*1 NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION v.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK & TRUST CO. et al. No. 96-843. Argued 6, 1997 October February 25, 1998* Decided * Together with 96-847, No. AT&T Family Federal Credit Union et al. v. First National & Bank Trust Co. al., et also on certiorari to the same court. *3 as to except the Court for which opinion, Thomas, J., delivered JJ., Kennedy Ginsburg, joined and J., Rehnquist, and C. 6. footnote O’Con- footnote toas except Scalia, J., joined full, and opinion Souter, and Stevens, which opinion, dissenting J., nor, filed post, p. 503. JJ., Breyer, joined, fed- for cause Waxman argued General Solicitor Acting Solici- were briefs on the him With eral petitioner. Hunger, Attorney General Dellinger, Assistant General tor Lewis, M. Letter, Jacob Douglas N. Frederick, C. David Roberts, G. John K. Ianno. John Robinson, and E. Michael Fed- Family AT&T cause Jr., argued petitioner were briefs on him With al. et Union Credit eral S. Brenda Franklin, S. Lambert, Jonathan J. Paul Furlow. for respondents. cause S. argued Michael Heifer Christopher Cohen, R. Louis were on the briefs him
With Crotty. † F. Michael III, Gill J. Lipsett, John R. Court, ex the opinion delivered Thomas Justice 6.* to footnote cept (FCUA), Act Union Credit Federal Section “[fjederal 1759, provides S. 12 U. C. Stat. a com- having to groups be limited shall membership
union association, or groups of occupation *4 mon Small Hoc the Ad for were filed reversal curiae urging † Briefs of amici Dines, Chris and Gaston, J. Richard G. by Paul et Group al. Employers H. Thomas by League Union Credit California Gigi Hyland; for tiane McDonald; A Joseph Clayton, and Horowitz, D. Wayne Ott, Craig A Zengerle; C. by Joseph Inc., al. America, et Federation Consumer Cooney, F. John by Unions Credit of Federal National Association for the Donovan, and J. Steinman, William Landau Glancz, Melissa R. Ronald Union of State Credit Association Haden; National for the and M. Fred Stephen C. Gorinson, Longstreth, and John Stanley M. by Supervisors Trimmier. Association Bankers the Independent a brief for J. Rubin filed Leonard affirmance. urging curiae amici as et al. America footnote except as opinion, this joins Scalia * Justice neighborhood, well-defined community, or rural district.” Since National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), agency charged with administering the FCUA, § interpreted permit has 109 to federal credit unions to be composed of multiple employer unrelated groups, each hav ing its own common occupation. bond of In this action, re spondents, five banks and the American Bankers Associa challenged tion, have interpretation this ground on the unambiguously requires that the same commonbond of occupation every unite member of an occupationally defined federal granted credit union. We certiorari to answer two questions. respondents First, do have standing under the Administrative Procedure Act to seek federal-court review interpretation? of the NCUA’s Second, analysis under set forth in Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De (1984), Council, Inc., 467 S.U. 837 is the NCUA’sinter fense pretation permissible? We question answer first in the affirmative question and the second negative. in the We therefоre affirm.
I A during In 1934, Depression, Great enacted the FCUA, which chartering authorizes the of credit unions at the provides national level and that federal credit unions may, as general matter, banking only offer services their members. Section 109 of the FCUA, has which remained virtually unaltered since expressly the FCUA’s enactment, restricts membership in federal credit unions. In relevant part, provides: union,
“Federal membership shall consist of the incorporators persons and such other incorporated unincorporated organizations, permit- to the extent regulations ted rules and prescribed by the Board, may be elected to membership and as such shall each, *5 subscribe to at least one share its pay of stock and if fee entrance uniform a thereon installment initial Federal except that directors; of by board required groups to limited be membership shall union credit or association, or occupation bond common having a commu- neighborhood, a within groups well-defined to (emphasis §1759 C.S. 12 U. district.” rural nity, or added). consistently predecessors its NCUA 1982, Until bond common same require that § to
interpreted defined occupationally anof every member unite occupation reversed NCUA however, 1982, In union. credit federal be to unions credit permit to order policy longstanding its IRPS See groups. employer multiple unrelated composed of § 109’s interpreted (1982). thus It Reg. 16775 Fed. 82-1, 47 employer only each to apply requirement common every than rather union, credit multiple-group ain group Reg. Fed. 82-3,47 IRPS union. credit member all interpretation, new the NCUA’s (1982). Under had union credit multiple-group a groups in employer NCUA ibid., but area,” well-defined a “within located be employer each provide requirement this revised later surrounding area “an located be could group reasonably can office branch union’s] home [credit by NCUA.” union] determined [credit served there- 1982, (1989). Since Reg. 31170 Fed. 89-1, IRPS unions federal permitted has NCUA fore, the having each groups, employer wholly unrelated composed bond. distinct own its
B pe- interpretation its revised the NCUA After (ATTF) ex- Union Credit Family Federal AT&T titioner em- adding unrelated considerably operations its panded now result, ATTF membership. As its groups to ployer only 35% nationwide, members 110,000 approximately has
485 employees whom are of AT&T and its affiliates. See Brief for Petitioner NCUA remaining 9. The members are employees of such companies diverse Apparel as the Lee Company, the Bottling Coca-Cola Company, Ciba-Geigy Corporation, the Duke Company, Power and the American Tobacco Company. App. 54-79.
In 1990,after the approved NCUA a series of amendments to ATTP’s charter that added several such unrelated em- ployer groups to ATTP’s membership, respondents brought this aсtion. Invoking judicial provisions review of the Administrative (APA), Procedure Act 5 U. S. C. §702, re- spondents claimed that the approval NCUA’s of the charter amendments contrary to law because the members of groups new did not share a common occupation bond of existing with ATTP’s respondents § members, as alleged 109 required. petitioner ATTP and Credit Union National permitted Association were to intervene in the action as defendants.
