In 1995 the Teamsters Union began an organizing campaign at North Atlantic Medical Services, a supplier of medical equipment. North Atlantic fought fiercely and also unfairly and now has unfair labor practice findings against it, as well as a bargaining order. A supervisor, though, had pro-union sympathies which he openly expressed. The employees — that is, a majority of them — both signed union representation cards and voted for unionization in an election. The employer has refused to bargain with the Union and twice has been ordered by the National Labor Relations Board to do so. The Board now petitions for enforcement of its various orders. North Atlantic also petitions for review, saying that both the election and the authorization cards, and thus the consequent Board orders to bargain, must be set aside because the supervisors conduct biased the outcome. North Atlantic has not challenged the finding of unfair labor practices on its part. The case involves review of the Board’s determination that *64 the pro-union activities of a supervisor were not sufficient to deprive employees of their right to a free and uncoerced choice, and thus to set aside the two bases for the bargaining order.
I.
We summarize the Administrative Law Judge’s undisputed findings of fact, adopted by the Board.
North Atlantic Medical Services supplies medical equipment. That equipment is delivered by field service technicians, or drivers. In April 1995, when union organizing efforts began, North Atlantic employed approximately eleven drivers and mechanics at its Leominster facility.
At the request of driver Marco Nagle, union organizer A1 Stearns met on April 6, 1995, with Nagle and four other North Atlantic employees who were interested in unionization. 1 Field Service Manager Steven Custer also attended the meeting. Custer said he supported unionization but told the others that North Atlantic’s president, Carbot Carabott, was adamantly opposed to unionization and had once threatened to “lock the [ ] doors” if the employees tried to organize a union. Custer warned that Carabott would “do everything in his power to make it miserable for everyone” if they tried to organize. All six attendees, including Custer, signed union authorization cards at that meeting. Custer did not himself pass out cards or ask employees to sign the cards, nor did he promise rewards if they supported unionization or punishment if they did not.
Shortly after the meeting, Nagle obtained signed cards from three more employees. When Stearns again met with employees on April 13, eight of the eleven unit members had signed cards. Stearns filed a representation petition with the Board. The Board then sent a copy to North Atlantic on April 17. The parties agreed to an election set for June 1, 1995.
In the weeks before the election, North Atlantic launched a campaign to defeat unionization. It undertook a series of personnel actions designed to undermine support for unionization in the bargaining unit. Three days after receiving the petition, on April 20, North Atlantic removed Gary Roy, a union supporter who had signed an authorization card on April 6, from a light duty assignment and placed him on full worker’s compensation pending further investigation of his condition. North Atlantic fired Roy a month later on May 22. Also on May 22, North Atlantic laid off another driver in the unit, Marc Kiroac, for “lack of work,” although Kiroac had worked over 60 hours in each of the previous two weeks, and was recalled one week after the election. And on April 21, North Atlantic transferred a salesman, Michael McDermott, a union opponent, back into the bargaining unit as a driver in order to dilute support for unionization. McDermott did not want to transfer and told other drivers that he was eager for the election to be over so he could go back to his sales job.
President Carabott held two mandatory employee meetings to discuss his opposition to unionization. At the meetings, Carabott questioned employees directly about their reasons for supporting unionization, and told them they could work down the street if they wanted a union. He also said that he would get out of the business when it stopped being “fun,” and spoke about a friend’s company that went out of business after employees chose unionization. This was an implied threat that North Atlantic would go out of business if the drivers won representation rights. Calling the unionization effort a “battle in a war,” Carabott said that he would not lose this war. He warned that unionization would be futile because there *65 would be no extra benefits even if the employees chose union representation, and that although a union could offer anything, he had the final say as to what would be given. Carabott also announced a new “open door policy” and solicited grievances from employees, and implied that he would suspend that policy if employees unionized.
North Atlantic also distributed two anti-union memoranda to employees shortly before the June 1 election. In the second memo, which accompanied paychecks, Car-abott wrote that unionization could “endanger the financial stability of this company and also the livelihood that enables you to provide for your family” because customers would be unlikely to continue to do business with a unionized company due to the threat of strikes. Carabott also warned that a strike “means loss of business and loss of jobs.”
Meanwhile, on April 20, three days after it received the representation petition, North Atlantic fired Field Service Manager Custer, purportedly for failing to competently perform his responsibilities as service manager. The Union filed a discriminatory discharge charge on Custer’s behalf on May 22. 2 The Union argued that Custer was an employee, fired in retaliation for his support of unionization. Custer attended four more union meetings before the June 1 election, but did not pressure employees to support unionization. He asked some employees in general terms whether they planned to vote for the Union, and told them that they should only do so if they were “110 percent sure” because President Carabott would fiercely resist unionization. Custer also voted in the June 1 election. 3
After the election, the Board held a hearing to resolve challenges to several of the ballots. The Board rejected North Atlantic’s challenge to the Union’s majority status based on Custer’s pro-union activities. Further, the Board found that North Atlantic committed numerous unfair labor practices, including firing several employees in retaliation for their union support, making unilateral changes to evaluation and compensation policies, threatening employees with job loss, and telling employees that unionization was futile because having a union would not result in improved benefits.
