195 Conn. 587 | Conn. | 1985
In this, case the plaintiff, National CSS, Inc., seeks a refund of personal property taxes that it paid to the defendant, the city of Stamford, on certain leased computer equipment. The trial court, Meadow, J., sustained the defendant’s denial of the plaintiff’s application for a refund of the overpayment.
The trial court could reasonably have found the following facts. The Itel Memory Equipment Corporation (Itel), located in San Francisco, California, leased computer equipment valued at $916,072 to the plaintiff, National CSS, Inc., a Stamford based corporation, in accordance with the terms of a written lease agreement. During the years in which the disputed taxes were paid, the equipment was located in Stamford. The agreement specifically required Itel to pay all local property taxes levied on the equipment.
As a general rule, the Stamford tax assessor does not individually check each item of property listed on these returns to determine actual taxpayer ownership, but instead assumes that a taxpayer provides information only on the property it owns. Because Itel and the plaintiff had each placed the leased computer equipment on their individual lists in 1973 and 1974, and the assessor did not separately verify ownership of the property, the assessor accordingly billed both corpo
Evidence presented to the trial court showed that the plaintiff paid taxes on the equipment in the amount of $28,092.26 in 1973 and $25,871.71 in 1974.
Sometime after the plaintiff paid its 1974 taxes it became aware that, under the lease agreement, it was not obligated to pay property taxes on the computer equipment. On September 16, 1976, pursuant to the provisions of General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 12-129,
The plaintiff then commenced the underlying action in Superior Court. During a hearing before the trial court, and upon close examination of the facts of the case, it apparently became clear to the judge and to the parties that the dispute could be more appropriately resolved under General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 12-60 rather than under § 12-129.
The plaintiff raises as its first claim of error the trial court’s conclusion that the statute of limitations contained in § 12-57 bars the plaintiff from obtaining a refund under § 12-60.
Section 12-60 provides that “[a]ny clerical omission or mistake in the assessment of taxes may be at any
The duties of tax assessors are prescribed with particularity by Chapter 203 of the General Statutes. “The
The legislature, in creating the municipal taxation scheme, placed precise statutes of limitations over most substantive taxpayer claims. See, e.g., General Statutes §§ 12-57,12-112,12-119. It specifically chose not so to restrict claims arising from “clerical omission[s] or mistake[s] in the assessment of taxes” by allowing such actions to be brought “at any time.” General Statutes § 12-60. While the phrase “at any time” ordinarily would be construed as placing no unreasonable limits on the time such a correction can be made; West Haven v. Aimes, 4 Conn. Sup. 391, 393-94 (1937); we note that
Section 12-60 provides a remedy for “any clerical omission or mistake in the assessment of taxes . . . .”
The trial court found that the “plaintiff’s error in listing the computer on its 1973 and 1974 returns is a clerical mistake within the meaning of C.G.S. Sec. 12-60.” We do not agree. Clerical errors are of a character different from errors of substance, of judgment, or of law. Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Naugatuck, 136 Conn. 29, 32, 68 A.2d 161 (1949). Where an error is of a deliberate nature such that the party making it at the time actually intended the result that occurred, it cannot be said to be clerical. See Kuhlemeier v. County of Los Angeles, 2 Cal. 2d 257, 261, 40 P.2d 828 (1935).
The plaintiff, at the time it listed the leased computer equipment on its tax return and paid the disputed taxes, operated under the mistaken belief that it actually owed taxes on the equipment to the defendant. Because the plaintiff’s action in listing the property and paying the taxes, although mistaken, was deliberate and intentional, it is not clerical, but can only be characterized as an error of substance.
Nor can we say that the error here occurred “in the assessment of taxes.” General Statutes § 12-60. “ ‘ “Assessment is the listing and valuation of property liable to taxation according to law. . . . [A]n assessment can only be made by the officer designated by law to make it.” ’ ” Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Henneford, 184 Wash. 502, 508, 51 P.2d 1083 (1935). The plaintiff, by listing property on its return, was not assessing its property, but was merely informing the taxing authorities that the property was available for taxation. The property did not become legally subject to taxation, or assessed, until the assessor placed it on
The plaintiff’s second claim of error concerns the applicability of the common law principle of unjust enrichment to taxpayer refund actions. The right of recovery for unjust enrichment is equitable, “its basis being that in a given situation it is contrary to equity and good conscience for the defendant to retain a benefit which has come to him at the expense of the plaintiff.” Schleicher v. Schleicher, 120 Conn. 528, 534, 182 A.2d. 162 (1935). Where, however, a statutory scheme exists for the recovery of a benefit that is also recoverable at common law, the common law right may be resorted to only where the statutory procedures are inadequate. Cf. State v. Salafia, 29 Conn. Sup. 305, 313, 284 A.2d 576 (1971).
In the present case, the procedure available was more than sufficient in providing the plaintiff a method by which a refund could be obtained.
Public policy requires, furthermore, that this court not permit taxes collected or paid to be the subject of perpetual litigation, at any time, to suit the convenience
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The lease clause read as follows:
“ITEL PAYS PROPERTY TAX RIDER
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 2, ‘Rental Charges,’ of the Lease Agreement, accrued property taxes, however designated, on the machines shall be paid by ITEL.”