The District Court complaint. dismissed the It held that respondents prudential lacked standing challenge chartering NCUA’s decision because their interests were not within the “zone of interests” to by 109, as required by this Court’s interpreting cases the APA. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. National Credit Union Admin., (DC 1991). 772 Supp. F. The rejected District Court respondents’ irrelevant claims that interpre NCUA’s tation had caused competitive them injury, stating that the legislative history of the FCUA demonstrated that was passed “to place establish a for credit unions within the coun try’s financial specifically market, protect the com petitive interest of banks.” Id., at 612. The District Court also determined respondents were not “suitable chal lengers” to the NCUA’s interpretation, as that term had been prior used prudential standing cases from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Ibid. Circuit Columbia District Appeals for Court Credit National v.Co. Trust & Bank Nat. First reversed. S.U. denied, 1272, cert. F. 2d Admin., Union did “Congress agreed Appeals (1993). The Court from competition banks to shield 1934, intend not, in *7 respondents hence 2d, at F. 988 unions,” credit § Re 109. of beneficiaries” “intended be said could involving the standing cases prudential our two of lying on v. Institute Company industry, Investment services financial Industry Securities v. (1971), Clarke 617 Camp, S. 401 U. nonetheless Appeals of (1987), Court 388 S.U. Assn., 479 sufficiently con were interests respondents’ concluded beneficiaries §109’s intended with gruent NCUA’s challengers” “suitable were respondents See proceed. could suit therefore, their decision; chartering 1276-1278.1 2d, at F. 988 District remand, the On Natural v. Inc. A.S.U. Chevron announced sis (1984), and 837 S.U. 467 Inc., Council,
Resources Defense 109. interpreted permissibly had NCUA held enacting whether, in 1994). (DC asked first It Supp. 9 F. question precise directly to the spoken Congress had § 109, must occupation bond common same issue—whether at multiple composed of union credit federal a members unite be- determined It 12. id., See groups. employer occu- permit understood plausibly § 109 could cause several consist union federal defined pationally distinct having own its each “groups,” employer ad- unambiguously had occupation, then Court District ibid. See question. this dressed stand prudential had respondents holding that of Appeals’ Court 1 The Appeals Court States United of the a decision with conflicted ing Secu v. Clarke decision Court’s to this prior reached Circuit Fourth & Trust Bank Branch (1987). Assn., S. 388 U. Industry rities (1986), 2d 621 Bd., 786 F. Administration Union Credit v. National Co. (1987). U. dеnied, S. cert. stated that it was unnecessary to decide, under the second step of Chevron, whether the NCUA’s interpretation was reasonable, respondents because had not “seriously argued” that the interpretation was unreasonable. See 863 Supp., F. at 13-14. Accordingly,the District Court summary entered judgment against respondents. See ibid.
The Court of Appeals again reversed.
NCUA’s provides: which ac agency of wrong because legal suffering person “A action by agency aggrieved or adversely affected or tion, to entitled is statute, relevant a meaning of § 702. C.S. 5 U. thereof.” review judicial pruden- impose 10(a) APA interpreted haveWe im- requirement, addition requirement standing tial have plaintiff Constitution, of the III by Article posed g., Association e. See, in fact. a sufficient suffered Camp, 397 v. Inc. Organizations, Processing Service Data plaintiff aFor Processing).4 (Data (1970) S.U. interest APA, “the standing under prudential have argua- be] [must complainant protected sought to regulated protected to be interests zone bly within 153. Id., question.” ... statute by competitors finding that prior cаses our four on Based agency challenge standing to have institutions financial activities on statutory restrictions relaxing action limit- respondents’ hold institutions, those argua- serve can unions federal ing markets § bly within standing under prudential respondents Therefore, interpretation. NCUA’s challenge the APA *9 A rule clear a stated have cases prior Although our “arguably is interest plaintiff’s a
determining when they none- statute, by a protected be interests” suffered respondents disputed action, this In who persons allows interpretation NCUA’s because in fact custom therefore members, and customers be their otherwise might ers, ATTF.
theless establish that we inquire should not whether there has been congressional intent to benefit the plain would-be tiff. In Data Processing, supra, the Officeof Comptrol ler of Currency (Comptroller) had interpreted the Na tional Bank Act’s powers incidental clause, Rev. Stat. § 5136, § 24 12 U. S. C. permit Seventh, national banks to perform data processing services for other banks and bank customers. See Data Processing, supra, at 151. The plaintiffs, a data processing corporation and its trade alleged association, this interpretation impermissible was because providing data processing services was not, required “[an] statute, powe[r]... incidental necessary to carry on the business banking.” See 397 S.,U. n. 157, 2. holding In plaintiffs had standing, we stated that 10(a) § of thе required APA only that “the sought protected by the complainant [be] arguably within the
zone of interests to be regulated by the statute question.” ... in Id., at 153. In determining plain that the tiffs’ interest met this requirement, we noted that although the relevant federal statutes — the National Bank Act, § 24 U. S. C. Seventh, and the Bank Service Corporation Act, Stat. 1132, 12 S.U. C. 1864 — did not “in protect terms specified group[,] . . general . their policy is apparent; those whose directly are affected by a broad or nar row interpretation of easily Acts are identifiable.” Data Processing, 397 U. S., “[A]s at competitors of national banks which are engaging in data processing services,” plaintiffs were within that class of “aggrieved persons” enti judicial tled to review of the Comptroller’s interpretation. Ibid. year
Less than a applied later, we the “zone of interests” test Tours, Arnold Inc. Camp, v. (1970) 400 U. S. 45 (per curiam) (Arnold Tours). There, certain agencies travel challenged a ruling Comptroller, similar to the one contested in Data Processing, permitted national banks operate agencies. travel See 400 U. atS., holding 45. In *10 APA, the standing under prudential had plaintiffs the that Data in decision our view to incorrect was it that noted history of legislative peculiar the resting on Processing as been had which Act, Corporation Service §4 Bank the industry. processing data behest part in passed did “we that explicitly statеd We 46. S., at U. See desired showing that history any legislative rely on Ibid. competition.” alone processors data protect to explained: further We §4 arguably that held [w]e . . Processing . Data “In competitor
brings §4 limited opinion in Nothing it. by data-proeessing in competitors only protecting to travel provide begin banks national When field. travel with compete they customers, their services processors data with compete they than less no agents cus- their services data-processing they provide when marks quotation and (internal Ibid, citations tomers.” omitted). Institute Company Investment decided later, we yearA invest ease, (ICI). In (1971) S.U. Camp, v. individual several and association trade company ment had Comptroller alleged companies investment 1932,5 Act, Glass-Steagall §21 of the alia, inter violated, what operate establish banks national permitting held We funds. mutual early versions were essence injured they would alleged who plaintiffs, action, Comptroller’s resulting from competition by case stated APA standing under had S., at U. Processing. by Data controlled person, any “[f]or unlawful Act, Glass-Steagall of the § 21 Under securities, issuing... business engaged ... corporation firm, [or] the business whatever extent any time same at the engage 189, 12 Stat. 1933, 48 Act Banking § 21 of deposits.” receiving 378(a). §G.S.U. *11 Significantly, we fonnd unpersuasive Justice argu- Harlan’s ment in dissent that the suit should be dismissed because “neithеr language pertinent provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act nor legislative history evineefd] any congressional concern for the interests petitioners and others like them in freedom competition.” Id., at 640. Our fourth case in this vein was Clarke v. Securities In- dustry Assn., (1987) (Clarke). U. S. 388 There, a securi- ties dealers trade association sued the Comptroller, this time for authorizing two national banks to offer discount broker- age services both at their branch offices and at other loca- tions inside and outside their home States. See id., at 391. The plaintiff contended that the Comptroller’s action vio- lated the McFadden Act, permits which national banks carry on the business of banking only at authorized branches, and open new only branches in their home States only to the extent that state-chartered banks in that State can do so under state law. See id., at 891-392. again
We held that the plaintiff had standing under the APA. Summarizing prior our holdings, we stated that al- though the “zone of interests” test right a “denies of review if plaintiff’s interests are . . . marginally related to or inconsistent with purposes implicit in the statute,” id., at 399, “there need be no indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff,” id., at ICI). 399-400 (citing We then determined that by limiting ability of national banks to do business outside their home States, “Congress ha[d] shown a concern to keep national banks from gaining monopoly control оver money.” 479 U. S., at 403. interest of the securities dealers in preventing national banks from expanding into the securities markets directly implicated this concern offering because discount brokerage services would allow national banks “access money, to more in the form of credit balances, and enhanced opportunities to lend money, margin viz., for purchases.” Ibid. The case was analogous thus to Data Processing and ICI: “In those engage could hanks activities what question cases engage can banks activities what question here, all; by state imposed limitations regard to without atS.,U. branching law.”
