192 Mass. 247 | Mass. | 1906
The first of these cases is an action brought to recover damages for a "refusal of the defendant to furnish to the plaintiff a quantity of Portland cement according to the terms of a contract in writing made by the parties. The second is an action by the defendant in the first action to recover from the plaintiff in that action the price of cement delivered under this contract. The cases were heard before an auditor who found for the plaintiff in the first action, whom we will hereinafter call the plaintiff, and he allowed, in diminution of the plaintiff’s claim, the amount due for cement delivered to the defendant in the first action, who will hereinafter be called the defendant. The case was afterwards tried before a judge without a jury, no evidence being introduced except the auditor’s report, and such evidence, documentary and oral, as either party chose to offer of that which previously had been received by the auditor. The judge reversed the decision of the auditor and found for the defendant, holding the plaintiff liable for the price of that which was delivered and not paid for. The contract signed by the parties was silent as to the time of payment. The legal effect of the contract was, therefore, to make the price of the goods payable on delivery. Fessenden v. Mussey, 11 Cush. 127. Stephenson v. Cady, 117 Mass. 6. Morton v. Clark, 181 Mass. 134. Both the auditor and the judge found that the parties subsequently, by their conduct in regard to the various shipments made and bills rendered and payments of the bills, impliedly agreed with each other that the writing should be modified in its legal effect in this particular, and that the terms of payment should be cash in thirty days after the delivery of each shipment. All the bills were made with a statement to this effect, and the plaintiff never objected to it, but acted in a way to indicate that it adopted this modification of the contract proposed by the defendant. We are of opinion that this finding was well warranted by the evidence.
The crisis came when, on July 18, the defendant being much behind in its shipments and the plaintiff being much behind in its payments, the plaintiff wrote to the defendant, demanding prompt shipments in accordance with its orders, and stating that on the defendant’s failure to fill the orders promptly, it should buy in the market and charge the defendant with the excess above the contract price. The market price of cement had risen considerably after the date of the contract. To this letter the defendant replied on July 21, demanding payment of so much of the account as was overdue, with prompt remittances in the future. In this letter the defendant stated that it would make no more shipments until it received payment for the two items which were then overdue. The plaintiff answered this letter on
Up to the time of the writing of the defendant’s letter of July 21, demanding payment of the overdue account and refusing to deliver any more cement until this should be paid, the plaintiff made no claim upon the defendant for damages caused by the delay in filling orders, and it does not appear that the plaintiff had suffered any substantial damages. Upon the evidence, the judge might well find that the plaintiff waived any claim that it might have made on account of the defendant’s default up to that time. Of course it had a right to insist upon perfect performance in the future; but the plaintiff’s failure to pay for the cement when the bills were due left the defendant with a right to insist at any time that these payments should be made. Such payments might be demanded as a condition precedent to the delivery of any more cement. Eastern Forge Co. v. Corbin, 182 Mass. 590, 593. National Machine & Tool Co. v. Standard Shoe Machinery Co. 181 Mass. 275, 279. Stephenson v. Cady, 117 Mass. 6. Wilkinson v. Blount Manuf. Co. 169 Mass. 374. The defendant made its demand, and stood on its right to have pay before making any more deliveries. The plaintiff sought to hold the money as security for damages from possible breaches of the contract by the defendant in the future.
We think it quite plain that the plaintiff could not lawfully do this. It could not be known that there would be any breach of the contract of the defendant in the future if 'the plaintiff made the payments then due and afterwards paid promptly. One who contracts for the purchase of goods by instalments cannot lawfully demand performance of the contract, and at the same time withhold payments due for instalments already received in order to protect himself from anticipated breaches of the contract by the seller. Stephenson v. Cady, 117 Mass. 6, 9, 10. Spaulding v. Backus, 122 Mass. 553. Wiley v. Bunker Hill
Upon the findings of the judge, the first request of the plaintiff for a ruling was rightly refused. The second, third and fourth requests of the plaintiff were also rightly refused. The matters referred to in them were all proper for consideration on the question whether the parties, after the making of the contract, by the new arrangement impliedly agreed that the payments might be made at the expiration of thirty days’ credit. If, as the plaintiff argues, under a contract calling for cash on delivery, the effect upon the rights of the parties of delivering goods without payment at the time might be different as to future performance without payment of the goods already delivered, from the effect of such deliveries without payment when payments are'due under a contract giving a specified credit, then the change in the time for payment was material. If the law is the same when the contract calls for cash on delivery as when the sales are on credit, these matters, did the plaintiff no harm.
The rulings given in accordance with the defendant’s requests are covered by what we have already said. In both cases the entry will be
Exceptions overruled.