*1 RELATIONS BOARD LABOR NATIONAL INTERNATIONAL SECURITY BURNS INC., et
SERVICES, al. May January 13, Argued 1972* 71-123. 1972 Decided No. * Together with 71-198, No. Security International Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations al., Board et also on certiorari to the same court. *2 J., White, opinion delivered the for unanimous Court 71-123, No. and for the 71-198, Court in No. in which Douglas, Stewart, Marshall, JJ., and joined. Rehnquist, J., Blackmun, opinion filed an concurring in No. dissenting 71-123 and in No. 71- 198, in J., which C. JJ., and Brennan Burger, and Powell, joined, post, p. 296. Norton J. argued Come the cause for National Labor petitioner Relations Board, in No. 71-123 and respondent in No. him 71-198. With on the brief were Griswold, Solicitor General Harry Sachse, R. Peter G. Nash, and Nancy M. Sherman. Bakaly, Jr.,
Charles G. argued for Burns the cause Security International Services, respondent in No. Inc., 71-123 petitioner 71-198. him No. With on Seymour brief was Swerdlow.
Gordon A. Gregory argued the cause and filed brief for International Union, United Plant Guard Workers of America, et al., respondents in both cases.
Briefs of amici Woll, were filed /. curiae Albert Gold, Laurence and Thomas E. Harris for the American Organi- of Industrial Congress Federation of Labor Siegel for Jay A. S. zations, and Milton Smith of the United States. Chamber Commerce opinion delivered Mr. Justice White Court. Security Services, (Burns), Inc.
Burns International Corp. replaced the Wackenhut employer, another plant pro- previously provided had (Wackenhut), which Co. services the Lockheed Aircraft Service tection Air- International (Lockheed) located at the Ontario providing port began in California. When Burns 27 of them security employed 42 guards; service, refused, how- employed by Wackenhut. Burns been *3 Plant Workers ever, with the United Guard a been certified after Na- (UPG) America which had (Board) election tional Labor Relations Board representative of em- bargaining exclusive Wackenhut’s ployees pre- four issues less than months earlier. The to bargain sented in case whether Burns refused are majority a representing with a union unit and the National Labor appropriate whether to- the terms Relations Board could order Burns observe signed of a the union collective-bargaining voluntarily and Wackenhut Burns had not assumed. that precise on the facts great Resolution turns to extent here. involved
I Corp. protection The Wackenhut services provided years at five Burns plant the Lockheed for before February 28, took months 1967, over this task. On few guard majority employers, before the changeover their exclu- guards Wackenhut selected union as in a bargaining representative sive Board election after and the union had that the Lockheed agreed Waekenhut plant 8, unit. On March appropriate bargaining was the Regional Director certified union as the exclusive representative on employees, and, these April 29, Wackenhut union a three- and the entered into year contract. since
Meanwhile, one-year agree- Wackenhut’s service provide ment security protection due expire was on June called for Lockheed had bids from various companies supplying these services, and both Burns and pre-bid Wackenhut submitted estimates. At a confer- ence attended May representative Burns on 15, a Lockheed informed the guards bidders Wackenhut’s were represented by union, the union had re- cently won a Board election been certified, and that was there in existence a collective-bargaining contract between Wackenhut and the union. App. 126.1 4-5, Lockheed then accepted Burns’ bid, May and on Wackenhut was notified that Burns would re- assume sponsibility for protection July services on 1. Burns chose to retain 27 of the guards, Wackenhut brought 15 of its guards own from other Burns locations.
During when June, Burns hired the 27 Wackenhut guards, it supplied them with membership cards of the American Federation of Guards (AFG), union another with which had collective-bargaining contracts at locations, other and informed them they be- *4 come AFG members to work for Burns, they that would not receive otherwise, uniforms and that Burns “could not live with” the existing contract between Wackenhut and the union. On 29, June recognized Burns AFG the on theory the it had that obtained a majority. card On July 12, the however, UPG demanded that Burns recog-
1 A Burns executive later admitted the unfair-labor-practice proceeding that Burns was aware status, of the union’s the unit certification, and the collective-bargaining May contract after the 15 meeting. App. 105. 276 Burns’ representative em- bargaining
nize as the it honor collective- at Lockheed and Burns ployees that the When it and Wackenhut. agreement between practice unfair labor refused, the UPG filed appro- the responded by challenging and Burns charges, by denying obligation and priateness of the unit bargain. findings and the trial examiner’s Board, adopting appropriate
conclusions, plant Lockheed found the (a)(2) and held that Burns had violated 8§§ unit and 49 Act, 8 of the National Labor Relations Stat. (a)(1) 158 (a)(2), §§ as 61 29 U. S. C. 140, Stat. amended, by unlawfully assisting and (a)(1), recognizing and it had violated UPG; rival of the that AFG, (5) C. (a) 8(a)(1), (a)(5), §§ §§158 and 29 U. S. and with the (a)(1), failing recognize bargain refusing collective-bargaining UPG honor agreement had been between Wackenhut negotiated and UPG.2 (2) challenge (a)
Burns did not unlawful assist- § Appeals finding sought the Court but review ance unit determination and the order to observe pre-existing collective-bargaining contract. of Appeals accepted The Court unit Board’s deter- mination and enforced Board’s insofar order as it regard finding, In to this latter the Board stated: question thus “The before us narrows to whether the national requires policy successor-employer labor embodied in Act negotiated agreement take over and honor a predecessor. on employing enterprise behalf of the We hold that, circumstances, imposes the Act absent unusual such an obligation. find, therefore, if
“We that Burns is bound signatory thereto, the con- were a its failure to maintain (a) (5) (d) and 8 tract effect is violative of Sections Act.”
related of a rival to the of unlawful assistance finding union and the refusal but held the bargain, Board had its Burns powers ordering exceeded honor Both Wackenhut. by executed Burns petitioned for Burns the Board certiorari, challenging bargaining the unit determination and the order position and the Board maintaining was bound the Wackenhut granted we contract, both petitions, though pro- we declined to review the priety of the unit, question which was presented in No. 71-198. 404 (1971). U. S. 822
II duty We first alleged bargain address Burns’ with union, in doing so it well to return to specific provisions the Act, which courts and the Board alike (a)(5), are bound to observe. Section 8 as amended Labor Management Act, 1947, Relations (a) (5), U. S. practice §C. 158 it an unfair labor makes for an employer collectively “to refuse to bargain with representatives his subject pro- to the employees, (a) visions of section (a) of this title.” Section 159 “ provides [representatives designated or selected purposes for the of collective bargaining majority a unit appropriate purposes, for such representatives shall be the of all the em- exclusive ployees purposes in such unit of collective bar- . gaining . . .” imposes Because Act itself representative of a majority of the employees in appropriate an the initial issue before unit, the Board was whether the union was such a charging bargaining representative.