B consistently held therefore, eases, prior Our in- “zone arguably to be plaintiff’s *12 not does there statute, by a protected be to terests” benefit to purpose congressional of “indication be to ICI); Ar- also see (citing 399-400 Id., at plaintiff.” would-be Processing). The (citing Data 46 S., at U. 400 Tours, nold be to sought interest “whether simply inquiry is proper of within arguably is complainant by the Process- Data statute.” by the protected... to be interests applying added). in Hence (emphasis 153 S., at U. ing, 397 enact- in whether, ask do test, we interests” “zone in- specifically Congress issue, statutory provision ing the discern first Instead, we plaintiff. benefit to tended statutory by the protected” to be ... “arguably interests plaintiff’s whether inquire then issue; provision are question in action agency affected among them. member union “[fjederal credit provides 109 Section having a groups limited be ship shall well-defined groups association, or or occupation C. S.U. district.” community, rural neighborhood, membership in §109 limits terms, express By § 1759. its “groups.” definable members union credit every federal offer matter, general may, as unions credit federal Because C.S. 12 U. g., see, e. members, only banking services every fed markets § restricts 1757(5)-(6), also §§ need markets Although these serve. can union credit eral be link limited. are unquestionably they small, membership union credit federal § regulation 109’s tween unions federal markets on limitation its said cannot if even Thus, is unmistakable. serve can had the specific purpose commer- benefiting
cial banks, one of the interests to be “arguably... protected” § is by an interest limiting markets that federal credit unions can serve.6 This interest precisely inter- est of respondents affected NCUA’s interpretation § 109. As competitors of federal credit unions, respondents have an certainly limiting markets fed- eral credit unions can serve, and the NCUA’s interpretation 6The legislative § history upon which petitioners so heavily rely, supports this conclusion. Credit unions originated in xnid-19th-century Europe as cooperative associations that were intended provide credit to persons of small means; they were usually organized around some common theme, eithеr geographic or associational. See General Office, Accounting Credit Unions: Reforms for Ensuring 1991). Future Soundness 24 (July Following the European example, the 1920’smany States passed stat utes authorizing the chartering unions, of credit and a number of those statutes contained provisions similar to 109’scommon bond requirement. See A. Burger & Dadn, T. Field of An Membership: Evolving Concept (2d 1992). ed. *13 the
During Great Depression, in contrast to widespread bank failures at both the state and level, national there were no involuntary liquidations of state-chartered credit unions. See Rep. 555,73d S. No. Sess., Cong., 2d (1934). 2 The cooperative of institutions, nature the which state-law com- mon bond provisions reinforced, was believed to have contributed to this result. See Credit Unions: Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and 73d Currency, Cong., Sess., 19-20, 1st 26 (1933). A common bond provision was thus in included the District of Columbia Act, Credit Union which Congress 1932; passed in it was identi- cal to the FCUA’s common provision enacted two years later. When Congress enacted FCUA, the sponsors of the legislation emphasized that the cooperative nature of credit unions allowed them to make credit avail- able to persons who otherwise would not for qualify loans. See S. Rep. No. supra, at 1,3. The legislative history thus § confirms that 109 was thought to reinforce the cooperative nature of unions, credit whiсh in turn was believed to promote their safety and soundness and allow access to persons credit to otherwise unable to Because, borrow. by nature, its very a cooperative institution must serve a market, limited the legislative history of 109 (cid:127) demonstrates that one of the interests “arguably ... to be protected” §by 109 is an interest in limiting the markets that federal credit unions can serve. unions credit federal allowing by interest that affected has base.7 customer their increase to statutory the from distinguished be cannot Section Data Tours, and ICI, Arnold Clarke, in issue at provisions ap- Act McFadden the Clarke in Although Processing. state of interest the only to protect designed to be peared none- banks, we national with treatment of in parity banks extent “the limited also statute the that determined theless bro- discount the in engage [could] banks [national] which impact competitive the Iimit[ed] hence and business kerage S.,U. Clarke, houses.” brokerage discount nonbank on spe- intend did although Accordingly, at “ar- interests the one dealers, securities to protect cifically interest an statute the by be protected” ... guably The plaintiff power. market bank national restricting in banks, had national competitors dealers, securities inter- the by affected been had interest interest, and formula our 503,509, at contentions, post, see dissent’s the Contrary require interеsts zone the “abolis[h]” or “eviscerat[e]” does tion under standing to have order that, in imply read can it Nor ment. statute the enforcing have merely must APA, a plaintiff the “ar interests the discerning articulated — test question. inquir and issue statutory provision the by protected” to be ... guably in ques action agency by affected interests plaintiff’s whether ing semantics matter aas only among them—differs are tion “abolish “eviscerating” us accused has dissent formulation “the establish must plaintiff (stating post, see ing,” sought 'within falls of... complains he basis legal forms violation whose provision statutory omitted)). citation marks (internal quotation complaint” his application lies dissent with disagreement only Our §109’s between link unmistakable theof Because test. of interests” “zone on limitation membership union on restriction express “some objectively serve, there *14 can unions federal markets respond- deleted), that (emphasis statute,” post, indication by protected” “arguably ents’ beneficiaries incidental merely than more are respondents Hence §109. competition. on effects §109’s
-495 pretation of the McFadden they Act sought to challenge, because interpretation had allowed national banks expand their activities and serve new customers. See ibid.
Similarly, in ICI, though even in enacting the Glass- Steagall Congress Act, did not intend specifically to benefit companies investmеnt may sought only protect national banks and depositors, their one of the interests “ar- guably protected” ... to be by the statute was an interest in restricting ability of national banks to enter the secu- rities business. The company investment plaintiffs, as com- petitors of national banks, had that and that inter- interest^ est had been by affected the Comptroller’s interpretation allowing national banks to establish mutual funds.