The difference in the amount of taxes paid in 1973 and 1974 was caused by a depreciation in the value of the computers.
Although the taxes assessed against Itel were identical to those assessed against and paid by the plaintiff, Itel in fact paid only approximately $10,000 in property taxes on the equipment. This was due to the application of a tax relief formula available to out-of-state corporations that are required to pay property taxes in both their home state and the state in which leased property is located.
“[General Statutes (Rev. to 1975)] Sec. 12-129. refund of excess payments. Any person, firm or corporation who pays any property tax in excess of the principal of such tax as entered in the rate book of the tax collector and covered by his warrant therein, or in excess of the legal interest, penalty or fees pertaining to such tax, or who pays a tax from which the payor is by statute exempt and entitled to an abatement, or who, by reason of a clerical error on the part of the assessors, tax collector or any other town officer, pays a tax in excess of that which should have been assessed against his property, or who is entitled to a refund because of the issuance of a certificate of correction, may make application in writing to the collector of taxes for the refund of such amount. Such application shall be made within
“[General Statutes (Rev. to 1975)] Sec. 12-60. correction of clerical error in assessment. Any clerical omission or mistake in the assessment of taxes may be at any time corrected according to the fact by the assessors or board of tax review, and the tax shall be levied and collected according to such corrected assessment.”
The defendant raises the issue that the plaintiff should be precluded from arguing the applicability of General Statutes § 12-60 because the plaintiff pleaded its complaint pursuant to § 12-129, and never amended it to include a § 12-60 cause of action. We find this elaim to be without merit.
Throughout the trial court proceedings the defendant treated the case as though it had been pleaded under § 12-60. At no time prior to this appeal did the defendant object to the plaintiffs or the court’s characterization of the case as a § 12-60 cause of action, and the defendant, in fact, appears to have assented to it by raising numerous contentions regarding § 12-60 at trial. “This court has repeatedly indicated its disfavor with the failure of a party ... to object to claimed errors occurring in the course of a trial until it is too late for them to be corrected, and thereafter ... to . . . [raise] such errors . . . [on] appeal.” Balch Pontiac-Buick, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 165 Conn. 559, 568, 345 A.2d 520 (1973); see State v. Grimes, 154 Conn. 314, 323, 228 A.2d 141 (1966). We will therefore treat this case, as did the trial court, as though “the present action was brought pursuant to § 12-60.”
“[General Statutes (Rev. to 1975)] Sec. 12-57. listing of tangible personal property; certificates of correction. The assessors of any municipality shall, at any time prior to the payment of the tax represented thereby, or within one year subsequent to the date the tax was paid, issue a certificate of correction removing tangible personal property from the list of any person, when such tangible personal property was not taxable on such list in the name of such person by such municipality, and shall, in case such tangible personal property was subject to taxation on the same grand list by such municipality in the name of some other person and was not so previously assessed in the name of such other person, add such tangible personal property to the list of such other person and, in such event, the tax shall be levied upon, and collected from, such other person. When it has been determined by the assessors of a municipality, at any time prior to or within one year subsequent to the payment of the tax, that tangible personal property has been assessed when it should not have been, the assessors shall issue a certificate of correction removing such tangible personal property from the list of the person who was assessed in error and, if such tangible personal property should have been subject to taxation for the same taxing period on the grand list of another municipality in this state, the assessors shall promptly notify, in writing, the assessors of the municipality where the tangible personal property should be properly assessed and taxed, and the assessors of such municipality shall assess such tangible per
The plaintiff claimed below and continues to argue here that since the defendant failed affirmatively to plead the statute of limitations; General Statutes § 12-57; prior to raising it at trial, it is precluded from raising it as a defense either at trial or on appeal. Ordinarily a party planning to raise the statute of limitations to bar an opposing claim must raise it prior to trial as a special defense. It was not necessary, however, for the defendant in this case to do so, since here the statute limits the time within which an assessor must issue a certificate of correction, and not the time within which a taxpayer must actually file suit. The affirmative duty is imposed on the assessor and not on the parties, and there is thus no need affirmatively to plead the limitation period.
General Statutes § 12-129 provides in relevant part: “refund of excess payments. Any person, firm or corporation who ... by reason of a clerical error on the part of the assessors, tax collector or any other town officer, pays a tax in excess of that which should have been assessed against his property . . . may make application in writing to the collector of taxes for the refund of such amount. Such application shall be made within six years from the date of payment . . . . ”
Section 12-60, which allows refunds for clerical errors “in the assessment of taxes,” is generally applicable to errors similar to those that § 12-129 is designed to remedy. A claim under § 12-60 is therefore subject to the § 12-129 six year statute of limitations.
We note that our imputation of this six year restriction into § 12-60 does not act to bar the plaintiff’s claim, since the plaintiff filed for a refund well within the six year limitation period.
The only procedure by which the plaintiff in this case could have obtained a refund was to apply for a certificate of correction pursuant to General Statutes § 12-57 within one year from the date its taxes were paid, and use the certificate to obtain a refund under § 12-129 within six years from the date of the tax payment. As previously noted, the plaintiff was unable to avail itself of this statutory procedure because it failed to file for a certificate within one year.