The trial examiner first found that the unit desig- nated regional director was appropriate unit for bargaining. appropriate The unit found was defined part-time full-time and regular employees of “[a] *6 deter- duties as plant performing protection [Burns] Labor (b) (3) in mined [National Section Air- International at Ontario Lockheed, Act Relations] em- professional employees, clerical port; office excluding defined employees as and all ployees, supervisors, other by the in affirmed the Act.” This determination was not at and is Board, accepted Appeals, the Court of of grant our limited pretermitted issue here because certiorari. alia, inter Burns trial then that
The examiner found, in its a of Wackenhut’s former employ majority “had already had ex- employees,” employees that these and pressed representative their choice of a bargaining election therefore held short before. Burns was a time duty held to a which arose when bargain, have of employees previous selected as work force its place perform at the same the same tasks they past. worked in accepted the trial exam- Board, without revision, iner’s findings respect to the conclusions bargain, no for aside. setting and we see basis them In an union before, election held but few months employees had been for the designated bargaining agent employees in the unit had been and a of these majority hired for is work in the identical unit. It undisputed all that Burns knew the relevant facts regard and was aware of the certification and of the of existence In these contract. it was not unreasonable the Board circumstances, to conclude the union all represent certified employees in unit represented majority still of employees reasonably Burns could not good-faith have entertained a doubt about fact. Burns’ with the union terms obligation over employment conditions stemmed hiring Wackenhut’s and from recent election and Board consistently certification. It has been held that a mere change employers ownership the em- ploying not industry such an “unusual circumstance” as to affect the force of the Board's certification within operative period normal majority if a after the change ownership or em- management were ployed by the preceding employer. NLRB Downtown v.
Bakery Corp.,
(CA6
330 F. 2d
NLRB
1964);
McFarland,
F. 2d 219,
(CA10
NLRB
1962);
Ventshade,
v. Auto
Inc., 276
2d 303,
(CA5 1960)
F.
;
*7
NLRB v. Lander
Corp.,
Shoe
(CA1
211 F.
284,
2d
286
1954);
Armato,
NLRB v.
It goes without of saying, course, that Burns was not upset entitled to what should accepted it have as an majority established by union soliciting representation 3 (c) (3) Cf. NLRA, 9 (c) 29 (3), U. S. C. pro § 159 which § vides that any election be bargaining shall directed in “[n]o unit subdivision within preceding which in twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been held.” NLRB See v. Gissel Packing Co., 575, (1969). 395 U. S. 14 599 n.
Where an same, remains the a Board certification car- ries with it an presumption majority almost conclusive representative time, status of the union continues for a reasonable usually year. a 96, (1954). See Brooks v. 348 U. S. 98-99 period, After presumption majority there is a rebuttable representation. Corp. America, 664, Celanese 95 N. L. R. B. (1951). change 672 If there employers, however, and an complete employees, almost turnover of the certification not challenge bar a if the successor is not bound the col- contract, lective-bargaining particularly employees if new are represented if another union or the old unit is ruled an accretion Refining Co., v. Oil unit. McGuire Humble & to another Cf. (1966). (CA2), denied, S. 5, F. 2d 384 U. n. See cert. infra. committing thereby for another union and cards it found practice guilty of which was unfair labor here and challenged holding That was not the Board. viewed as imperative makes it the situation be guard unit, was when Burns hired its majority represented Board- whom were Packing Co., NLRB Gissel certified union. See 609, (1969). U. S. 610-616 if Board wholly case It would be a different operational because Burns’ structure determined that practices Wackenhut, differed those no bargaining longer appropriate Lockheed unit was if it would different Burns had not one.1 Likewise, already represented by a union hired certified agent,5 as a and the Board recognized Appeals unimpressed The Court of was with the asserted differ- operations: ences Burns’ and “All of im- between Wackenhut’s portant factors which the Board has used and courts have approved present in the same are the instant case: ‘continuation of types product lines, departmental organization, employee identity job . are nationwide functions.’. . Both Burns Wackenhut organizations; performed both the identical services at the same facility; their although supervisors, its own functions used *8 by prede- responsibilities performed and were similar to those their cessors; finally, significantly, perhaps and and most Burns com- 27 performance of the contract with former Wackenhut menced 911, complement total of 42.” 441 F. 2d 915 employees out of its (citation omitted). the (1971) Although policies labor two the somewhat, determination that the the Board’s companies differed changeover the appropriate remained after meant bargaining unit essentially relations face the same environ- that Burns would labor representing it union would confront the same ment as Wackenhut: employees in same the unit. most of the same 5 Labor never held that the National Relations has Board winning the bid requires employer an submits Act itself who assets of a business be purchases for a service contract who though predecessor employees of the obligated hire all might obligation be the em- an assumed that such possible is (1965). B. 1074 Corp., 151 N. L. R. Chemrock ployer. But cf. employees solely hire because However, declines to employer who
281
much at
argument.6
oral
unit
bargaining'
But where
remains
a
unchanged
majority
hired
recently
the new
a
represented
are
certified bargaining
faulting
there
agent
is
basis
little
implementation of
express
Board’s
mandates
(a) (5)
§ 8
9 (a)
§
ordering
employer to bar-
gain with the incumbent union. This
the view of
several
of appeals
courts
agree
we
with those courts.
NLRB v. Zayre Corp., 424
(CA5
;
F. 2d 1159,
1970)
1162
Transit,
Tom-A-Hawk
NLRB,
Inc. v.
1025,
419
2dF.
Kresge
S. S.
1026-1027 (CA7
NLRB,
Co.
1969);
416
v.
McFarland,
NLRB v.
