53 Ga. App. 241 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1936
The beneficiaries recovered $435, the amount of a life-insurance policy issued on the life of their father. The insurance company set up the affirmative defense that the insured had made false and fraudulent answers to questions in his application for insurance, as follows: “Are you in good health? (A.) Yes . . Who is jurar doctor? (A.) Dr. M. K. Jenkins . . What illness, injury, or accident have you ever had? Give details. (A.) None except children’s diseases infancy.” The’ application was made and signed on August 7, 1934. The policy was issued on August 13, 1934. The insured died on September 11, 1934. There was some dispute under the evidence relative to the healthful appearance, activities, and realization of the insured as to the seriousness of the condition which caused his death; and also some conflict in the testimony of the insurance agent who took the application and that of a daughter of the insured, one of the beneficiaries, on whose initiative the policy was obtained, as to the exact form of the questions in the application .as asked by the agent, and what was said by the agent and the replies by the insured. The daughter testified: “He asked my father who his doctor was, I believe, and my father told him, Dr. M. K. Jenkins. Dr. Jenkins was my father’s physician at that time,
Dr. O. A. Rhodes, who was the daughter’s “family physician,” and was called by her to attend the insured, testified: “I have been a practicing physician in Atlanta since 1911, some 24 years. I took my medical course at Johns Hopkins, and my internship in New York. . . The first time I treated [the insured] was June 25, 1934. . . When I saw him, he was at home in bed. . . He was suffering an intense pain over his gall-bladder region, very sore, and rather prostrated; he had a temperature I think at that time of between 103 and 105; I. think his temperature when I saw him was around 104. . . He was a very sick man and my diagnosis at that time was that he had coleo cystitis and infected gall-bladder, and I felt he had gall-stones with it at that time. . . I saw him on my own accord three times on the 26th of June . . and I also saw him twice on the 27th, and after that I saw him up until July 3d, I saw him once. . . He was not able to work from the 25th of June to the 23d of July; he was in bed most of that time. . . On the 5th of July, he came to my office and we x-rayed his gall-bladder . . my opinion is that he had a stone; I couldn’t say he did or didn’t, but his gall-bladder was entirely out of commission; the bile didn’t go back or come out. I recommended that he have an operation to drain the gall-bladder or have it removed, just depending on what they found when they got in it; I didn’t intend to operate myself; I don’t do that. I recommended on the 5th of July, 1931, that he have an operation, and that is the last time I saw him. A gall-bladder operation is regarded as a major operation. . . I was not [his] personal physician; I had treated his wife and treated a couple of his little boys, but I had never treated him personally; I have treated members of his family. . . I never at any time regarded him as near death, but he was very sick, but I was satisfied all the time he was going to get well. . . I never at any time told [the insured] he was in a dangerous condition.”
“Concealment of material facts may in itself amount to a fraud— . . When, from any reason, one party has a right to expect full communication of the facts from the other. . . [Or] where one party knows that the other is laboring under a delusion with respect to . . the condition of the other party, and yet keeps silent. . . ” Code of 1933, § 96-203. These rules are as applicable to contracts of life insurance as to other transactions.
A misrepresentation in a life-insurance application as to whether the insured had been attended by a physician would be material, where the insured, if correctly informed, would have had the opportunity to investigate and ascertain for itself the seriousness of the ailment for which the insured was being often treated. “Whether misrepresentations are material is ordinarily a question for the jury; but whore . . the evidence excludes every reasonable inference except that they were material, no issue is presented upon that point for determination by the jury. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Henderson, 37 Ga. App. 704 (141 S. E. 498).” N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Hollis, 177 Ga. 805, 807 (171 S. E. 288). Where uncontroverted facts show a material misstatement or material fraudulent concealment in answers to questions in an application for life insurance, a verdict will be demanded in favor of the insurer in a suit by the beneficiary on the insurance policy. Kelly v. Interstate Life & Accident Co., 49 Ga. App. 766 (176 S. E. 793), and cit. In the instant case, the verdict in favor of the plaintiff beneficiaries was contrary to law and without evidence to support it; where, under the undisputed evidence, the insured, in answer to a question as to who was his doctor, gave only the name of his personal family physi
cJudgment reversed.