So too, in Arnold Tours and Data Processing, although in enacting the National Bank Act and the Bank Service Corpo ration Act, did not intend specifically to benefit agents travel processors and data may have been con only cerned with the safety and soundness of national banks, one of the interests “arguably ... protected” statutes was an interest in preventing national banks from entering other product businesses’ markets. competi As tors of national agents banks, travel processors and data had that interest, and that interest had been affected Comptroller’s interpretations opening their markets to na tional banks. See also NationsBank N C., N. A. v. Vari able Annuity Ins. (1995) Co., U. S. 251 (deciding Life the Comptroller had permissibly interpreted § 24 12 U. S. C. Seventh to allow national banks to act agents in the sale of annuities; agents’ insurance standing to challenge .the interpretation questioned).
C Petitioners attempt to distinguish this action principally on ground that there is no evidence that Congress, when *15 competi- the with concerned all FCUA, was the enacted it concerned all indeed banks, or commercial of tive 21-22. ATTF Petitioner for Brief See competition. with Congress very reason the that contend petitioners Indeed, the in simply not were “[blanks that was FCUA the passed thus concerned, were borrowers small as far picture” of source a new create necessary to believed id., at means. modest of people for argu- similar that is argument this difficulty with The Process- Data of each unsuccessfully in made were ments Processing, Data In Clarke. ICI, and Tours, ing, Arnold following standing the for against argued Comptroller the reasons: Seventh Section contend not do “[P]etitioners potential of interest the protect ... purpose any
had the clear: reason banks. national of competitors possible all dispels Section history of legislative 101) for (18 was Stat. enactment its doubt strong na- creating a of purpose sole express and pro- extent theTo system .... banking tional of bottom atwas interest competitive aof tection it was Seventh, of Section enactment Brief competitors.” their banks of national Data Association Currency in Comptroller for T. Camp, O. v. Inc. Organizations, Processing Service pp. 19-20. 85, No. 1969, contended Comptroller Tours, the Arnold Similarly, in “markedly differ- agents travel рosition find could who processors,” data ent concern legislative manifestation history “some legislative Comptrol- for Memorandum position.” competitive their v. Tours, Inc. Arnold Opposition Currency in ler Comp- ICI, inAnd 8-4. pp. 602, No. T.O. Camp, standing, because— find urged us again troller
“[t]he of legislation, thrust and the concern of the protect drafters, was to the banking public through the maintenance of a sound national system banking .... “There Congressional was no objective protect mu- tual funds or their investment advisers underwrit- ers.” Brief for Comptroller of Currency in Investment Company Institute Camp, v. O.T. 1970,No. 61,pp. 27-29 (internal quotation omitted). marks
“Indeed, Congressional the. attitude toward the in- vestment bankers only can be characterized as one distaste. For example, in discussing private invest- ment bankers, pointed Senator Glass out that many of them had ‘unloaded millions of dollars of worthless in- vestment upon securities the banks of this country.’” (citation Id., at omitted). 30, n. 22 Finally, in Clarke, Comptroller “[tjhere contended that is no doubt Congress only had type one of competitive injury in mind passed when it the [McFadden] type Act—the that national and state might banks upon inflict each other.” Brief for Federal in Petitioner Clarke v. Industry Securities Assn., O. T. p. No. 85-971, 24.
In each case, we declined accept the Comptroller’s argu ment. In Data Processing, we considered it irrelevant that question in statutes “d[id] not prоtect terms speci group,” fied because general “their policy [was] apparent[,] and those whose [were] interests directly by affected a broad or narrow interpretation [the statutes] [were] easily identi fiable.” 397 S.,U. at 157. In Arnold Tours, we similarly believed it Congress irrelevant that had shown no concern for the competitive position agents travel enacting question. statutes in See atS., U. 46. In ICI, we were unmoved Justice Harlan’s comment in dissent that the Glass-Steagall Act passed was spite positive its effects on the competitive position of investment banks. See 401 U. S., at 640. And in Clarke, we did not debate whether concerned Act McFadden enacted Congress dealers. securities position competitive about cases, these in each issue provisions at S., U. safety-and-soundness merely to said could moreover, their banks national protect only to enacted provisions, effects. competitive concern without depositors standing. find hesitate did nonetheless We re- argument petitioners’ accept cannot therefore We evidence nois there standing because do spondents with concerned § was enacted accept that To banks. of commercial competitive inter- “zone *17 reformulate to have would we argument, intended specifically have Congress that require to test ests” plaintiff а before plaintiffs class particular benefit to sue. to APA the standing under have could class that refuse we and eases, prior in our this do to refused haveWe today. sodo to Air decision our rely on mistakenly also Petitioners (1991). 517 S.U. Workers, Postal v. Courier Conference Service Postal the held Courier, we Air In not opportunities employment maximizing employees postal to interests” “zone within have not did employees those hence and statutes, monopoly regu- Service Postal challenge APA standing under op- international certain over monopoly its suspending lation purposes stated We 519. at id., erations. Post revenues increase solely to were statute ain provided were services postal ensure Office 526- id., see interest, public with consistent manner interests therefore, interests, Only those “ar- were employment, their employees Service Postal by protected” guably Federation, National Lujan v. Wildlife Cf. statute. com- reporting agency (stating that (1990) 871, S.U. challenge standing to prudential would pany eon- statutory mandate awith comply failure agency’s record). hearings duet on the We further noted that al though the in question statute regulated competition, the in terests plaintiff of the employees nothing had to do with competition. See Air supra, Courier, n. (stating that “[ejmployeeshave generally been denied standing to еn competition force laws they because competitive lack and di injury”)- rect In this only action, not do respondents have “competitive and injury,” direct but, as the foregoing discus sion they makes clear, possess an interest that “arguably is § ... protected” to be by 109.