F. 2d 1225,
(CA6
1234
1969);
Ill It does not follow, however, from Burns’ bar gain that it was bound the substantive terms observe they (a) are (3) members of a union commits 8 unfair labor § Young’s Super Markets, NLRB, B. See K. & J. Inc. v. practice. (CA9), F. NLRB v. denied, (1967); 377 2d 463 cert. 389 S. 841 U. England Industries, Inc., New Tank (CA1), F. 2d 273 cert. 302 (1962); Corp. denied, Piasecki U. v. S. Aircraft (CA3 1960), Tri denied, (1961); F. cert. U. 2d S. 933 Corp., State Maintenance (1967), 167 N. L. B. 933 enforced R. Corp. NLRB, sub Tri nom. State Maintenance mod. 132 U. S. App. (1968). F. D. C. 2d 171 Further on the restrictions employer’s successor choice of would seem follow from pre- the Board’s decision that honor instant must infra, existing collective-bargaining contract. at 288-290. See 6 “Q. Union], argued, But for the he said that when [counsel Wackenhut], any [employees if over even hadn’t taken [Burns] they single employee, legal even if hadn’t taken situation over be would the same. go “Mr. that far. don’t Come do not We We NLRB]. [for you go
think that have far in- “Q.’Do you majority? think it has to *9 say majority, think it to be a I “Mr. Come. I wouldn’t that has enough give to number. It has to be it has to be a substantial bargaining unit.” you employment in the continuity of conditions Arg. 64^65. Tr. Oral nego the union
of the no had in to which Burns tiated with Wackenhut provides Act (d) expressly way agreed. Section “does obligation bargaining of such that the existence require or a proposal to party agree compel either not consistently has Congress a concession." making bargaining7 collective interfere with declined to free voluntary arbitration, preferred device, and has that compulsory terms as means imposition of to the report In its terminating disputes. labor avoiding or on Committee Act, the 1935 Senate accompanying and Labor stated: Education dispel any possible false “The committee wishes to compel impression designed bill is this governmental permit or to making agreements supervision of their terms. It must stressed carry collectively duty to does not because the es- it the to reach an agreement, party is either bargaining of collective sence proposals whether made shall be free decide satisfactory.” Cong., No. 74th Rep. 573, are S. 12 (1935). 1st Sess., immediately
This this fundamental theme Court noted compel agree- does not legislation: Act] “[The free theory . of the Act is that ment whatever. . . representa- opportunity for with accredited negotiation peace promote tives of industrial likely adjustments bring agreements about general to interfere with free exceptions to reluctance Two compulsory arbitration imposition collective are (1942), occasion, wartime, and, on Exec. Order No. 9017 during Congress has industry, 132, 122. Stat. 81 Stat. in the railroad remedy consistently compulsory as a rejected arbitration even Goldberg, The disputes, Labor emergency” however. See “national Employer, Nw. L. Obligations of a Successor U. Rev. Law (1969). 742-743
283 attempt compel.” which the Act in does not to itself Laughlin NLRB Corp., 1, v. Jones & Steel 301 S. 45 U. (1937). See also NLRB v. American National Insurance Co., 343 U. Local 395, (1952); S. 401-02 Teamsters NLRB, 857 v. (1961). 365 S. 676-677 667, U. (d), policy Section 8 C. (d), § U. S. made this an express statutory was in 1947 mandate, and enacted present because Congress feared that Board has “the gone very far, in guise whether or determining not employers bargained in good faith, setting up employer itself as the judge what concessions an must make and proposals and counterproposals may or may that he not make. . . Congress . [UJnless follow, writes into law for the Board to guides carry process Board attempt further to still to seek control more and more the terms of collec- H. bargaining agreements.” Rep. 245, tive R. 80th No. Cong., (1947). 1st Sess., 19-20 history
This was reviewed detail con- given in H. K. Porter trolling effect Co. 397 U. S. 99 (1970). There this Court, while agreeing (a)(5) by adamantly violated refusing §8 checkoff, agree thereby to a dues intending to frustrate any the consummation of held that bargaining agreement, the Board had erred ordering agree provision: to such a power Board does have to re- ...
“[W]hile quire employers and employees to it is negotiate, power compel without company or a union agree provision substantive contractual of a collective-bargaining agreement.
“It would be anomalous indeed to hold that while (d) prohibits § the Board a re- relying on to agree fusal as the sole evidence of bad-faith permits Act bargaining, compel the Board to re- Board’s dispute. The in that same agreement broad, but 10 of Act are § under powers medial policies out they carrying limited to are policies fundamental itself. One these the Act S., U. at of contract.” is freedom (citations omitted). *11 explicit lan- from considerations, evident the
These underlay history laws, of the labor and guage legislative until have con- which now prior decisions, the Board’s may sistently employers that, although held successor they union, with the recognize be and bound a provisions of col- are not bound the substantive by by negotiated predeces- contract their lective-bargaining Rohlik, agreed but not assumed them. by sors Inc., N. B. 1242 n. General Ex- (1964); 145 L. R. 15 1236, Co., 1165, Jolly N. B. (1958); trusion 121 L. R. 1168 Co., 413, (1955); Dumber 114 L. B. 414 Giant N. R. Inc., System Maryland, Slater N. B. 865, 134 L. R. (Juneau Matter ILWU (1961); Spruce), 866 82 of F. 2d (1949), enforced, L. R. B. 658-659 189 650, N. (CA9 aff’d on other 237 1951), grounds, 177 342 U. S. (1952). Appeals the of said case, As Court in this previous of successorship “In none the has the cases ever reached that result. The has al- Board successor ways merely been held to have the bargaining 8 predecessor’s 441 with his union.” F. 915. 2d, at 8 signed union has a When decertified, succeeding is union is certified the Board not it, need prior contract, not bound administer negotiations contract, for if demand a new even the terms yet Seating Co., expired. not American 106 contract have old (1953); Farmbest, 1421, Inc., N. R. B. 250 R. B. N. L. L. Farmbest, (1965),, enf. mod. sub nom. Inc. v. 1453-1454 (CA8 1967); Mfg. F. 2d 1015 see also Modine Co. 1954). Machinists, (CA6 Association 216 F. 2d International “long standing” American has declined to overturn its The Board Dynamics Corp., Seating Burns. N. B. rule after General L. R. (1970). 71No. departed has now view Board, however, same that mandate a con- argues policies
tinuity that suc- require also bargaining obligation employers predecessor’s cessor be bound to terms a It the stabil- collective-bargaining contract. asserts that ity jeopardized of labor relations will and that em- ployees uncertainty gap bargained- will face and conditions of as well as the employment, terms prior possible advantages loss gained negotiations, unless new held to have assumed, matter of labor law, obligations federal under into employer. contract entered the former Recog- nizing that under principles party normal contract would be bound to not a contract the absence of consent, Wiley Sons, the Board notes that in John & Livingston, Inc. v. 376 U. the Court (1964), S. declared that “a agreement collective is not ordinary an contract” but is, rather, outline *12 particular plant industry. common law of or The Court in Wiley predecessor held that although the em- ployer signed which had contract by with the union disappeared the merger with suc- cessor, the union could compel the successor to arbitrate the extent the which successor obligated was under the collective-bargaining con- agreement. The Board tends that the same that emphasized factors Court the Wiley, peaceful the settlement of industrial conflicts “protection [against] the a sudden [of] change the employment id., relationship,” at 549, require that the treated under collective-bar- gaining exactly as Wackenhut would have been if it had continued protecting the plant. Lockheed
