delivered the opinion of the Court.
Wе brought this case here because on an important phase in the administration of the National Labor Relations Act it was in conflict with
Universal Camera Corp.
v.
Labor Board,
The case is before us for the second time. It arises from the petition of the Pittsburgh Steamship Company to review an order of the Board, entered August 13, 1946, directing it to reinstate a dismissed employee and to terminate what were found to be coercive and discriminatory labor practices. 69 N. L. R. B. 1395. The Court of Appeals originally denied enforcement on its finding that the order was vitiated by an underlying bias on the part of the trial examiner.
The Government concedes, we think rightly, that the scope of the court’s reviewing power was governed by the legislation in force аt the time that power was exercised even though the Board’s order antedated such legislation. See
United States
v.
Hooe,
The acts claimed to constitute unfair labor practices took place during the campaign of the National Maritime Union to organize the unlicensed employees of the respоndent’s 73 vessels, plying on the Great Lakes, during the winter and spring of 1944. The Board adopted the findings and conclusions of its trial examiner and held that the respondent hаd engaged for several months preceding the election in a deliberate course of antiunion conduct, thereby interfering with the rights of employees guaranteed by § 7 of the Wagner Act.
This conclusion was based in part on the discharge of a seaman who was one of the union organizers. The Board disbеlieved some of the testimony justifying dis *501 missal on the ground of incompetence and other evidence it deemed so insubstantial that it drew the “plain inference” that the discharge was “for reasons aside from the manner in which he performed his work.” 69 N. L. R. B. at 1420. The Board also relied on the testimony of union organizers, partly corroborated, that officers of some of the respondent’s ships had expressed hostility to the union, in conversation with members of crews or in their рresence. Evidence of respondent’s intent to coerce employees was also found in two letters of the president of the steamship сompany circulated among the crews. Each assured that union membership would not affect an employee’s position in the company. But an officer of the union testified that some of the policies attributed to the union in the letters were inaccurate and the Board found that these letters, although “not unlawful per se . . . constitute an integral and inseparable part of the respondent’s otherwise illegal course of conduct and when so viewed they аssume a coercive character which is not privileged by the right of free speech.” 69 N. L. R. B. at 1396. *
Since the court below had originally found that the Board’s order was vitiated by the examiner’s bias, we must take care that the court has not been influenced by that feeling, however unconsciously, on reconsidering thе record now legally freed from such imputation. Consideration of the opinion below in light of a careful reading of the entire record convincеs us that the momentum of its prior decision did not enter into the decision now under review. The opinion was written by a different *502 judge, and the court was differently constitutеd. The new member was a judge well versed in matters of industrial relations and not likely to be unsympathetic with such findings as were here made by the Board. The court painstakingly reviewed the record and unanimously concluded that the inferences on which the Board’s findings were based were so overborne by evidence calling for contrary inferences that the findings of the Board could not, on the consideration of the whole record, be deemed to be supportеd by “substantial” evidence.
Were we called upon to pass on the Board’s conclusions in the first instance or to make an independent review of thе review by the Court of Appeals, we might well support the Board’s conclusion and reject that of the court below. But Congress has charged the Courts of Aрpeals and not this Court with the normal and primary responsibility for granting or denying enforcement of Labor Board orders. “The jurisdiction of the court [of apрeals] shall be exclusive and its judgment and decree shall be final, except that the same shall be subject to review ... by the Supreme Court of the United Statеs upon writ of certiorari . . . .” Taft-Hartley Act, § 10 (e), 61 Stat. 148, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 160 (e). Cer-tiorari is granted only “in cases involving principles the settlement of which is of importancе to the public as distinguished from that of the parties, and in cases where there is a real and embarrassing conflict of opinion and authority between the circuit courts of appeal.”
Layne & Bowler Corp.
v.
Western Well Works,
This is not the place to review a confliсt of evidence nor to reverse a Court of Appeals because were we in its place we would find the record tilting one way rather than the other, though fair-minded judges could find it tilting either way. It is not for us to invite review by this Court of decisions turning solely on evaluation of testimony where on a conscientious consideration of the entire record a Court of Appeals under the new dispensation finds the Board’s order unsubstantiated. In such situations we should “adhere to thе usual rule of noninterference where conclusions of Circuit Courts of Appeals depend on appreciation of circumstances which аdmit of different, interpretations.”
Federal Trade Comm’n
v.
American Tobacco Co.,
Affirmed.
Notes
Since we do not disturb the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that these letters are not substantial evidence of an unfair labor practice under the Wagner Act, we express no opinion on the possible effect of § 8 (c) of the Taft-Hartley Act. 61 Stat. 142, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 158 (c). This section provides that expression of views, argument or opinion shall not be evidence of an unfair practice.