Pеtition of the National Labor Relations Board to enforce its order of April 29, 1946, directing respondent to bargain collectively with Natiоnal Organization, Masters, Mates and Pilots of America, A.F.L., as the exclusive representative of the mates on its vessels. The issues are, (1) whether the first, second and third mates employed on each of respondent’s four vessels, regularly sailing the Great Lakes, are “employees” within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A, § 151 et seq.; and (2) if so, whether the 12 men comprise a unit appropriate for purpоses of collective bargaining. It is the Board’s position that each question must be answered affirmatively.
Respondent, on the other hand, аrgues that the mates are licensed officers, and as executive officers of the ship do not do any manual labor, and their duties are supervisory in nature, that when on watch each is responsible for the safety of the ship and that in addition the first mate is largely responsible fоr the employment and discharge of unlicensed personnel and for the maintenance of the ship.
As 'to these duties the Board found: “The first mate is in direct charge of the hire and discharge of the unlicensed personnel, and to him the other mates make their recommendatiоns on these subjects. In the event of incapacity or absence of a master, a mate takes over the master’s position, in which hе has absolute control over his ship, the cargo, and all the personnel, including the other mates, when the ship was not in port. Except for that single instance the mates have no supervisory authority over each other.”
There was some evidence that a second оr third mate might occasionally discharge an employee and that the first mate was usually the working boss, and that the other mates would not do anything that he thought was wrong, although on their own watches they had equal authority so far as seamen were concerned. There was evidenсe that although the master might issue orders directly to the other mates, he usually gave them to the first mate to be handed by him to the others.
There is no real divergence between the record and the Board’s findings, except in the amount of supervision the first máte exercised over the оthers, but this matter is only material on the question of what is an appropriate unit.
On the first question, respondent argues further that in the 30 years it has oрerated ships on the Great Lakes, there has never been a period when its mates did not have free access to the top management for expression of grievances and for discussion of relations existing between licensed personnel (mates and others) аnd unlicensed (such as seamen). It contends that the mates have always acted directly and indirectly for management and that a need fоr protecting a collective bargaining right should be found before it is granted in a case like this.
Confronted with our decision in N.L.R.B. v. Packard Motor Car Co., 6 Cir.,
These distinctions come to this: The duties of mates have not changed greatly for over 30 years, except that the Director of Industrial Relations consults them with reference to conditions of employment. Mates have strictly executive positions and are a part of management and hire and discharge and have full control over unlicensed personnel, whereas the forеmen are subject to rigid control of management and over the years have been relieved of responsibilities by Departments for Emрloyment, Layout, Routing, Stock or Traffic, Time Study, Inspection, Personnel, etc. Grievances are taken up by mates and they can dischargе if orders are disobeyed, whereas grievances by-pass foremen, and they can only “recommend”, as to discharges, transfers, etc. Furthеr, it is claimed foremen are more managed than managing, whereas mates are consulted by management about policies on thе ship and have opportunities to express themselves. Supervisory foremen „ may only “recom
There are readily recognizable differences between thе work of mates on a vessel and that of foremen in a plant, but we think that since the decision of the Supreme Court in the Packard case we are foreclosed from considering them other than differences of degree, rather than of kind. That decision, affirming this court (four judges dissenting), was handed down since the hearing in this case. Packard Motor Car Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
The question remains whether thе 12 mates of respondent comprise an appropriate unit for organization. Under the authority of the Packard case the answer must be that they do. Each mate is licensed and could in an emergency take over the control of the ship even though as a mattеr of orderly management the first mate seems to have somewhat informal supervisory control over the others, but there was a similar supervision of general foremen over the others in the Packard case. In its opinion in that case, the Supreme Court stated that the Boаrd has broad discretion to determine appropriate units and that if there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s determination, that determination will rarely be disturbed.
In Jones & Laughlin Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 5 Cir.,
On the authority of these cases, an enforcement order will issue.
Notes
See N. L. R. B. v. E. C. Aitkins & Co., 67 lin Steel Corp.,
S.Ct. 1265, and N. L. It. B. v. Jones & Laugh.