We do not Wiley controlling find in the circum- Wiley stances here. arose in the context of a § 301 suit to compel not in the arbitration, context of an un- practice fair proceeding labor where the Board is ex- pressly limited the provisions of §8(d). That national labor preference of emphasized
decision “[t]he strength tests of for as a substitute for arbitration policy the only agree- forces” and held contending before aof national in the context “construed arbitrate, ment to arbitra- the left merger labor survived policy,” of question ultimate judicial review, the tor, subject was company surviving if which, any, the extent to Id., at contract. provisions bound other 551. legisla- accommodation between
Wiley’s limited judicial and the of freedom contract tive endorsement dis- settlement labor preference peaceful arbitral em- holding putes does not the Board’s warrant he honors practice an unfair labor unless ployer commits contract. pre-existing substantive terms suit; nor it does present § does not involve a case is that Rather, arbitrate. the claim involve the executed Burns must be held bound the contract or not and Wackenhut, agreed whether Burns has it perfectly even clear that it had Burns made though no Wiley intention of assuming suggests contract. no open-ended holding such Its narrower obligation. occurring against background dealt with a merger law general merger state that embodied rule that corporation situations for the surviving liable corporation. Y. obligations disappearing See N. Corp. (1951); Stock Law Fletcher, §90 W. Private Corporations (1961 ed.). rev. Here no § there was assets, dealings and there were no merger sale what- soever between Wackenhut and Burns. On con- *13 they competitors work, were for trary, the same each at for the contract Lockheed. bidding service Burns purchased nothing Wackenhut became liable for none of its Burns obligations. merely financial hired require it to enough Wackenhut’s by 8 (a)(5) § with the union commanded (a). § wholly But this is a consideration insufficient basis implying agreed either or in law that Burns had fact be must held to have to honor Wackenhut’s agreed collective-bargaining contract. agree Appeals
We with Court Board H. K. Porter case. failed to heed the admonitions important is an aim fed- Preventing industrial strife eral labor but has not chosen to legislation, Congress make employers bargaining freedom and unions totally subordinate im- goal. bargaining When passe is reached, may strikes and lockouts This occur. bargaining freedom parties means both that need not any make as a compul- concessions result of Government they sion are free from having contract provi- imposed upon sions them against their will. Here, had notice of the existence of the Wackenhut collective- bargaining contract, but it did not consent to bound by it. The source of its bargain with union is not but voluntarily fact that took over a unit that bargaining was largely intact and that had been certified within past year. in its Nothing actions, indi- however, cated that Burns assuming was the obligations of the contract, and “allowing the Board to compel agreement when parties unable agree themselves are would violate the premise fundamental on which the Act is private under governmental super- based — vision procedure alone, without official com- pulsion over the actual terms of the contract.” H. K. Porter Co. S.,U. at 108.
We also agree Appeals the Court that holding either the union or the new bound to the substantive terms of old collective-bargaining con- tract inequities. potential result serious A em- ployer may be take over a willing to moribund business only if he can changes corporate make com- structure, *14 location, work task
position force, assign- the labor of Saddling such supervision. of and nature ment, employment of and conditions with the terms employer may contract old in the contained and discourage and impossible may changes make these other capital. the hand, of On inhibit transfer the failing or to small union have made concessions a large to make to unwilling it would be pol- congressional firm. The economically or successful to nego- to the icy parties in the Act is enable manifest to appropriate, but any protection for either deems tiate to be set of advantage allow the balance if bound to occur power realities. Strife is economic correspond not that must be honored do concessions the parties. of strength economic relative problems, would new position The Board’s also raise would be the successor circumscribed exactly the col way predecessor same as the under follow lective-bargaining seemingly contract. It would predecessor would be deemed em only in ployees dischargeable accordance successor, subject griev provisions with and ance Burns would provisions and arbitration thereof.9 replace guards not been free Wackenhut’s with have except own permitted. as the contract Given continuity employment pre-existing relationship, specify majority collective-bargaining agreements The vast choosing jobs, procedures for available be used in place limitations approximately all such contracts some 92% Bargaining Negotiations discharge. right on the Collective 1971). theory, (BNA the Board’s §§40.T, 60:11 Under Contracts predecessor’s if hire fired a successor refused to grievance through applicable procedures, going employees without 8(a) (5) bargain. NLRB might guilty refusal to See of a § Huttig Strong, 357, (1969); v. & Door NLRB Sash U. S. 1967). (CA8 Co., 2d 968-969 377 F. provisions contract’s respect to wages, seniority- rights, vacation pension privileges, fund retirement *15 benefits, job security work provisions, assignments and the like would on the devolve Nor would successor. the union commit a (b) (3) § 8 practice unfair labor if it refused to bargain a modification of agreement the effective prior to expiration the date of agreement.10 A successor employer might also be deemed to have (d) Section 8 provides, the Act part: there is in effect a collective-bargaining covering “[W]here contract employees in industry affecting commerce, collectively shall also party mean that no to such contract shall modify terminate or contract, such party desiring unless the such termination or modification—
“(1) serves a upon written notice party the other contract proposed sixty days prior termination or modification expiration thereof, date or in the event such con- contract expiration date, sixty days tains no prior pro- to the time it is posed to make modification; such termination or
“(2) offers to meet and party pur- confer with the other for the pose negotiating containing a new contract or a contract proposed modifications;
“(3) notifies the Federal and Mediation Conciliation Service thirty days within dispute, after such notice of the of a existence simultaneously any agency and therewith notifies or Territorial State disputes established to mediate conciliate within State or Territory occurred, agreement dispute provided where the no has time; been reached
