NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. CHARLES BATCHELDER COMPANY, INC., Respondent.
No. 684, Docket 80-4174
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued Feb. 2, 1981. Decided March 23, 1981.
Prоfessor Moore has noted, “the courts of appeals have treated the position of nonparticipants in an appeal on a case to case basis and have not read Rule 3 to limit the jurisdiction to reverse or modify a judgment properly brought before it.” 9 Moore‘s Federal Practice Par. 204.11[5], at 4-61 (emphasis in original). I believe this principle should govern here.
Dr. Green‘s failure to take an appeal is understandable. Both he and the plaintiff were content with the jury‘s limitation of Dr. Green‘s liability to 25%. The plaintiff appealed only the 27% deduction based on the jury‘s finding of contributory negligence. Dr. Green apparently continues to be willing to abide by the 25% verdict even after disallowance of the 27% erroneously deducted by reason of the plaintiff‘s alleged contributory negligence. He therefore proceeded on the basis that this would be his maximum exposure. The majority, in reversing the judgment against his co-defendant (the hospital), does not merely leave untouched the scope of his liability but increases it by 75%. Under these circumstances, to hold him liable for the full 100%, which was based on impermissible grounds, strikes me as unconscionably harsh. Under the circumstances we should exercise our discretionary power as a matter of fundamental justice to reverse the judgment as to him and remand the validly stated individual claims against him for a new trial, unaffected by the unsustained claims upon which the jury held him liable.
Guy C. Quinlan, New York City (Joan M. Markey and Rogers & Wells, New York City, on brief), for respondent.
Before FEINBERG, Chief Judge, NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, and MISHLER,* District Judge.
MISHLER, District Judge:
The National Labor Relations Board (the “Board“) petitions this court pursuant to
In April 1978 the Company3 announced a break with tradition and informed its employees that the annual wage increases which were customarily effected every May 1 would be deferred until September 1978. The employees were advised that the change was being made in order to conform the timing of the wage increases to the Company‘s new fiscal year end but that the employees would not be penalized as a result since the increases would be rеtroactive to May 1. Nevertheless, employee objections ensued and employee Steven Carmichael, at the suggestion of fellow employee Edward Fleming, contacted Local 1040 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (the “Union“) on May 8, 19784 and met with a representative that same day.
Within a few hours after Carmichael‘s meeting with Union representative Edward Iulo, Carmichael met with Fleming and discussed what had transpired. The two agreed to initiate an organizational campaign and vigorously embarked upon that course through their concerted efforts. Between May 9 and May 12 both employees actively promoted the Union through their discussions with fellow employees and their solicitations of authorization cards. In addition to setting up a meeting for the Company employees on May 14 with Union representative Iulo, Carmichael successfully engaged a fellow employee, Tom Elliot, to assist him in posting Union organizational literature in various locations around the shop, including the restrooms, and an area immediately adjacent to their work place.
Two of the unfair labor practice charges arise out of the discharge of Edward Fleming on the afternoon of Friday, May 12, after he threatened a fellow employee, Joseph Emanuelle, who had indicated that he would not attend the union meeting scheduled by Carmichael for the following Sunday. It is undisputed that Fleming responded to Emanuelle‘s rejection of his personal invitation by blocking his egress, coaxing him to come to the meeting by stating that it was for Emanuelle‘s own benefit, and threatening him with physical retaliation. As recounted by Emanuelle, Fleming stated that, “If you don‘t like it I‘ll take you out in the parking lot and kick your ass ....” Emanuelle, who had been on friendly terms with Fleming prior to the May 12 incident, failed to return to his job and immediately reported the incident to shop foreman Plourde. Emanuelle testified that he had been frightened by his encounter with Fleming and this was corroborated by Plourde, who stated that Emanuelle was “shook up... pale and scared” at the time he reported the incident.