Respondents’ limiting interest in the markets that credit unions can serve “arguably within the zone of interests to § be protected” by 109. Under precedents, our it is irrele- vant in enacting FCUA, specifi- did not cally protect intend to commercial banks. Although it is clear respondents’ objectives in this action are not elee- mosynary in nature,8 prior under our cases that, too, is beside point.9
Ill Turning to the merits, judge must the permissibility of the NCUA’s interpretation current of 109 employing the analysis set forth in Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Re *18 sources Council, (1984). Inc., 467 U. S. 837 Defense Under that analysis, we first ask Congress whether “directly has spoken to precise question the at issue. If the intent of Con gress is that clear, is the end of the matter; for the court, as well agency, the give must effect to the unambiguously 8The data processing companies, travel agents, investment companies, and securities dealers that challenged the Comptroller’s rulings in our prior cases certainly did not suit bring to advance the noble goal of main the taining safely soundness of national banks, or to promote the in terests of national bank depositors. 9Unlike sоme of our prudential standing cases, no suggestion is made in this action Congress that has sought to preclude judicial review of agency e.g., Block v. Community See, action. Institute, Nutrition 467 U. S. (1984). de-we If 842-848. at Id., Congress.” of intent expressed precise the directly spoken not has Congress that termine in- agency’s whether inquire then we issue, at question Because 843-844. id., See reasonable. is terpretation same that clear it made has that conclude we anof member each unite must occupation of bond common that hold we union, credit federal defined occupationally under impermissible is interpretation contrary NCUA’s Chevron. step of first mem- union “[fjederal credit that requires §109 noted, As bond common having a groups limited be bership shall well-defined groups toor association, or occupation Respondents district.” rural community, neighborhood, e., one”— “a”—“i. article § uses because contend “natural bond,” “common noun with conjunction in occupationally members all §109 is that reading” of common by one united be must union credit federal defined reply Petitioners 33. Respondents for Brief See bond. permits “groups,” noun plural uses because that multiple con- bond, common own its with each groups, Petitioner Brief See union. credit federal stitute 29-30. NCUA either think not do Appeals, Court Like article conclusive. alone, standing contentions, these must bond one merely convey thought to could “a” multiple-group ain group each members only the unite union credit members all unión, credit plural Similarly, the 3d, F. See together. taken multi merely to refer thought could “groups” word every rather union, but credit particular a groups ple under union a distinct forms “group” single Appeals Court as the Nonetheless, ibid. FCUA. compel the considerations additional recognized, correctly must occupation same conclusion *19 federal defined occupationally anof members of the all unite union. First, the NCUA’s current interpretation makes the phrase "common bond” surplusage applied when ato federal credit union up made multiple unrelated employer groups, because each "group” in such a credit union already has its own "commonbond.” See ibid. To use the facts of this ac- tion, the employees of AT&Tand the employees of the Amer- ican Tobacco Company already each had a “common bond” before being joined together as members of ATTF. The for- mer were bonded because they worked for AT&T, and the latter were bonded they because worked for the American Tobacco Company. If phrase “common bond” is to be given any meaning when employees these are joined to- gether, a different "common extending bond”—one to each every еmployee together considered be found to —must unite them. Such "commonbond” exists when employees of different subsidiaries the same company joined are to- gether in a federal credit union; does not exist, however, when employees of unrelated companies joined. are so See ibid. way, Put another in multiple employer group con- text, the has NCUA read the statute as though it merely “[fjederal stated credit union membership shall be lim- occupational ited to groups,” but that is simply not what provides. statute
Second, the interpretation NCUA’s violates the estab lished canon of construction that similar language contained within the same section of a statute must be accorded a con sistent meaning. Dept. Wisconsin Revenue v. Wil liam Wrigley, Jr., (1992). Co.,505 U. S. 214, 225 Section 109 parallel consists of two clauses: Federal credit union mem bership is groups limited “to having a commonbond of occu pation or association, or groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district.” 12 U. S. C. § 1759 added). (emphasis The NCUA concedes that even though the second permits limitation geographically defined credit unions to have as members more than one "group,” all of the groups must come from “neighborhood, the same *20 Petitioner for Brief district.” rural community, inter- never has NCUA the reason The 37. NCUA geo- the interpret, could it contend does and pretеd, of composed be to union credit a allow limitation graphical geographic unrelated number unlimited an from members limita- geographical the render would sodo is units, statutory principles established Under meaningless. tion interpretation, limitation occupational the interpret must way. same the in- should why we reason one advanced Petitioners They con- differently. limitation occupational terpret word uses limitation geographical whereas tend limita- occupational "prepositional,” thus is and "within” (and “participial” thus is “having” word uses tion NCUA Petitioner Brief limiting). See less therefore in- phrase participial why a no reason however, is, There indeed, one; prepositional a than open-ended herently more universe relevant narrow can phrases participial certain “persons example, manner —for exceedingly effective in having Reading anniversary.” wedding a February 29th conclude must way, we same in the clauses parallel two federal defined geographically aof members all just as that, “neighborhood, same drawn be must union credit occupationally of an members district,” rural community, or same united be must union credit federal defined occupation.” bond “common membership requires § terms, Finally, its inter- NCUA’s The limited.” “shall unions credit federal must occupation which pretation —under group— еmployer unrelated each members only the unite en- statute out words these read potential has current its under that, contested has NCUA tirely. a charter grant permissible would interpretation, include would members whose union conglomerate Nor States. United company every employees “group,” be a would employees company’s Each it: can each such would “group” have its own “common bond of occu- pation.” Section 109, however, cannot be considered a limi- tation on credit union if at membership same time it *21 permits such a limitless result.
For foregoing reasons, we conclude that the NCUA’s current §of interpretation 109 is to the contrary unambigu- ously intent expressed of and is thus impermissible under the first step of Chevron.10 judgment Court Appeals is therefore affirmed.
It is so ordered. Justice O’Connor, with whom Justice Stevens, Jus- tice Breyer Souter, and Justice join, dissenting.
In determining respondents have standing under zone-of-interests test to challenge National Credit Union Administration’s (NCUA’s) interpretation of the “common bond” provision of the Federal Credit Union Act (FGUA), 12 U. § S. C. 1759, Court the test applies a manner that is contrary our decisions and, more importantly, that all but eviscerates the zone-of-interests requirement. In my view, under a proper of the conception “the inquiry, sought be protected by” respondents in this action is not within the “arguably zone of interests to be protected” by the common bond provision. Association Data Process- ing Organizations, Service Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. 150, S. (1970). I Accordingly, respectfully dissent.