“(4) resorting effect, continues in full force and without to strike lock-out, existing all the and conditions of the terms period sixty days given for a after such notice is or until the contract, expiration date of such whichever occurs later: imposed upon employers, employees, organi- “The duties and labor (2)-(4) paragraphs . shall zations of this subsection . . not requiring party agree construed as either to discuss or in a contract for modification of the terms and conditions contained period, if is to become effective before such a fixed such modification provisions reopened can be under the terms conditions (d). C. contract.” U. S. 158§ predecessor’s
inherited its pre-existing contractual obli gations past to the union under accrued con tracts and that had not been discharged when business was successor well ac transferred. “[A] Burns than appear result quire more liabilities as a on of a will Finally, the face contract.” successor despite good-faith be bound to the contract observe majority the time that during doubts about union’s representation election, the contract a bar to another Inc, Ranch-Way, L. 116 (1970).12 183 N. R. B. No. For expressed the above the Board itself has reasons, of its Burns rule.13 general applicability doubts as to the 11Doppelt, Companies: Options— Successor Limits the NLRB *16 Problems, 176, (1971). and Raises 20 DePaul 191 Some L. Rev. 12 imposes the a The Board this contract-bar rule for term of duration,” period collective of “reasonable a the Board years. Corp., now Cable 139 N. L. R. B. defines as three General time, (1962). employer cannot doubt during 1123 Also this an use refusal-to-bargain charge. majority about a union’s as a defense to a Co., 1384, (1963); Maintenance 142 L. 1387 N. R. B. Oilfield Burns, (1955). Co., Hexton B. 342 Prior Furniture 111 N. L. R. by the the held barred contract Board had that a successor was during requesting representation predecessor from a election Jolly only the it had the contract. term of the contract if assumed Co., (1955); Extru 114 B. General Giant Lumber N. L. R. 413 (1958); Dominator, 162 Co., sion 121 B. 1165 MV N. L. R. by (1967). Moreover, assumption N. L. such had to be R. B. 1514 Pipe Hawaii, express agreement. American Concrete written permitted Inc., (1960). The had also a N. L. R. B. 720 Board 128 good-faith as to union’s non-assuming to raise a doubt the successor refusal-to-bargain charge during the term majority as a defense a Randolph Co., L. Rubber 152 N. R. B. 496 of the old contract. (1963). Corp., 140 N. 496 (1965); Mitchell L. R. B. Standard 13 (1971). Inc., B. No. Maintenance, 188 N. L. R. Emerald provide who undertook to Emerald involved a civilian contractor During the an Air base. services at Force certain maintenance performed had two other year, services been preceding the same had represented a union that companies were whose will employers find many cases, course, In successor with only bargain advantageous recognize it not pre-existing the union but also to observe the in uncertainty Also, than to turmoil. rather face a stock ac- variety involving merger, a circumstances the Board reorganization, assets quisition, purchase, a fact successor might properly find as matter of that the under contract. obligations had the old assumed Co., Maintenance N. L. R. B. Cf. Oilfield duty ensue (1963). does as not, however, Such employer law fact than an matter of mere place the same the same work the same with doing had predecessor, recog- as his as the Board nized until its decision the instant case. cases See supra, at accordingly cited 284. We set aside the practice unfair finding (a)(5) Board’s of a labor § Burns was insofar as rested on conclusion that required to but did not honor the contract executed Wackenhut. yet
negotiated collective-bargaining agreements had not ex- substantially employer pired. performed The the work with employee predecessors. as The Board complement same recognize held had a trial agree with the examiner union but could not emphasizing contract, provisions bound was Act of respect impact Contract Service circum- presenting unusual was considered Stat. 1034. case *17 rule; the Board noted justifying exception to the an stances of enforcing the contracts suggests case the hazards of that “[t]his normally rebidding annual against where one a successor identity. These circumstances changes in contractor produces annual arm’s-length whenever might encourage less collective it would not be awarded expect reason strongly An amicus succeeding service contract.” next annual Burns and is rule inconsistent with the Emerald is contends that history of Service legislative misreading of based on Curiae 23 as Amicus for AFL-CIO Brief Act of 1965. Contract 2.n.
IV It therefore follows that the Board’s order requiring Burns to “give retroactive effect to all the of clauses said and, with [Wackenhut] of per- interest cent, make employees whole its for any losses suffered reason of Respondent’s adopt refusal to honor, [Burns’] and enforce contract” said must be set aside.14 We
14In entirety, its required the Board’s order Burns to: “1. Cease and desist from:
“(a) Refusing collectively, upon request, with the Union as the bargaining representative exclusive employees of its in the above-described unit. “(b) Refusing adopt, honor and its enforce contract with the
Union, as successor of Wackenhut. “(c) Assisting recognizing or AFG as representative its employees purposes for the bargaining, collective unless until said organization labor shall have been certified as the exclusive bargaining representative employees said appropriate in an unit. “(d) Interfering representation employees through of its organizations labor choosing. their own “(e) any In like or interfering related manner with, restraining, coercing or its join in the rights exercise of their assist the Union engage protected or otherwise activities Act.
“2. Take following necessary affirmative action which is policies effectuate the of the Act: “(a) recognition Withdraw withhold from AFG until or unless bargaining representative certified as Respondent’s employees in appropriate unit.
“(b) Bargain collectively, upon request, and, with the if Union any reached, embody understanding is understanding such in a signed agreement.
“(c) adopt Honor, between.Respondent, and enforce the contract Wackenhut, as give successor to and the Union retroactive all and, effect to the clauses of said contract per- with interest of 6 cent, make whole losses suffered reason Respondent’s honor, adopt refusal to and enforce said contract.
“(d)
Ontario,
Lockheed,
California, operations
Post at its
copies
‘Appendix.’
notice
Copies
notice,
attached hereto
of said
*18
instituting this
charge
director’s
regional
that
note
July
Respond-
1, 1967,
that
or about
case asserted
“[o]n
rates,
wage
changed existing
unilaterally
ent
[Burns]
differentials
wage rates,
employment,
overtime
hours
and
terms
and other
shift,
and
swing
graveyard
for
shift
appro-
in the
employment
conditions
opin-
Board’s
that the
,” App.
. . .
priate
unit
aon
imposed
obligation
ion
stated
“[t]he
injunction
negative
includes
successor-employer
bene-
other
unilaterally changing wages
refrain
agreement
by
prior
fits established
re-
In
expired.
agreement
though
even
the same
are
successor-employer’s obligations
spect,
during
employers generally
imposed upon
as those
App.
collective-bargaining agreements.”
between
period
with
consistent
by the Board is
8-9. This statement
hold that whether
cases that
prior
subsequent
its
predecessor’s
or not
is bound
a successor
conditions
terms and
contract,
it must not institute
prede-
in its
provided
those
employment different from
first
contract, at least without
cessor’s
Transportation
Overnite
employees’ representative.
sub nom.