Plourde reported the incident to Ronald Beilin and Bruce Batchelder.5 Thereafter, Emanuelle repeated his account of what had just occurred and after hearing his statement Beilin and Plourde discussed Fleming in general. All parties then present were aware of Fleming‘s union activities. In the course of their conversation Beilin requested that Plourde comment specifically on Fleming‘s work record. He answered that Fleming was a fair worker but he had some problems with absenteeism. Plourde ultimately recommended discharge and Beilin concurred. After Plourde had
Shortly thereafter Carmichael learned of Fleming‘s discharge and confronted shop foreman Plourde stating, “If Fleming is let go, I am leaving too.” Plourde cautioned him that, “If you walk out now don‘t bother to come back,” to which Carmichael acknowledged his understanding and left the plant. However, within one-half hour following his departure from the Company plant Carmichael telephoned Plourde requesting to have his job back and stated, “I want to apologize for my hasty decision, and see if I can come back to work.” Plourde answered, “I [must] think about it . . . . Call me back Monday morning.” When they next communicated on Monday morning Plourde stated that Carmichael could not have his job back. It is undisputed that Carmichael quit and was not discharged.7
In the wake of these disputes the union meeting which had been sсheduled for May 14 went forward as planned. Thereafter, union activity continued. Fleming and Carmichael filed unfair labor practice charges against the Company on May 22. The Board‘s consolidated complaint issued on June 30 and stated that the Act had been violated by their discharge in retaliation for their union activity. During the two to three week period following their discharge, Fleming and Carmichael handbilled the Company‘s plant with the assistance of union agents. Union related activity subsided after this effort and all overt activity ceased by early June.8
In mid-June the Company notified all employees that the new wage increases would become effective July 1, rather than September 1 as announced prior to the advent of union activity. The proffered explanation for the implementation of accelerated benefits was that the Company desired to quell employee dissatisfaction arising from the uncertainty concerning the amount of wage increases.
The Board, in agreement with the ALJ, found that the Company violated
DISCUSSION
In determining whether the findings of the National Labor Relations Board are supported by substantial evidence, a court “may not ‘displace the Board‘s choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.‘” NLRB v. Walton Manufacturing Co., 369 U.S. 404, 405, 82 S.Ct. 853, 854, 7 L.Ed.2d 829 (1962) (per curiam), quoting Universal Cаmera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 465, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). We have examined the record keeping in mind this well established proposition.
When an employer has both valid and invalid grounds for disciplining an employee, commonly referred to as a “dual motive“, any action taken against the affected employee will not constitute an unfair labor practice unless it is shown that there is “‘a reasonable basis for inferring that the permissible ground alone would not have led to the discharge, so that it was partially motivated by an impermissible one.‘” Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d at 98, quoting NLRB v. Park Edge Sheridan Meats, Inc., 341 F.2d 725, 728 (2d Cir. 1965). Under this test “[t]he magnitude of the impermissible ground is immaterial as long as it was the ‘but for’ cause of the discharge.” Id. at 98 (citations omitted). With respect to the instant controversy, the Board found that the impermissible ground was the only basis
Examination of the evidence may reveal ... that the [employer‘s] asserted justification is a sham in that the purported rule or circumstance advanced by the employer did not exist, or was not, in fact, relied upon. When this occurs, the reason advanced by the employer may be termed pretextual. Since no legitimate business justification for the discipline exists, there is, by strict definition, no dual motive.
Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc., 251 NLRB No. 150 (1980) (emphasis added). Accordingly, in reviewing the Board‘s findings we need not engagе in the “but for” analysis since the question before the Board was not the extent to which the Company relied on valid grounds for its action, but whether the stated grounds were the real ones.12
Even though the Board accepted the ALJ‘s credibility findings, it nevertheless overturned the decision of the ALJ and found that Fleming‘s threat against Emanuelle was not the basis for his discharge. It relied on four facts and circumstances in finding that the discharge was motivated solely by anti-union sentiment. All but the first of these enumerated reasons—the fact that Fleming had been “a long-term satisfactory employee“—are unpersuasive of its conclusion. The Board found that the record was devoid of any indication that Fleming‘s language was more than a simple angry statement—that his statement was neither intended to be, nor reasonаbly could have been, interpreted literally. This view is contrary to Emanuelle‘s credited testimony that he had been frightened by the threat and had a reasonable basis for believing that Fleming would carry it out.13 250 NLRB No. 9 at note 1. Further, in discounting the seriousness of Fleming‘s threat the Board relied on the Company‘s settlement offer to hire Fleming made six months after his discharge to show that the Company never considered him to have violent tendencies. The subsequent offer, of doubtful admissibility as a settlement offer, does not provide a substantial basis for rejecting the bona fide belief six months earlier that Fleming‘s threat justified his dis-
Our view of the record leads us to the conclusion that the Board‘s characterization of Fleming‘s threat and its finding that the threat was not the ground for discharge amounts to nothing more than the mere substitution of its hindsight judgment for a decision which is properly vested in management. The Board engaged in mere speculation when it concluded that the proffered ground for discharge was pretextual. Before an undisputed threаt of violence to an employee can be written off as pretextual with the consequent impact of depriving the employer of his right of management, more evidence than is before us now must be presented.14
With respect to the unfair labor practice charge arising out of management‘s refusal to rehire Carmichael, the record is also devoid of substantial evidence to support the Board‘s conclusion. It is undisputed that Carmichael quit after learning of Fleming‘s discharge. He abandoned the Company during mid-shift and in the face of Plourde‘s cautionary instruction not to quit. In doing so, Carmichael committed a serious breach of his employment obligation—the departure of Carmichael and Fleming, both furnace operators, left the Company with only onе of the three furnaces attended by a furnace operator. The ALJ found that the Company‘s decision was not attributable, even in part, to Carmichael‘s union activity because the only basis for such an inference arises from his key role in the union organizational campaign. Nevertheless, the Board found that he was denied re-employment for union-related reasons since the announced basis for the Company‘s refusal to rehire Carmichael was without a rational foundation.15
Simply stated, the Board has used sрeculation, rather than substantial evidence, in arriving at its conclusion. The record indicates only a weak showing of union animus at the time Carmichael quit. However, even if the Company had exhibited a somewhat stronger anti-union sentiment, Carmichael‘s union membership alone does not measure up to substantial evidence in support of the Board‘s order that Carmichael be reinstated.
As to the July 1978 wage increase, even though the question is a close one we believe the Board‘s conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.18
The petition for enforcement is granted in part; the order of the Board is modified by vacating paragraphs 1(a), 2(a), and 2(b) thereof and by appropriately modifying the notice which must be posted.
NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur in all of the conclusiоns reached in Judge Mishler‘s thorough opinion for the Court and in virtually all of his opinion, but add these additional views in an attempt to clarify analysis of employer motivation cases under
In Wright Line, the Board surveyed the assortment of pronouncements in prior decisions of the Board and the Courts of Appeals and concluded that the correct framework for determination of employer motivation is the model adopted by the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). Applying Mt. Healthy to the context of a
The Board suggests in Wright Line that “an additional benefit which will result from our use of the Mt. Healthy test is that the perceived significance in distinguishing between pretext and dual motive cases will be obviated.” Slip op. at 20 n.13, [1980] Lab.L.Rep., supra, at 32,472 n.13. That suggestion bears examination in this case, because Judge Mishler‘s opinion analyzes this case as one of pretext, rather than dual motive, thereby implicitly indicating that the distinction serves a useful purpose.
To see why this is so, at least to some extent, requires a clear understanding of the analytical processes involved (1) in examining whether a ground asserted by an employer is a “pretext” and (2) in applying the “but for” test to an employer‘s dual motivation. Simply stated, “pretext” analysis asks, “What happened?” “But for” analysis asks, “What would have happened?” When we say an asserted ground is a pretext, we mean that we do not believe the employer when he says that he relied upon that ground in taking the challenged action.1
When we say an employer has not sustained his burden under the “but for” test, we mean that he has not proven that he would have acted the same way if only the valid ground had existed. Of course, “but for” analysis asks the hypothetical question as to what would have happened in order to reach a conclusion as to the legal significance of what did happen, but the fact that both approaches answer the same ultimate legal question should not obscure the different factual inquiries each pursues.