I Respondents this brought suit 10(a) § under of the Admin- istrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. 702. To establish their standing sue here, respondents must demonstrate 10We have no need §109’s to consider legislative which, history, as both courts found, below is extremely “murky” and a “slender reed on which to place reliance.” 3d, (internal 90 F. at 530 quotation marks and citation omitted). ac- agency aggrieved or “adversely affected they are see Ibid.; statute.” relevant aof meaning tion 517, S.U. Workers, Postal v. Courier Air Conference 871, U. S. Federation, 497 National Lujan v. Wildlife (1991); corre- requirement aspects two (1990). The 882-883 “injury standing doctrine concepts in familiar spond “zone Constitution III Article under in fact” See, principles. standing prudential our under interests” (1997). U. S. Spear, v. g., Bennett e. show must respondents First, Air fact. suffered e., have i. aggrieved,” fected supra, Federation, 523;National Wildlife supra, Courier, in- establish must respondents addition, In stat- relevant meaning of “within they assert jury Courier, Air test. *22 zone-of-interests satisfies e., i. ute,” at supra, Federation, 523; National Wildlife at supra, in- establish must plaintiff “the Specifically, 886. effect adverse (his aggrievement, complains he jury be to sought interests’ 'zone him), within falls upon forms violation whose provision statutory by the protected Feder- National Wildlife complaint.” his basis legal 523-524. аt supra, Courier, Air also 883; see at supra, ation, “injury The interpretation NCUA’s is plains, their be otherwise might who persons “allows provision bond Family AT&T petitioner customers” . .. be to customers way, another Put 488, n. Ante, Union. Credit Federal com- ato base customer respondents’ loss ais injury respondents’ to injury generally, more entity, or peting question relevant The competitor. a as interest commercial to injury whether then, test, zone-of-interests under “falls competitor a interest commercial respondents’ protected sought supra, Courier, g., Air E. provision.” bond] [common plain- Processing, where Data instance, For 523-524. competitive alleged respondents here — tiffs—like their commercial interest, we found plaintiffs that the had standing because “their commercial interest sought was protected provision the . . . which they alleged had been violated.” supra, Bennett, at 176 (discussing Data Processing). adopts quite Court approach different to the zone-
of-interests today, test eschewing any assessment of whether the common provision bond protect respond intended ents’ commercial interest. The begins by Court observing that the terms of the common provision bond “[f]ederal — credit union membership shall be to groups limited having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a neighborhood, well-defined community, or rural dis trict,” 12 U. S. C. expressly limit membership in fed 1759— eral credit unions persons belonging to “groups.” certain citing Then, statutory other provisions that bar federal credit unions from serving §§1757(5)-(6), nonmembers, see the Court reasons sought that one to be by the common provision “is an interest limiting markets that federal credit unions can serve.” Ante, at 493. The Court concludes analysis by its observing simply that respondents, “[a]s competitors of federal credit unions, . . . certainly [that] interest..., and the interpre NCUA’s tation has affected that interest.” Ante, at (empha 493-494 added). sis
Under the Court’s approach, every litigant who establishes injury in fact under Article III will automatically satisfy the requirement, zone-of-interests rendering the zone-of- interests test ineffectual. See Air supra, Courier, at (“mistak[e]” “eonflat[e] to the zone-of-interests test with in fact”). jury in That result stems from the Court’s articula tion of the relevant “interest.” stating In that the common provision bond protects an in limiting “interest the markets that federal credit unions can serve,” ante, at 493, the Court presumably uses the term “markets”'in the sense of cus tomer opposed markets, as to, for product instance, markets: prohibit- provisions the and requirement bond common The to limit combine serving nonmembers unions ing credit a services the serve, not can union credit a customers the offer. can union credit re that conclusion Court's understanding, the that With mar [customer] “limiting thе in interest an “have” spondents more little means serve” can unions credit federal kets enforcing the in interest an “have” respondents than credit a limits requirement The statute. certain to base, customer its hence membership, and union’s view, Court’s the in and § 1759, C.S.U. groups, in an “have” respondents standing that establish enough to serve. can union a customers limiting the in terest interest respondents’ observation additional Court’s The little adds interpretation NCUA’s by the “affected” been has statutory restric aof interpretation agency analysis; the to the in interest an has who party a affect course ofwill tion suit bring will presumably party a Indeed, restriction. affected been has only the interest if interest an vindicate zone-of- Court’s crux challenged action. must plaintiff simply that then, is inquiry, interests statute. pertinent enforcing the in interest an “have” en an invariably have will however, party, A caused fact injury in establish can he when statute a forcing used example we An statute. alleged violation by an point. illustrates Federation National Wildlife failure involving “the situation hypothesized There, 'on requiring provision statutory comply with agency an circumstance That S., U. hearings.” record’ company upon effect adverse assuredly “would agency’s transcribe record contract has establish company would so proceedings,” zone- satisfy would company But Ibid. fact. obviоusly provision “the because test, of-interests proceed parties protect enacted Courier, Air Ibid.; see reporters.” theof those ings and
cn o -a
Our decision in Air Courier, likewise, cannot squared with the analysis Court’s in this action. Air Courier in volved a challenge by postal employees to a decision of the Postal Service suspending its statutory monopoly over cer tain international mailing postal services. The employees alleged a violation of (PES)— Express Private Statutes provisions codify postal Service’s monopoly— citing injury as their in fact competition private mailing companies adversely affected employment their op portunities. 498 U. atS., 524. We postal concluded that the employees did not standing under the zone-of-interests test, because “the PES designed were not protect postal employment or postal job further opportunities.” Id., at 528. As example with the from National Federa Wildlife though, tion, postal employees would have established standing under analysis the Court’s in this action: The em ployees surely “had” an interest enforcing statutory monopoly, given suspension monopoly of the caused in jury employment their opportunities.
In requiring simply short, litigant that a “have” an enforcing the relevant statute hardly any amounts to test why all. That is our required decisions have instead party injury “establish that the complains he of.. . falls within the ‘zone sought interests’ statutory provision” question. National Feder- Wildlife supra, ation, (emphasis added); Bennett, see 520 U. S., at 176. In Air Courier, for noting instance, after that the asserted in fact was “an employment adverse effect on opportunities postal workers,” we “[t]he characterized question before us” as “whether the adverse effect on the *25 the within is ... workers postal of opportunities employment atS.,U. PES.” encompassed interests of zone 885- supra, Federation, National also Wildlife see 524; interests plaintiffs’ the tois injury asserted (noting that finding and enjoyment,” aesthetic and use “recreational in interests of sorts the among “are interests particular those protect”). to designed specifically were [the] statutes same the inis Spear v. Bennett in Term last decision Our effort an in Service, Wildlife and Fish the There, vein. biological a fish, issued of species particular preserve of maintenance the requiring of effect the had opinion group A reservoirs. certain in levels water minimum asserting a brought suit districts irrigation and ranchers part, in alleging, water,” the in interest “competing irri- for using reservoirs the in interest commercial their charged that plaintiffs The 160. atS.,U. water. gation Spe- Endangered the provision violated had Service the commercial scientific [of] best “use requiring Act cies whether simply ask didWe Id., at available.” data Service holding the an “had” plaintiffs whether assessed Instead, requirement. data” “best inter- zone within fell plaintiffs by injury asserted concluded provision, data” by “best protected ests adversely affected parties interests economic inter- zone are within opinions biological by erroneous (observing 176-177 Id., by statute. ests to avoid “is provision data” “best purpose one officials by agency produced dislocation economic needless environmental their pursuing unintelligently zealously but objectives”). this ask Court lead should approach same in- commercial their injury respondents’ whether action pro- interests falls competitors terest recog- Respondents provision. bond by tected decisions. by our mandated inquiry such nize were of banks competitive “the argue that They
among Congress’s concerns when it enacted the Federal Credit Union Act,” and that the provision commonbond motivated “[ejongressional concerns that chartering credit unions could inflict an competitive unwanted injury on the commercial banking industry.” Briеf Respondents 24-25. The Court instead asks simply respondents whether have an interest enforcing the common provision, *26 approach an tantamount to abolishing the zone-of-interests requirement altogether.
II Contrary to the Court’s suggestion, ante, at 494-495, its application of the zone-of-interests test in this action is not in concert with approach we followed in a series of cases in which the plaintiffs, respondents like here, alleged that agency interpretation aof statute competitive caused injury to their commercial interests. In each of those eases, we focused, as in Bennett, Air Courier, and National Wildlife Federation, on competitive whether plaintiff’s to the commercial interest fell within the zone of pro- interests by tected the relevant statute.