Co.,
enforced
(1966),
157 N. L. R. B. 1185
Transportation
Overnite
Co.
be sustained that Burns employment, changed existing terms and conditions thereby practice an unfair labor which re- committing monetary circumstances. quired restitution these
Affirmed. with whom The Chief Rehnquist, Justice Mr. Justice, Brennan, Justice Justice Mr. Mr. join, in No. 71-123 and Powell concurring dissenting in No. 71-198.
Although studiously the Court term using avoids “successorship” concluding that Burns did have a statutory obligation bargain with it affirms union, Appeals the conclusions the Court of Board and to that effect entirely which based on the suc- were cessorship I doctrine. believe that the Board Because and the Court of Appeals concept beyond stretched that the limits of its I proper application, would enforce im- neither the order order Board’s nor its upon posing Burns the of the contract between terms the union I and Wackenhut. therefore concur No. *21 71-123 and dissent in No. 71-198. Labor an imposes upon
The National Relations Act employer the obligation collectively “to . bargain . . representatives with the employees . . . .” 29 his (a)(5). representa- § U. S. C. 158 It also defines those (a), “[r]epresentatives § 159 as or tives, designated selected for purposes of collective majority employees of the in a unit appropriate for purposes such . . . .” The union must establish its status majority representative as either one of the meth- Co., NLRB Packing ods discussed in v. Gissel 395 U. S. (1969), representa- or because its certification as a employees tive of the of another binds Burns as a “successor.”
The Court concludes that because the trial examiner and the an facility Board found the Lockheed be appropriate bargaining unit for Burns’ employees, pre- majority because Burns hired a of Wackenhut’s employees vious had Burns facility, who worked at that should have bargained though with even union, union never made showing majority to Burns representation. difficulty There is more one with than analysis.
First, mathematically it is no means demonstrable that majority the union was the choice of began performance which Burns of its contract had True, with Lockheed. 27 of the 42 represented been by the em- they union when were ployees of Wackenhut, but there is in the nothing record before us all to indicate that 27 of these chose the union their even at the bargaining agent as time of negotiations with Wackenhut. There is obvi- no evidence em- ously whatever that the remaining 15 ployees Burns, employed by been who had never way Wackenhut, expressed ever their one views repre- the other about union as a bargaining sentative. It if asked, would have that, all designated they union. But were never asked. Instead, the trial examiner concluded that because was a “successor” it was obli- Wackenhut, gated that fact bargain alone to with the union. problem reasoning The second with the is Court’s approval it relies on the Board’s the Lockheed plant as an appropriate unit to support its conclusion that Burns must it with the While is union. notes, Court trial true, examiner and facility the Board found the Lockheed to be appro- priate bargaining unit for Burns’ employees, equally finding true trial examiner’s to this effect was *22 clearly dependent stipulation upon previous between Wackenhut the union.1 asserted One reasons Burns the union was declining recognize for ap- facility belief that was not single Lockheed propriate This than bargaining unit. was more had Wackenhut, colorable claim. Unlike Burns never bargained with a union of its in consisting job dif- single location. One of the reasons ference practice transferring was Burns made a employees from job temporary one aon another, or permanent basis. Both Burns and Wackenhut security numerous guard jobsites in Cali- Southern fornia; for purposes, administrative Wackenhut treated each jobsite a separate unit, Burns while treated large numbers of them together.
The says Court effect at Lockheed were found appro- the Board to be an priate unit; that Burns has not expressly preserved that point for review here; that Burns is therefore obli- gated to bargain previously with the certified union. But major premise to this leading conclusion, determination of appropriate unit, itself estab- was lished the Board and sustained the Court of Appeals solely under of successorship. doctrine Burns is required expressly neither challenge the designation of the bargaining nor unit, prevail such a challenge order to the error in demonstrate the bargaining order. Burns has expressly challenged the determination underlay both determina- 1“While a might broader unit have appropriate, been I find a unit guards single facility limited to a appropriate as an Here, unit. pursuant certification was to a consent agreement.” election Trial decision, Examiner’s App. 22.
“Trial Examiner: I am not concerned with whether or not there was a hearing. Regional approved Director of the consent elec- tion and stipulation, and the having election place, taken I would find that the Regional Director’s properly action was conducted' in due course . . . .” Proceedings before App. 68.
299 unit order— tion as to bargaining bargaining suceessorship. finding in at a situation where there was no evidence Thus, time of the preference as to the of a majority facility employees at the Lockheed a bargaining as to agent, and there no independent finding was facility at that unit as appropriate were an to Burns, imposed duty the Board to nonetheless This on bargain. only result is if sustainable, all, at theory that Burns to Wackenhut.2 was “successor” imposition in this suceessorship case unusual because the purchasing successor instead of business or assets from in with direct merging Wackenhut was competition with Wackenhut for the con- Lockheed I analysis tract. believe that admittedly a careful of the imprecise concept suceessorship im- indicates that portant rights employee of both the the employer independently to order their own are affairs sacrificed needlessly by the application of that doctrine to case.
It has
aptly
been
observed that
doctrine
“suc-
employer
cessor”
the field of labor law is “shrouded
impressionist
in somewhat
approaches.”3
In John
Sons,
Wiley &
Livingston,
Inc. v.
376
(1964),
U.
543
S.
employed a form of the
we
“successor” doctrine
im-
pose upon
an obligation to arbitrate dis-
putes under an arbitration
clause
an agreement entered
predecessor
into
between
and the bargaining
representative of the
employees.
latter’s
The doctrine
applied by
has been
the Board and
the courts of
2
ante,
emphasis,
275-276,
The Court’s
at
on the Board’s determina
practices
tion
Burns committed unfair
aiding the
cannot
AFG
any support
merely
be taken
for the
It
sup
order.
ports
directing
stop
cease-and-desist order
prac
such
tices,
challenged
which
not been
has
here
Burns.
3
Assn,
NLRB,
International
Machinists v.
134 U. App.
S.
D. C.
243,
239,
1135,
(1969) (Leventhal, J.,
2d
concurring).
