National Distilling Co. v. Cream City Importing Co.

86 Wis. 352 | Wis. | 1893

PiNNey, J.

1. Taking the allegations of the first defense in their most liberal sense, it is apparent that they are irrelevant and have no legal relation to the controversy between the parties to the action, which is whether the plaintiff shall recover the demand set forth in its complaint. It is obvious that they state no defense to the action; and it does not appear that any of the matters so set up can be material in any aspect of the case as now presented, but they are of such a character that they may embarrass and prejudice the plaintiff in preparing for trial and in maintaining its action upon the merits. An entire defense may be stricken out as irrelevant (R. S. sec. 2684); and where a defense is irrelevant and of the tendency above indicated, it ought to be stricken out on motion. Horton v. Arnold, 17 Wis. 139; Joint School Dist. v. Kemen, 65 Wis. 282. But in this instance the motion was denied, with $10 costs of motion against the plaintiff.

The first defense does not deny any allegation of the complaint, but the substance of it is that the sale and delivery of the goods in question to the defendant was void as against public policy, because the vendor was at the time a member of an unlawful trust or combination formed to unlawfully interfere with the freedom of trade and commerce, and in restraint thereof, and to accomplish the ends therein set forth. It is not claimed in the answer that the trust or combination had acquired the control and monopoly of all such goods, or that the defendant might not have purchased the goods in question of other dealers in Milwaukee or elsewhere. Conceding, for the purposes of this case, that the trust or combination in question may be illegal, and its members may be restrained from carrying out the purposes for which it was created by a court of equity7 in a suit on behalf of the public, or may be subject to indictment and punishment, there is, nevertheless, no allegation showfing or tending to show that the contract of sale between the plaintiff, and defendant "was tainted with any illegality or was contrary to public policy. The argument, if any the case admits of, is that, as the plaintiff was a member of the so-called “trust” or “combination,” the defendant might voluntarily purchase the goods in question of it at an agreed price, and convert them to its own use, and be justified in a court of justice in its refusal to pay the plaintiff for them, because of the connection of the vendor with such trust or combination. The plaintiff’s cause of action is. in no legal sense dependent upon or affected by the alleged illegality of the trust or combination, because the illegality, if any, is entirely collateral to the transaction in question, and the court is not called upon in this action to enforce any contract tainted with illegality or contrary to public policy. The mere fact that the plaintiff is á member of a trust or combination created with the intent and purposes set forth in the answer will not disable or prevent it in law from selling goods within or affected by the provisions of such trust or combination, and recovering their price or value. It does not appear that it had stipulated to refrain from such transactions. A contrary doctrine would lead to most startling and dangerous consequences. The defendant is not a party to any illegal contract, and the case is, therefore, not within the rule of Wheeler v. Russell, 17 Mass. 281, and many similar cases, to the effect that “no action will lie upon a contract made in violation of a statute or a principle of the common law; ” for the right of the plaintiff to make the sale in question, or of the defendant to buy, was in no way connected with or dependent upon the alleged trust or combination, although the plaintiff was a member of it. These views are sustained and illustrated by the cases of Brooks v. Martin, 2 Wall. 70, and Sharp v. Taylor, 2 Phil. Ch. 801; and many other cases might be cited to the same effect. The provision for a rebate of a part of the purchase price to purchasers who would conduct their business in the manner stated in the answer was an inducement to them to. continue their business relations with the plaintiff. It does not appear that there was any contract obliging the defendant to that course. A party' may legally purchase the trade and business of another for the purpose of preventing competition, and-the restraint of trade caused thereby is not, we think, unreasonable. Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. (8th ed.) pt. 2, p. 756 (*417), and notes. And it would seem that an agreement between a number of dealers and manufacturers to raise prices, unless they practically control the entire commodity,— and this is not claimed of the trust in question,— cannot operate as a restraint upon trade, nor would it injuriously affect the public.

Both the plaintiff and defendant are Wisconsin corporations, and the goods in question were sold in this state. The sale, therefore, wTas not a transaction of interstate commerce, and was not within the act of Congress of July 2, 1890. 26 Stats. at Large, 209.

The allegation that the trust or combination is the real party in interest in this action, and that it can only be maintained by it, and should be dismissed unless brought in its name or the names of all the members thereof, is fatally defective as a plea or defense in abatement. It does not appear whether the alleged trust or combination is a partnership or a corporation, and so a legal entity, capable of suing or being sued; nor is it averred that it or any of its members other than the plaintiff had any interest in the goods sold or the money to be paid for them. The answer in this respect deals only in conclusions of law, leaving wholly uncontroverted the allegations of the complaint that the goods in question were sold and delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant at a price agreed upon between them; nor does it deny the allegation of indebtedness therefor to the plaintiff. It fails to state any facts showing that the action is not rightly brought in the name of the plaintiff.

2. The circuit court omitted, inadvertently as we presume, to pass upon the second branch of the plaintiff’s motion, namely, to make certain portions of the second defense more definite and certain. It is correct practice, we think, to combine in a single motion as many objections as the plaintiff supposes the defendant’s answer is subject to, with a view of having them all determined at the same time, and not piecemeal, thus avoiding a multiplicity of motions and possible appeals. The plaintiff had an undoubted right to have its motion decided in all its material aspects, and, without indicating any opinion whether the motion as to the second defense should have been to make it more definite and certain or for a bill of particulars thereof, we hold that it was material error for the circuit Court to omit or fail to determine this branch of the motion, for, until determined, the plaintiff could not secure the rights which the statute gives it in respect to such pleading, to either have the same made more definite and certain or a bill of particulars under it, and it is thereby deprived of all remedy it may have in this respect.

For these reasons the order of the circuit court is erroneous, and must be reversed, and the cause remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings according to law.

By the Court.— It is so ordered.