The earliest of competitor standing decisions was As- sociation Data Processing Service Organizations, v. Inc. Camp, 397 (1970), U. S. in which we first formulated the requirement. zone-of-interests There, an association of data processors challenged a decision of the Comptroller of the Currency allowing national provide banks to data processing services. processors The data alleged violation among of, §4 other statutes, of the Bank Service Corporation Act, Stat. 1132, provided which “[n]o bank corpora- service may tion engagе any in activity performance other than the of bank services.” S., U. at 154-155. We articulated applicable test as “whether the sought interest pro- to be by tected the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to protected regulated by the statute ... in question.” Id., at 153. in whether assessed question, answering In arguably interest an towas plaintiffs by the asserted jury stat relevant by the protected zone within asserted here, respondents like processors, data ute. banks by national “competition injury” “economic Id., services.” processing data providing business “com processors’ data concluded We 152, 154. anti- protected sought to was mercial supra, Bennett, § 4,” contained limitation competition provi explaining Processing), (discussing Data inter competitor brings a “arguably sion S., at U. it,” ests soon Processing was Data decision Our Act, Corporation Service Bank 4 of involving case other curiam). (1970)(per 45S. 400 U. Camp, v. Tours, Inc. Arnold except that Processing, Data similar Tours Arnold challenging agents travel group awere plaintiffs authorizing national Comptroller ruling of analogous *27 like agents, travel The services. travel provide banks commercial to their alleged processors, data ruled surprisingly, Not 45. S., at U. competitors. as standing, on established had agents travel that proc data protect “desir[e] to did ground Un at 46. Id., through competitiоn” from alone essors Tours Arnold decisions our then, action, this like in economic conclusion on Processing turned Data fell competitors jury statute. relevant by Camp, 401 v. Institute Company Investment decided We Arnold as Term same (ICI), later (1971) U. S. association by challenge involved case The Tours. Comp- issued regulation a companies investment mutual operate banks national authorized troller regula- alleged companies investment funds. 1933, 48 Act, Glass-Steagall of the provisions violated tion business entering the banks barring national Stat. of investment banking. We found that the investment com- panies had standing, but did not rest that determination simply on the notion that the companies had an interest in enforcing the prohibition against banks entering the in- vestment business. Instead, we observed that, as in Data Processing, “Congress had arguably legislated against . .. competition” through the Glass-Steagall Act. 401 S.,U. 620-621.
The final decision in this series was Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 (1987). U. S. 388 That ease involved provisions of the McFadden Act, 44 Stat. 1228, allowing a national bank to establish branch only offices in its home State, and then only to the extent that banks of the home State were permitted branches under state law. The statute defined a “branch” office essentially as one that offered core banking services. The Comptroller allowed two banks to establish discount brokerage officesat locations outside the allowable branching area, on the rationale that brokerage services did not constitute core banking services and that the offices therefore were not “branch” offices. Representatives of the securities industry challenged the Comptroller’s action, alleging a violation of the statutory branching limitations.
We held that the plaintiffs had standing under the zone-of- interests test, again, but not simply on ground they had an interest in enforcing the branching limits. Instead, we found that, in ICI, Congress had “arguably legislated against . . . competition” through provisions. those (internal U. S., at quotation omitted). marks Specifi- *28 cally, Congress demonstrated “a concern to keep national banks from gaining a monopoly control over credit and money through unlimited branching.” Ibid.; see also id., at 410 (Stevens, J., concurring part in and concurring judg- in ment) (“The general policy against branching was based in part on a concern about the national potential banks’ for be- coming massive financial institutions that would establish no makes services”). Court The financial on monopolies the through Congress, that action this in finding analogous unions prevent to sought provision, bond common bank- of customers the over control” “monopoly gaining services. ing at Court the true, as isIt deci line this require not didwe that 488-492, 494-498, the benefit to designed was issue at statute that sions 399- at supra, Clarke, See suit. bringing party particular instance, Processing, for Data and Tours 400, Arnold In interests protect to desired Congress that sufficient was Service Bank § 4 through generally competitors mind have not did Congress if even Act, Corporation processors. data or agents travel interests particular anti- likewise, Clarke, In 46. at supra, Tours, Arnold been may Act MeFadden branching provisions securi banks, state protect primarily intended thus Respondents injury. competitive industry, from ties was provision that establish need any more banks, commercial benefit specifically enacted ben intended was provision that show they must than any of Bank, State Piedmont Bank, State Lexington efit suit. this filed banks particular found found though, cases, standing competitor the each In limitation,” “anticompetition enacted had Congress Processing), Data (discussing S., at U. Bennett, see .. against. “legislated had alternatively, that or, 620- at supra, ICI, 403; at supra, Clarke, see competition,” “com plaintiff-competitor’s accordingly, anticom- protected to be sought mercial We 176. supra, Bennett, issue, limitation” petition plaintiff] [the “the words, other determined, sought [fell] of... complainfed] Na provision.” statutory [relevant] Court atS.,U. Federation, 497 tional Wildlife here. analysis undertake fails
III Applying proper inquiry zone-of-interests to this ac- competitive I tion, would respondents’ find commercial arguably interests does not fall within the zone sought protected by of interests to be pro- commonbond vision. The suggest terms of the statute do not a concern protecting with competitors. the business interests of “[fjederal provision common bond limits credit union mem- bership groups having ... to a occupation commonbond of groups neighborhood, association, or to within a well-defined community, or rural district.” 12 U. C.S. 1759. And the provision exception is framed preceding as an to the clause, membership which “incorporators confers on and such other persons incorporated unincorporated organizations and and may ... elected .. . and as such shall each, subscribe to at least one pay share of its stock and the initial install- ment thereon and a uniform entrance fee.” Ibid. The lan- guage suggests requirement common is in- bond organizational principle primarily ternal concerned with defining membership way financially secures a organization. sound no There is indication in the text of the provision surrounding language or in that the member- ship arguably designed protect limitation was even competitors. commercial any Sig- Nor is there nontextual indication that effect. nificantly, operation provision of the much different from the Clarke, ICI, statutes at issue in Processing. congressional Data Those statutes evinced legislate against competition, g., intent to supra, Clarke, e. they imposed because direct restrictions on banks generally, specifically barring entry their into certain mar- Processing question kets. In Data ICI, “the was what engage activities banks could in at all,” and in Clarke, “the [was] question [could] engage activities what banks in with- regard out imposed by branching to the limitations state law.” 479 S.,U. at 403. *30 not does provision bond common the operation against legislate desire congressional a denote likewise not does requirement bond common First, the competition. large, becoming from unions credit restrict purport provi- if expected might be organizations, nationwide competitive with concern congressional a embodied sion Peti- Brief growth. union credit consequences 1.6 has Union Credit (Navy Federal 25-26 NCUA tioner Union Credit Federal Airlines members; American million Cong., 73d Rep. No. members); S. also see
„ 157,000 has States the United “employees (1934) (citing Sess., 2d bond a common with group “specific aas Government” association”). occupation or ap- provision bond common although tellingly, More against operates restriction unions, credit all plies to requirement bond common individually: The unions credit member- union’s credit particular a only to whether speaks whether customers, group given ship include can aif Even group. serve can general in unions credit requisite share does customers would-be group of common nothing in union, credit particular awith bond a dif- joining from group same prevents provision bond “neighborhood, same union credit ferent members whose with or district” community, rural or association[al]” “occupation[al] adequate shares group con- could group Also, C.S. 12 U. connection. sense, this In union. credit own its ceivably form col- unions credit not limit does requirement any bar does customers, nor any serving lectively from unions. by credit being served from customers stat- contrast, Clarke, ICI, and Processing, Data In prohibiting generally, banks national against operated utes in Banks market: particular a competing from all banks service type of specific providing from barred were general aat services providing ICI), fromor Processing (Data Proc- Data (Clarke). Thus, whereas location particular essing could customers not obtain processing data services any bank, national and in Clarke customers outside of permissible branching area likewise could not obtain fi- any nancial services from national bank, in this action cus- adequate tomers who lack an bond with the members of a particular credit union can still receive financial services from a credit union. Unlike the statutes Data different Processing, ICI, and Clarke, provi- then, common bond competitive sion does not boundary excluding erect а *31 any unions from identifiable market. surrounding
The circumstances
the enactment of the
Congress
FCUA also indicate
legislate
did not intend to
against competition through the
provision.
