The Reliance Fuel Oil Corporation, respondent herein, was found by the National Labor Relations Board to have committed certain unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. Jurisdiction before the Board was predicated upon the fact that Reliance, a New York distributor of fuel oil whose operations were local, 1 purchased within the State a “substantial amount” of fuel *225 oil and related products from the Gulf Oil Corporation, a supplier concededly engaged in interstate commerce. Most of the products sold to Reliance by Gulf were delivered to Gulf from without the State of New York and prior to sale and delivery to Reliance were stored, without segregation as to customer, in Gulf’s tanks located within the State. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1959, Reliance had gross sales in excess of $500,000 2 and, during the calendar year 1959, it purchased in excess of $650,000 worth of fuel oil and related products from Gulf.
The Board adopted its trial examiner’s findings that the operations of Reliance “affected” commerce within the meaning of the Act and that the unfair labor practices found tended “to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce ...” 129 N. L. R. B. 1166, 1171, 1182. The Court of Appeals reversed,
Under § 10 (a) of the Act, the Board is empowered “to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8) affecting commerce.” Section 2 (6) defines “commerce” to mean “trade, traffic, *226 commerce, transportation, or communication among the . . . States . . and § 2 (7) declares:
“The term 'affecting commerce’ means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.”
This Court has consistently declared that in passing the National Labor Relations Act, Congress intended to and did vest in the Board the fullest
jurisdictional
breadth constitutionally permissible under the Commerce Clause. See,
e. g., Guss
v.
Utah Labor Board,
That activities such as those of Reliance affect commerce and are within the constitutional reach of Congress is beyond doubt. See,
e. g., Wickard
v.
Filburn,
Notes
In 1969 Reliance purchased a few hundred dollars worth of truck parts in New Jersey, but the Board did not rely on such transactions to sustain its assertion of jurisdiction.
Since the Board apparently treated Reliance as a “retail” concern, this amount of gross sales met its self-imposed standard for exercise of jurisdiction. 129 N. L. R. B. 1166, 1170-1171.
