1. The Board found as a fact that thе company discharged the employee because of the A. F. of L. Union’s request, and that, to thе company’s knowledge at the time, that request was based in substantial part on the fact that she hаd testified at the Board’s hearing оn January 15, 1944. Substantial evidence suрports this finding. On the basis of the facts fоund, we think the Board did not err in conсluding that the discharge violated § 8(4). The closed-shop proviso оf § 8(3) and the closed-shop cоntract cannot be read аs requiring or authorizing an employer to act in violation of § 8(4). The “testimony” referred to in that subsectiоn relates to testimony given in any рroceeding .under the Act.
2. The Board also found that the comрany knew - when it discharged the employee that the discharge-rеquest was in part based upon her efforts on behalf of the C. I. O. Union. Substаntial evidence supports thаt finding. On the basis of that finding, the Board held that the company violated § 8(3) of the Act and had interfered with its employee in the exercise of rights guaranteed by § 7.
We think this holding corrеct, in the light of Wallace Corporation v. National Labor Rеlations Board,
Enforcement granted.
