thus invested with a cause of action, Mrs. Brown had the right to resort to any
It is said, however, that, this rule conflicts with the decision' announced by the Appellate Division,™ the. second department in. Popper v. Supreme Council (61 App. Div. 405), which case was ■cited with approval in Hallenborg v. Greene (66 App. Div. 590). The most cursory examination shows that this contention is without foundation. In the Popper case the question arose upon a demurrer do a complaint in an action brought by a creditor of the corporation in this State, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, for the purpose of having a receiver appointed, to the end that' the assets of. the corporation might' be equally distributed among the persons entitled thereto, and the court therein simply passed upon the sufficiency of the complaint as stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and reached the conclusion that it did. It did not, however, undertake to determine, nór did it decide, as to the rights of attaching creditors, which liad become fixed prior to the appointment of a receiver in tliis State or prior to the institution of the action therein, the subject of consideration. On the ■contrary, the court expressly said: “We are not now concerned with the question of the distribution or disposition of the funds in the manner adopted in that case (referring to People v. Granite S. P. Assn., 41 App. Div. 257), but simply with the question of jurisdiction and whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” Undoubtedly the court had. jurisdiction to .entertain such an action and to appoint a .receiver in this jurisdiction, so that the fund might be secured for the benefit of the
She has been defeated in enforcing such right by the judgment rendered in this action, based upon the ground that the fund deposited with the plaintiff bank was a trust fund, impressed with the payment of those entitled to share in the relief fund of the cor- ' poration. It appeared by the complaint that the relation which existed between the bank and the corporation was the ordinary one of creditor and debtor, created by the deposit of the money with the bank, which was subject to the check or warrant of the corporation. . So far as the pleadings are concerned there is no disagreement between the defendant receivers and the bank in this respect. The answer of the Indiana receiver avers that the plaintiff “ received on deposit and agreed to repay to.the said The Supreme Council of
It necessarily follows from these views that Mrs. Brown acquired a perfect lien to the extent of her claim upon the fund in question. Such claim she is entitled to enforce as against the receivers, and it becomes their duty to recognize and pay such claim. As the facts are not in dispute and show right in Mrs. Brown to be paid from this fund, it follows that the judgment should be reversed and judgment pass in favor of Mrs. Brown for the payment of the
Tan Bkunt, P. J., Patterson, Ingraham and Ladghlin, JJ., concurred...
Judgment reversed and judgment ordered in favor of appellant, with costs of action and of appeal.