F.
employer a
upon the successor
appeals
impose
of his
representatives
Ventshade,
Inc.,
NLRB v. Auto
2d
276 F.
predecessor,
Welding, Inc. v.
Makela
(CA5
303,
1960);
support
finding
(CA6 1967),
2d
F.
conduct
practices
engaged
unfair labor
from a course of
NLRB successor,
and the
predecessor
both the
*24
Quarries, Inc.,
Blair
and to
(CA4 1945),
This clear that opinion Court’s makes it successorship one of the bases is the finding for a need from a grant protection some employer’s sudden transformation of their business results in entity, the substitution of a new not legal bound con- collective-bargaining contract under tract law, significant but leaves intact employer, employer’s elements of the business. said The Court there: objectives
“The of national labor reflected in policy, established principles require of federal law, rightful prerogative of owners independently *25 rearrange their businesses and even eliminate them- employers protection selves as balanced some be employees the from a in the em- change sudden ployment relationship. The from one transition corporate organization another will in most cases be eased and employees’ industrial strife avoided if claims continue to be rather resolved arbitration than 'the strength relative ... contend- the ing forces’. . . 376 U. atS., .” 549.
But other in language Wiley makes it clear that favoring continuity considerations existing bar- gaining relationships are not their limits: without
“We do in every hold that which not case in ownership corporate or enterprise structure of an changed duty is to arbitrate survives. As indi- above, cated there in cases the lack which continuity substantial identity in the busi- enterprise ness before and after a change would from imposed something duty to arbitrate make a particu- in the reasonably be found not without, parties and the acts of the agreement lar bargaining S., at 551. involved.” 376 U. of the portions in these implications conflicting indeed are
opinion Wiley suggest in change protection against entitled to a measure continues new entity where the employing used assets intangible tangible use of to make They employer. first of the carrying on the business carried successorship doctrine, make clear that also well- equally to other limits, runs counter to its ultimate is peace law. Industrial principles established of labor Management Relations important of the Labor goal sacri- refused to again But has time and Congress Act. representatives free fice collective between system of com- of the and the NLRB v. said in pulsory arbitration.4 As the Court Agents, (1960): Insurance U. S. of cases before the Board and
“The mainstream provisions under the reviewing orders, the courts concerned fixing bargain collectively, instances, Congress Supreme “Except in isolated . . . allow, govern compel, refused or even to that form of Court have compulsion decisions which has come to be mental of economic Jones, Compulsion Con 'compulsory arbitration.’” and the called Arbitration, (1965). Va. L. sensual in Labor Rev. of labor dealing problem with the of the direct settlement dis- “In variety proposals great putes committee has considered arbitration, establishment fact-find- ranging compulsory *26 tribunal, mediation ing boards, creation of an over-all waiting periods. . . do not feel specified . imposition of [W]e any plans permanent recommending that such become warranted Sess., (1947). 105, Cong., 80th 1st 13 legislation.” Rep. No. S. during the Taft- Taft, debate on speech Senator also See Employees v. 3835-3836, Bus Cong. cited in Hartley Act, Rec. 93 (1951). Board, n. 21 U. S. 395 Wisconsin bargain- insuring parties approach that the But [good table with this attitude ing faith]. apart conduct, essential standard of Con- parties have wide gress intended that should by any in their unrestricted negotiations, latitude to solu- governmental power regulate the substantive tion of their differences.” recently And this has held that the Board itself Court may compel parties not one of the in the collective- process pro- bargaining agree particular K. Porter posal of the other. H. Co. (1970). Conceivably imposition
U. of a S. system compulsory granting or the arbitration, authority parties to the Board to insist that the at some point particular contract, terms of agree potential on would risk But Congress lessen the of industrial strife. has plainly unwilling purchase peace been industrial the price at curtailment free collective substantial freely representatives chosen employer. with their
There is also a natural tension between the constraints imposed employers by on Rela- Management Labor tions right employers competi- and the of those Act, tion with one another rearrange their “independently businesses and even eliminate employers.” themselves as Wiley, S., at An employer’s U. 549. to com- ability pete his market is affected, course, the .terms of whatever he agreement negotiates representative with the of his employees. Aside from price the direct on brought influence about terms a collective-bargaining agreement, the collective-bar- process gaining presents itself certain cost factor that competition employers affect between in the market.5 The national commitment to collective bar- Accounting recognized Office The General has that bidders NASA, cost-plus-fee for a subcontract who dealt with different *27 304 Rela- Labor Management in the embodied
gaining many of these permits or requires either tions Act of the expectations But quite reasonable constraints. unit collective-bargaining in particular a the in voluntary change by a" disappointed may be incapable quite that is employer the of condition application any rational of remedied being by cease free to is employer An successorship doctrine. wholly to do so he chooses though even business, doing v. Textile Workers anti-union animus. because of An em- Co., (1965). Darlington Mfg. S.U. adamantly expiration may at the ployer refuse, agreement, covered period the agree- term of particular consent again NLRB as employees regarded significant. ment that Co., 343 U. S. American National Insurance employer con- permissible examples These (1952). Act Relations Management for which the Labor duct the conduct notwithstanding that remedy, no provides expectations disappointment legitimate in the results successorship principle, employees, suggest beyond limits which every principle law, other has like it not be expanded. in supra, speaks change in terms of a “own-
Wiley, ership corporate enterprise” bringing or of an as structure per- play obligation into of the successor voluntarily prede- obligation form an undertaken employer. principle But while the enunciated cessor corporate limited to Wiley merger no means present cannot there, logically situation extended naked of a from one shifting group mere another without disregarding totally of a change for the doctrine. The notion basis unions, varying on the could be evaluated NASA basis of costs might generate. Rep. itself Lab. Rel. that collective (1971). enterprise” “ownership corporate structure of an con- very continuity notes at the least there is continuity enterprise, change; well as and that *28 part employer’s equa- be at least in the of the side on If tion, only rather on we employees. than that of the employees deal with legitimate expectations the of employer the to agreed who the collective-bargaining perform contract it, require employing can another we entity perform the contract when he has suc- only by ceeded to or assets tangible intangible some the use of which expected the the might have first performed have his contract them. in successorship Phrased another the doctrine of way, the federal common law of labor relations accords to general protection the same transfer against by entity of they assets claim against which have a as is accorded other legal doctrines to nonlabor- related claimants against entity. the same Nonlabor- related claimants in such transfer situations protected only by not assumption agreements resulting from the self-interest of contracting parties partici- the in a pating merger or sale of but assets also state laws imposing upon the corporation successor merger of the of obligations corporation g., the merged (see, § e. Corp. of the N. Y. Stock Law (1951), Wiley, cited in supra), and bulk in sales acts found numerous States.6 These latter are designed give the nonlabor-related predecessor creditor of the entity either as claim, some a of right against matter or successor, a matter property right charge the assets that pass predecessor impli- successor. The Wiley cation is that federal common law of labor general type relations accords the same degree protection to employees claiming under a collective- bargaining contract. Code 6-101 Uniform Commercial to 6-111. §§ have found succes- appeals
Cases from courts where the consistently principles, with these sorship, all of the a assets part purchases new Corp., Interstate 65 NLRB v. predecessor employer, business where entire (CA6 1971); F. 2d 269 McFarland, NLRB v. employer, is new purchased merely is (CA10 1962); and where there 2d 219 306 F. partnership ownership interest change Colten, NLRB v. entity, operates employing appeals 1939). courts (CA6 Other 105 F. 2d refused equally consistently with have, principles, these no con have been successorship to find where there and all two employers, tractual between the dealings Tri State employees. place has taken shift Corp. Maintenance App. D. C. U. S. Assn, Machinists *29 International (1968); F. 2d 171 408 of F. NLRB, 239, 414 2d 1135 App. v. S. C. U. D. (1969).7 of a relations imposition prior-existing labor rigid employer only on a
environment
new
whose
connection
hiring
old
is the
of some of
latter’s
the
the
performance
of
work
employees and the
of
the
some
by
previously performed
latter, might
which was
the
produce
well
of a sort. But
peace
tend to
industrial
at a
peace
produced
industrial
such a
would be
case
by
appro-
Board of
sacrifice of the determination
the
priateness of
and of
wishes of
bargaining agents
majority of
which
was
Act
de-
signed
preserve.