In light of North Atlantic’s unfair labor practices, the Board concluded that a remedial bargaining order was warranted, requiring North Atlantic to recognize and bargain with the Union.
The Board ordered North Atlantic to cease and desist from the unfair labor practices and from interfering with or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act. North Atlantic was also required to offer reinstatement to the fired employees and to compensate all employees for losses caused by its unfair labor practices. Finally, the Board ruled that the remaining valid ballots were to be counted and, if the Union received a majority of the valid ballots, directed the Regional Director to certify the Union as the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative. 4 The Board ordered the Regional Director to set aside the election if the Union did not receive a majority of the ballots east.
The Union was certified after a revised tally revealed that the Union indeed had won the election, by a count, of eight to two. But North Atlantic again refused the *66 Union’s request for recognition and bargaining, claiming that the Union had been improperly certified because Custer’s pro-union activities tainted the election, requiring it to be set aside. Acting on a Union complaint, the Board’s General Counsel issued an unfair labor practice complaint and the Board granted its motion for summary judgment against North Atlantic. The Board found that North Atlantic had not produced any new evidence or special circumstances requiring the Board to alter its earlier decision that Custer’s activities did not taint the representation proceedings. The Board concluded that North Atlantic’s refusal to bargain with the Union violated the Act and again ordered North Atlantic to bargain with the Union and to cease and desist from interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under the Act.
In its petition for enforcement, the Board seeks summary affirmance of its findings that North Atlantic committed several unfair labor practices, which North Atlantic does not challenge on appeal. Further, the Board seeks affirmance of its finding that the Union achieved a valid card majority which, combined with the numerous unfair labor practices, led the Board to certify the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative; that certification formed the basis of the Board’s remedial bargaining order and refusal to bargain unfair labor practices finding in 1995. The Board also requests affirmance of its finding that North Atlantic violated the Act by refusing to bargain with the Union after it won the election and was again certified as the exclusive bargaining agent in 1999. North Atlantic seeks review of the Board’s orders.
II.
The ultimate issue here is whether North Atlantic has an obligation to bargain with the Union, as ordered by the Board. There are two bases for the Boards bargaining orders. First, there is a
Gissel
bargaining order, which provides a basis for a bargaining order irrespective of the outcome of the election because the Board found North Atlantic had committed massive unfair labor practices, sufficient to render a fair election improbable, and the Union had obtained an authorization card majority.
See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
Normally in representation cases, our review of the NLRB determinations is for abuse of discretion.
Fall River Sav. Bank v. NLRB,
Both an organizing campaign and an election involve the balancing of First Amendment freedoms of expression against the need to prevent coercion of employees, and the balance is meant to preserve the employees ability to make a free choice. The First Amendment protections concerned Congress when it enacted the National Labor Relations Act, and so it provided in 29 U.S.C. § 158(c):
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this sub-chapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
The Board tells us it has attempted to be even-handed in its application of the rules imposing consequences for certain speech, recognizing that neither the employer nor the union side may alter the balance in an election by threats of reprisal or promises of benefits. And the Supreme Court tells us that Congress intended the Board to have a wide degree of discretion “in establishing the procedure and safeguards necessary to insure the fair and free choice of bargaining representatives by employees.”
NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co.,
Under the Board’s rules, a party may bring a challenge to election results before the Board “only where compelling reasons exist therefor,” including grounds that a “substantial question of law or policy is raised” not governed by Board precedent or that there was a prejudicial error.
See
29 C.F.R. § 102.67(c). But a party cannot seek direct court review of the Board’s certification decisions; it can only challenge certification in the context of a refusal to bargain unfair labor practice charge.
See NLRB v. S. Prawer & Co.,
The role of a supervisor attempting to help the union organize his workplace might be thought a bit odd, and here, as is often true, there was a dispute about whether the supervisor was really a supervisor or was an employee.
See, e.g., Wright Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB,
This case does not raise the first concern. The employer left no one in doubt of its anti-union position, as the uncontested findings of unfair labor practices against it attest. Indeed, supervisor Custer, in his debut on this issue, warned other employees that North Atlantic president was virulently anti-union.
Accord Catholic Med. Ctr. v. NLRB,
And so we turn to the second concern: whether there has been explicit or implicit coercion. While this Circuit has not had an abundance of these cases, the few existing decisions establish the principle that “without evidence of any threats, express or implied, [the fact that supervisors favor a union ] does not compel a finding of coercion.”