Conversely, the Board can start with pretext analysis, in which event it will have to move on to “but for” analysis only in some cases. In every case the Board can ask, “Did the employer really rely on the asserted, valid ground?” If the answer is no, the employer loses, and the Board need never make the hypothetical inquiry necessary for “but for” analysis. If the answer tо the “pretext” inquiry is yes, the case is then one of dual motivation, and the Board must then move on to “but for” analysis and ask, “Would the employer have relied on the valid ground if it had been the only existing ground?”
The point is that the Mt. Healthy “but for” formula does not always eliminate the distinction between “pretext” and “dual motivation” cases. The further point is that analysis of any
Moreover, as this case illustrates, it will sometimes be more sensible for the Board to start with “pretext” analysis. In this case the Board did not аsk, “Would the employer have discharged Fleming if the only existing ground had been his threat to Emanuelle?” Instead the Board pursued “pretext” analysis and asked “Did the employer really rely on the threat episode?” The Board answered that question no, and therefore ruled against the employer. By using “pretext” analysis and inquiring as to what actually happened, the Board avoided the need to make the more speculative “but for” analysis and to inquire as to what would have happened if the threat episode had been the only existing ground. Had there been substantial evidence to support the Board‘s conclusion, “pretext” analysis alone would have sufficed.
An additional complication arises when the Board‘s decision in a
However, I believe it is appropriate and preferable, аt least in a case such as this, for the reviewing court to avoid the delay of a remand and move on to “but for” analysis. I think we can safely assume that since the Board concluded from the evidence that the employer did not really rely on Fleming‘s threat, the Board, if reversed on that conclusion and obliged to move on to “but for” analysis, would inevitably conclude that the employer would not have discharged Fleming if the threat had been the only existing ground. If the Board thought there was no reliance on this ground, it could hardly think there would have been independently sufficient reliance.3 Having found no substantial evidence to support the Board‘s “pretext” conclusion, we should therefore assume the Board would also rule against the employer on a “but for” analysis and procеed to consider whether there is substantial evidence for that conclusion. As Judge Mishler‘s opinion points out, supra at 39 n.12, there is not substantial evidence for that conclusion either, and for that reason enforcement of the order concerning Fleming is properly denied, without the need for a remand. The same reasoning applies to the portion of the order concerning the failure to rehire Carmichael. For these reasons, I join the Court‘s opinion.
Norman ARCHER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION OF the STATE OF NEW YORK and the Attorney General of the State of New York, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 875, Docket 80-2365.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued March 13, 1981. Decided April 8, 1981.
Notes
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of [Title 29 of the United States Code];
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(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization....
Approximately two years prior to the birth of union activity at the Company in 1978, at least one member of management, Bruce Batchelder, had expressed a strong anti-union sentiment to nonsupervisory personnel. When the first overt signs of union activity surfaced on the morning of May 12, Bruce Batchelder called a foreman‘s meeting “to find out what was going on.”
250 NLRB No. 9 (1980).[W]e must decide whether [the] circumstances support the conclusion urged on us by the General Counsel that Fleming was discharged for unlawful reasons, rather than for the lawful reasons advanced by Respondent.
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[W]e find that the reasons given by Respondent for Fleming‘s discharge were wholly pretextual and that Fleming was in fact discharged for his prounion stand.
[W]e find the reason given for the refusal to be pretext and that Carmichael was refused reemploymеnt because of his prounion activity.
In face of this credited testimony, thе Board suggests that the fact that Emanuelle and Fleming had been on friendly terms provides some showing that Emanuelle did not really fear Fleming. On the facts before us, we believe this inference must be disregarded since it is without a rational basis. See e. g., NLRB v. Local 50, American Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 339 F.2d 324, 328 n.4 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 827, 86 S.Ct. 62, 15 L.Ed.2d 72 (1965); NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., Inc., 326 F.2d 172, 184 (2d Cir. 1963) (Friendly, J., dissenting).Q. Why [were you scared]?
A. Well, it‘s common knowledge at the shop that [Fleming is] an ex-con, and nobody to be messed with.
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Q. Did you feel you were going to get hit then and there?
A. I was expecting it.
In part, the Board‘s decision with respect to Carmichael was based upon the fact that the Compаny failed to advance any reason for its refusal to re-employ Carmichael. However, by