principles
These latter
caution us
against
under
the banner of
extending successorship,
successorship
hand,
finding
upheld,
been
on the other
A
has
dealings
no
appeals
court of
where there were
contractual
one
employer merely
employers,
two
between the
and the successor
replaced
predecessor
a transit
as a successful bidder for
fran
(CA7
Transit,
Tom-A-Hawk
Inc.
industrial where the only connection between the two is a naked employing entities employees. in Hudson transfer Justice Holmes Water McCarter, Co. v. (1908), U. S. summarized problem way: general rights
“All tend to declare themselves absolute to logical are their extreme. Yet all fact limited neighborhood principles of policy which are other than on particular right those which the founded, and enough which become strong hold their own when point certain is reached.” acquired not single asset, or in- tangible tangible, negotiation transfer Wackenhut. It succeeded to the and rights contractual duties plant protection service contract with not Lockheed, consent, reason Wackenhut’s over assignment or but I vigorous opposition. only Wackenhut’s think the permissible conclusion is that not a Burns is successor to Wackenhut. Following case, its decision in this Police, concluded in Lincoln Private Board. N. L. R. B. No. 103 that an (1971), guards successor, was not a saying:
“Respondent, has an en- moreover, operated as tirely new independent enterprise. business It obtained its capital, purchased own operating new uniforms, vehicles, equipment, occupied *30 premises different than Industrial. Additionally, there is no any carry- indication that has been there over of supervisory personnel from Industrial Respondent.” 189 N. L. R. B., at-. Tri State
See also Maintenance v. Corp. supra. To conclude that Burns was a successor to Wackenhut situation, consequences its attendant under order imposing Board’s with the employees, of Wackenhut’s representative labor-manage into rigidity unwarranted import would employers competing fortunes The relations. ment cur who has employer flow, and an inevitably ebb and of another expense orders at production rently gained other. away from that employees to hire may well wish interests of the the best to think that There is no reason ultimately free of the employers, and employees, inher Yet by such are not served movement. market successorship that doctrine of expanded ent is the notion that somehow in this case urges Board environment” comes with new the “labor relations obtained if the new has but orders to the old em previously belonged or business that in the instant ployer. fact situs, their work at the same perform case continued analysis, while not irrelevant cannot be deemed that would follow from rigidity For the controlling. successorship to application the Board’s this case only competition would not affect between Wacken- Burns, oper hut and but would also affect Lockheed’s In effect, saddled, ations. it would be as against competitors, with the disadvantageous consequences of contract unduly favorable to employees, Wackenhut’s even though Lockheed’s con tract with Wackenhut1 was expire set at given By time. token, same it would be benefited, at the expense of its competitors, as a result of a “sweet heart” negotiated between Wackenhut and its employees. From viewpoint recipient services, dissatisfaction with the labor relations environ ment stimulate a desire for change of contractors. g., Tri E. State Maintenance Corp. NLRB, supra; 76 Lab. Rep. Rel. 230 (1971). Where the relation be tween the first and the second is as attenuated *31 expectations as is and the reasonable here, application of the employees equally attenuated, by the Labor successorship doctrine is not authorized Management Relations Act. unilaterally say not to that Burns would be free
This County previously to mesh into its Los recognized Angeles in- unit such as were bargaining group already volved here who have a collective- designated previous employ- bargaining representative their subject ment. regard Burns’ actions this would Management Act, commands of the Labor Relations regulation proper applica- to the of the Board under tion of governing principles. resulting The situation from the addition of a element component new work force of an has been dealt with Board in cases, weighed numerous and various factors are in order to determine whether the new workforce com- ponent should be separate unit, itself a bargaining whether component in this “ac- shall be creted” already unit See, existence. g., Council, NLRB Food Employers Inc., e. 2d 399 F. (CA9 Co., 1968); Galvanizing Northwest 168 N. L. R. B. 26 (1967). Had the Board made the appropriate inquiry factual required determinations the Act, such inquiry might justified have the conclusion that Burns was obligated to recognize and bargain with the union a representative of its employees at Lock- heed facility.
But the Board, analysis instead of applying type to the complaints union’s concluded here, that because Burns was a “successor” it absolutely was bound to the mold that had been fashioned Wackenhut and its employees at Lockheed. thereby precluded was from challenging the designation of Lockheed ap- as an propriate bargaining unit year for a after original certification. Stat. 29 U. S. C. (c)(3). § 159 *32 down the
I follow the Board this far unwilling am I to do so would sub- believe successorship road, since stantially principle bargain- of free choice undercut designation representatives ing Board are unit appropriate bargaining by the Act. guaranteed