Fall River Sav. Bank,
The initial focus is on whether there were coercive actions by the supervisor against anti-union employees, actions such as discharge, surveillance, coercive investigation, or rewards. Similarly, courts focus on whether there were words that amounted to an express threat or promise of reward.
See Gissel,
Instead, this case involves the more subtle question of whether the conduct and speech of the supervisor amounted to implicit threats or coercion. The Board has generally considered the specific facts and circumstances and looked to three areas of inquiry: the nature of the supervisory authority, the nature of the activity and speech of the supervisor, and the context in which the supervisor acted.
The first line of inquiry looks to the scope of the supervisor’s role over the employees to determine whether the supervisor has the actual ability to harm the interests of the employees or to reward them.
See Fall River Sav. Bank,
The period of time that this supervisory authority existed is also relevant. The ALJ noted that Custer was terminated by North Atlantic early in the organizing campaign. Although Custer continued to attend union meetings, he no longer had workplace authority. The ALJ acknowledged that this fact alone was not disposi-tive in the Unions favor, given the precedent of
NLRB v. Howard Johnson Motor Lodge,
The second area of inquiry has to do with a very fact-intensive examination of the activities and speech of the supervisor. The ALJ found that Custer’s pro-union activity was very limited: he attended union meetings, but when he spoke, it was mostly to say that the employees would have a tough time getting a union given the attitude of North Atlantic president. Custer’s most explicit statements of union support came, not surprisingly, after he had been fired. He had no supervisory authority then. The ALJ also noted the lack of certain evidence. There was no evidence, for example, that Custer passed out or collected authorization cards, campaigned for the Union while he was a supervisor, or made promises or engaged in any form of coercion to further his pro-union views. And there was no evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred *70 that other employees felt Custer was trying to force them to support the Union.
On this last point, there is an evidentia-ry refinement. The Supreme Court in
Gissel
cautioned against after-the-fact evidence from employees as to whether they had felt coerced in any way, noting that even that testimony could be subject to coercion.
See
Finally, there is an examination of context. As the ALJ found, North Atlantic had itself engaged in coercion and discrimination in an effort to stop the Union. In this context, “the employees could not possibly believe ... that they had anything to fear by offending Custer and opposing the Union.” Again, there was no suggestion that this fact of North Atlantics strong anti-unionism was dispositive. It may well be that a supervisor could engage in pro-union coercion even while the company is virulently anti-union.
See WKRG-TV,
Viewing all the facts, the Board concluded there was no conduct or speech by supervisor Custer that would give rise to an inference of coercion, and therefore no basis to invalidate either the authorization cards or the election. The Board’s determination of whether a supervisor’s conduct tainted an election is “essentially a matter of drawing inferences, and it has long been settled that an agency’s conclusions based upon such inferences should not be set aside by a reviewing court unless they transgress the bounds of reason.”
Catholic Med. Ctr.,
North Atlantic attacks this conclusion by saying that it has been held to too high a standard of proof. All it needs to show, it says, relying on the Ninth Circuit decision in
Island Film,
is that the pro-union supervisory activity would “reasonably tend” to have a coercive effect, and does not need to show actual proof of coercion. It also says that in most of these sorts of cases, where management loses, management is aware of what its wayward supervisors are doing and does nothing in response.
See NLRB v. Lamar Electric Membership Corp.,
There are three difficulties with North Atlantics argument. First, it makes no allowance for the fact that judicial review is deferential to the Board, unless the Board’s decision is “arbitrary and capricious” or its findings not supported by substantial evidence.
NLRB v. Beverly Enterprises-Massachusetts, Inc.,
For these reasons, we grant the Board’s petition for enforcement of its orders and dismiss North Atlantics petition for review.
Notes
. Stearns represented the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO. We refer to the local, Truck Drivers Union Local 3170, as “the Union,” either as the proposed representative or as the certified representative of North Atlantic’s drivers.
. That charge was still pending at the time of the election.
. On July 22, Custer's discriminatory discharge claim was dismissed after a finding that Custer was a supervisor, not an employee, and therefore was not protected by the Act from discharge. That decision was not appealed.
.The record does not reveal the reason for the seeming anomaly of a bargaining order followed by an order to count ballots. It may be that the Board was simply providing alternative grounds, should one prove infirm on judicial review.
. For example, there is no claim here that the supervisor solicited union authorization cards.
Cf. NLRB v. WKRG-TV, Inc.,
. It is theoretically possible, of course, that other employees might nonetheless perceive him, despite his being characterized by the ALJ as an employee, to have some sort of supervisory power over them. This case, as the facts described later show, does not raise any such issue of perceived authority.
. If, on the other hand, we misunderstand Island Film and it does hold that mere supervisory status alone compels a finding of coercion, or to use the language of that opinion, that such status alone is sufficient to show that the activity reasonably tends to have a coercive effect, then the Board is correct that such a rule is in conflict with First Circuit law, by which we are bound.