common bond
explains,
As
ante,
493,
6,
Court
at
n.
the FCUA was
enacted in
Depression;
the shadow of the Great
thought
ability
through
that the
of credit unions to “come
depression
failures,
without
when banks have failed so
notably,
cooperative
is a tribute to the worth of
credit and
clearly
great potential
rapid
indicates
value of
national
Rep.
credit union extension.”
555,
S.
No.
at 3-4. Credit
general public,
unions were believed to enable the
which had
largely
by
ignored
been
banks, to obtain credit at reasonable
id.,
2-3;
rates. See
First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Na
tional Credit Union
988
2d
Administration,
F.
1272,
(CADC),
(1993).
denied,
cert.
The of a common bond was thus meant to ensure that cooperative each credit union remains institu- to its mem responsive economically stable tiоn of inter principle aAs at 1276. 2d, F. needs. bers’ viability individual secure designed to governance nal common membership, the theof interests unions credit restric impose a designed to way no inwas provision bond institutions in the unions credit all on tion very no “Indeed, the competitors. day become might one purpose general Congress’ anomalous, because tion seems unions, which proliferation encourage the towas custom would-be those service provide expected were Branch also 1275; see Id., at disdained.” banks ers Administration Union Credit v. National Trust Co. &Bank (CA4 1986), cert.U. S. denied, 2dF. 625-626 Bd., 786 (1987). come later would requirement That curbing a credit tool a useful competitors viewed zone-of-interests affect membership should union’s zone-of-interests under question pertinent inquiry. inter protect certain Congress intended is whether test irrespective whether, provision, particular through a ests may provision intent, effect congressional (the *32 atS., Clarke, 479 U. See interests. those protecting in congressional interpreting basically one [is] “matter (“To time as sure, be 2d, F. tent”); 400; id., among competition flourished unions credit passed—as began to intensified—bankers lending institutions consumer limitation a desirable requirement bond common see assuming fact, But . . . expansion. union credit on Congress intent illuminate serves hardly true, 1934”). in requirement bond enacted first in challenging the bring suits could competitors Otherwise, might FCUA in provisions host of a terpretation competitive furthering their effect the unintended can unions credit loans on as restrictions such interest, See borrow. can unions sums on make (6). §§ 1757(5), U.S.C. light, In this I read our as establishing decisions that there must at least some indication in beyond the statute, mere fact that its enforcement has the incidentally effect of benefiting plaintiff, from one can which draw an inference plaintiff’s injury arguably falls within the zone of sought to be provi that statute. The sions we construed Processing Clarke, ICI, and Data al lowed such Congress legislates inference: Where against competition, properly one can infer that the statute is at arguably least protect competitors intended to their commercial interest, even if that is not the statute’s (indi principal objective. Bennett, 520 S.,U. at 176-177 cating that zone-of-interests test is satisfied if one of several statutory objectives corresponds sought with the interest protected by plaintiff). “[t]here Accordingly, [was] sound reason to infer” in Congress those cases “that in [the] [of tended plaintiffs] class upon to be relied to challenge agency disregard (inter of the law.” supra, Clarke, at 403 omitted). quotation nal marks
The same cannot be said of respondents in action, this be- cause neither the terms of the common provision, nor way provision operates, which the nor the circum- surrounding stances congressional its enactment, evince a legislate against competition. desire to This, then, is an ac- plaintiff’s tion where “the interests are marginally so related to or purposes inconsistent implicit with the in the statute reasonably that it cannot be assumed intended permit the suit.” S., 479 U. at 399. The zone-of-interests test plaintiffs “seeks to exclude those whose are suits more likely statutory objectives,” frustrate than to further id., at 397, readily n. one can envision circumstances competitors, which the interests who have the incentive *33 suppress expansion credit union in all circumstances, would be at odds general with the supporting statute’s aim of growth the of credit unions that are cohesive and hence fi- nancially stable. ante, Courier, Air distinguish attempt The Court’s observes Court The regard. this in instructive
498-499, is “com suffer plaintiffs the Courier, Air in unlike here, the But n. 5. 528, atS.,U. injury.” 498 direct and petitive be Courier in Air pertinent injury was competitive of lack PES— violated—the been have alleged to the statutes cause com of conduct the regulate statutes “competition were the all provision, bond common The Ibid. petitors.” pres mere the so and law, competition is not reasons, noted establish not should injury” direct “competitive ence 1, 5-6 S.U. Co.,390 Kentucky Util. v. Hardin standing. See question statute “the Courier in Air (1968). Thus, while em plaintiff the [but] interests the competition regulatеd 499, ante, at competition,” with nothing do had ployees competi regulate not does provision here, the do everything plaintiff the interests the but tion injury is at plaintiff’s ease, the either In competition. with pro to be sought the interests related” “marginally best most 399, supra, at Clarke, statute, tected effect incidental has provision that the said is can enough to estab not was That plaintiffs. benefiting the here. suffice should it Courier, and standing in Air lish I—i <1 concern ‘founded “are principles standing Prudential courts properly limited—role proper about —and (quoting supra, Bennett, society.’” democratic
in a (1975)). zone-of- The S. Seldin, 422 U. v. Warth standing prudential part integral an test interests gives way ain test apply ought to inquiry, and my today, undertakes analysis Court content. one. a hollow requirement zone-of-interests view, leaves where Federation, example in National with Wildlife As alleged stat- injury from company suffered reporting company^ commercial injury to the violation, but utory *34 the statute, here, too, respondents injury suffer from the NCUA’sinterpretation of the requirement, commonbond but to their commercial interest is not -withinthe provision. Applying the zone- inquiry of-interests as it has been articulated in our deci- I sions, conclude respondents have failed to establish standing. I would therefore vacate judgment of the Appeals Court of and remand the action with instructions that, it be dismissed.