NATIONAL GYPSUM COMPANY v. WAMMOCK et al.
43860
Supreme Court of Georgia
MARCH 12, 1987
256 Ga. 803 | 353 SE2d 809
The record indicates the trial court was monitoring Mr. Lawson‘s testimony and instructed him on several occasions to be more responsive. We find no manifest abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying the motion for mistrial.
Judgmеnt affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Marshall, C. J., and Hunt, J., who concur in the judgment only.
DECIDED MARCH 12, 1987.
Greene, Buckley, DeRieux & Jones, Burt DeRieux, Eileen M. Crowley, Emory F. Robinson, for appellant.
Lanham & McGehee, William C. Lanham, Clark H. McGehee, for appelleеs.
PER CURIAM.
This case has been docketed in this court as certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The facts and the certified questions, as stated by the certificate from the Eleventh Cirсuit, are as follows:
“This civil action was commenced by Julian P. Wammock in 1981, approximately three years after his retirement from work as a carpenter. The complaint was filed against sixteen manufacturеrs and distributors of asbestos-containing products, for damages arising from Mr. Wammock‘s exposure to asbestos. Mr. Wammock asserted two legal theories of liability — strict liability and negligent failure to warn. In addition to comрensatory damages, Mr. Wammock sought to recover against all defendants an award of punitive damages on the grounds that the defendants for a long time were aware of the danger of asbestos exposure but intentionally failed to disseminate such information. All other defendants settled or were dismissed and the case proceeded to trial against National Gypsum Company (‘National Gypsum‘) alone in May 1985.
“The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff of $40,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages, and National Gypsum appealed from the final judgment entered on that verdict. On appeal, we ordered the certification of certain questions to the Su
“Mr. Wammock, a life-long carpenter, throughout his career had been exposed in various degrees to asbestos-containing products of numerous manufacturers. His primary but not sole exposure to a National Gypsum product was to joint compound while installing wallboard. National Gypsum‘s joint compound — sometimes called joint treatment or joint cement, a product used to cover the seams between sheets of wallboard — in the past contained asbestos as one of its constituent ingredients.
“Mr. Wammock‘s employment as a carpenter began in the shipyards between 1942 and 1946. Thereafter, he worked in the construction trades until his retirement in 1978. In 1981, three years after his retirement, Mr. Wammock was diagnosed as having asbestosis due to his continued exposure to asbestos. At the time of trial, Mr. Wammock was seventy-one years of age.
....
“For present purposes, we need not recount the evidence adduced at trial in detail... In short, the appellee contends that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient such that National Gypsum ‘knew or should have known’ of the hazards оf asbestos before 1972... In contrast, the appellant contends that even if National Gypsum was negligent in failing to extrapolate from the known hazards of high level exposure to the unknown dangers of low level exposure, the fact that it should have known of those dangers is insufficient to support an award of punitive damages under Georgia law.”
Certified Questions
“(1) Can a plaintiff recover punitive damages under Georgia law in asbestos tort litigation where the defendants may be liable for multiple awards of compensatory and punitive damages for the same conduct?
“(2) Was the evidence concerning the conduct of defendant sufficient tо justify an award of punitive damages under Georgia law?
“The Georgia Supreme Court will not in any way be bound by this articulation of the questions in consideration of the issues in
1. We respectfully decline to answer the first certified question. Our review of this case shows that the Eleventh Circuit‘s references to “punitive damages” are intended to mean exemplary damages awarded pursuant to
We find that, “[b]ecause of the anticipatory nature of the suit there are no facts presenting a controversy to which this court can apply the provisions of [
2. The second certified question asks us to determine the sufficiency of the evidence in this case to support the award of punitive damages. We respectfully declinе to answer this question, because the jury instructions did not accurately reflect
Punitive damages are generally regarded as having three purposes: To punish the person doing the wrongful act, to discourage him frоm similar conduct in the future, and to discourage others from such conduct. Restatement of Torts (2d), § 908 (1). However, in contrast to the general view, the first ground of
3. In the instant case, the federal district court instructed the jury as follows: “In addition to actual damages such as I have tried to explain to you, the law permits the jury, under certain circumstances, to award an injured [party] punitive or exemplary damages, in order to punish the wrongdoer for some extraordinary misconduct, and to serve as an example or warning to others not to engage in such conduct.” (Emphasis supplied.) Neither of the purposes stated in this charge are included in
4. We find that, inasmuch as the punitive damages in question were not awarded under
Certified Questions declined. All the Justices concur, except Hunt, J., who concurs specially as to the second question, and Smith, J., who dissents. Gregory J., disqualified.
HUNT, Justice, concurring specially.
I write separately to exprеss my disagreement with the reasons stated in Divisions 2, 3 and 4, for declining to answer the second certified question. The majority declines to answer on the grounds that the trial court‘s erroneous charge (to which neither party оbjected) resulted in an award of punitive damages based on something other than Georgia law. Neither that conclusion nor the use of it as a reason not to answer the question seems logical to me.
There are, however, two reasons upon which to decline and which bear directly on the certified question itself. First, the question basically asks us to decide whether the facts of this case create a jury issue as to punitive damages — that is, a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence. I do not believe this type of question is contemplated under our Rule 37, dealing with certified questions. Secondly, the federal standard оf appellate review as to the sufficiency of the evidence differs somewhat from that adopted by our state courts,1 and the Eleventh Circuit follows the majority view that the federal test would apply under the facts of this diversity case. Brown-Marx Assoc., Ltd. v. Emigrant Savings Bank, 703 F2d 1361, 1367, fn. 5 (11th Cir. 1983).
Consequently, I would respectfully decline to answer the second question.
SMITH, Justice, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent as to Division 2 and the judgment. Certainly, the plaintiff in this case is entitled to present the question of compensatory damages before a jury. The purpose of exemplary damages in Georgia, however, as the majority notes, is to deter the defendant from future wrongdoing. Under the facts of this case, the defеndant should not be hit with exemplary damages no matter what the jury charge said. The second certified question should be answered in the negative.
The defendant stopped production of asbestos, as have the other manufacturers of asbestos. For the majority of the time that the defendant manufactured asbestos, no one was aware of the dangers inherent in exposure to asbestos. The imposition of punitive damages in this case could only serve to deter the defendant from future wrongdoing by destroying the defendant financially.
While a stinging blow might serve well to beat caution into a reckless party, this case could set off a сhain of events that would amount to the stoning to death of the defendant. We do not impose the death penalty upon individuals in tort cases in Georgia. Except in instances of the most heinous intentional act, we should not sanction the death penalty in like cases against corporate defendants.
DECIDED MARCH 19, 1987.