National Capital Presbytery v. NielsenNational Capital Presbytery v. Nielsen
Case Information
*1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA NATIONAL CAPITAL PRESBYTERY et al .,
Plaintiffs , v. Civil Action No. 18-2681 (TJK) ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS et al .,
Defendants. [1]
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs challenge Defendants’ denial of National Capital Presbytery’s petition to renew the nonimmigrant religious worker visa for one of its congregation’s ministers. They argue the denial violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. They also seek a writ of mandamus. Before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant both motions in part and deny them in part and remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings.
Background
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background
“The Immigration and Nationality Act allows ministers and other religious workers to
enter and stay in the United States under a non-immigrant visa, known as an R-1 visa, for up to
five years.”
Iglesia Pentecostal Casa de Dios Para Las Naciones, Inc. v. Duke
, 718 F. App’x
646, 648 (10th Cir. 2017);
see also
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(R), (27)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.5(m),
214.2(r). “To obtain the visa, a religious organization seeking to hire and sponsor an R-1
applicant petitions the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”).”
Iglesia
Pentecostal
,
A petitioner can show how it intends to compensate an R-1 applicant by submitting several types of documents to USCIS. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(r)(11). The petitioner must “state how the petitioner intends to compensate the alien, including specific monetary or in-kind compensation, or whether the alien intends to be self-supporting. In either case, the petitioner must submit verifiable evidence explaining how the petitioner will compensate the alien.” Id. Evidence of compensation “may include past evidence of compensation for similar positions; budgets showing monies set aside for salaries, leases, etc.; verifiable documentation that room and board will be provided; or other evidence acceptable to USCIS.” Id . § 214(r)(11)(i). If the petitioner can submit IRS documents “such as IRS Form W-2 or certified tax returns,” it must do so. Id. If not, “the petitioner must submit an explanation for the absence of IRS documentation, along with comparable, verifiable documentation.” The petitioner “must prove by a preponderance of evidence that he or she is eligible for the benefit sought.” Matter of Chawathe , 25 I & N. Dec. 369, 375 (2010).
B. Procedural Background
Presbyterian Church USA is the largest Presbyterian denomination in the United States. ECF No. 23-1 ¶ 1. The Church is divided into many regional presbyteries, which are subdivided into local congregations. The Church, regional presbyteries, and local congregations are all distinct legal entities, but they act as “one ecclesiastical body.” Id. National Capital Presbytery (“NCP”) is a regional presbytery and Mizo Presbyterian Church (“Mizo”) is a local congregation within NCP’s geographic bounds. ECF No. 1-4 at 2. Both are chartered entities under the Presbyterian Church. ECF No. 23-1 ¶¶ 2, 4. The Church’s governing document is the Book of Order. Id. ¶ 3. Section G-2.0505 of the Book allows presbyteries, including NCP, to “recognize the ordination and receive as a member of presbytery a new immigrant minister” for “immigrant fellowships and congregations.”
In 2014, NCP filed an I-129 petition for an R-1 visa for Reverend Lal Engzau, an ordained Presbyterian minister and citizen of Myanmar. Id . ¶ 5 NCP represented that it would offer Rev. Engzau $43,041 in annual compensation: “$16,786 for wages; $14,868 for housing; $3,684 for utilities; $2,703 for ‘Self Employment Contribution Act’; and $5,000 for medical insurance.” ECF No. 19-2 ¶ 21. In 2015, USCIS approved the petition, ECF No. 23-1 ¶ 5, and in April of that year, Rev. Engzau and his wife were admitted to the United States. ECF No. 1-2 at 5.
In July 2017, NCP petitioned to renew Rev. Engzau’s visa. [2] ECF No. 19-2 ¶ 1. In its petition, NCP represented that it would offer the following compensation package to Rev. Engzau: “$33,000 for wages; $3,000 for ‘Self Employment Contribution Act’; and $14,000 for medical insurance.” ECF No. 19-2 ¶ 2. This reconfiguration of Rev. Engzau’s compensation package reflected NCP’s decision in 2016 to structure his compensation to “combine salary, housing and utility payments in to a salary.” ECF No. 1-2 at 5. NCP also attested that it was “willing and able to provide salaried or non-salaried compensation to [Rev. Engzau],” ECF No. 19-2 ¶ 3, and certified that it was the “Employing Organization,” id. ¶ 4.
NCP submitted several documents with its petition. The documents included Rev. Engzau’s employment contract, Mizo church’s budget, checks from Rev. Engzau’s personal checking account to a utility company, and proof that Mizo had made out three checks to Rev. Engzau in June 2017—two for $1,375 for the pay periods of that month, and a third check for $105.47 with “TA” written in the memo line. Id. ¶¶ 6–8, 11. The documents also included a housing contract showing that Rev. Engzau and his wife were tenants under a lease signed by Mizo, and that Mizo was responsible for lease payments of $11,358, $7,400, and $14,500 in 2015, 2016, and 2017, respectively. Id. ¶ 9–10.
NCP also provided various tax documents. Id. ¶ 12. Rev. Engzau’s 2015 W-2 reflected Mizo paid him a salary of $12,979 and provided housing worth $12,979. Id. ¶ 13. His 2015 Form 1040 also showed he received a salary of $12,979. Id. ¶ 14. His 2016 W-2 stated that he received a salary and housing from Mizo, both worth $16,000. Id. ¶ 15. And his 2016 Form 1040 likewise reflected a salary of $16,000. Id. ¶ 16. None of the petition documents reported any health insurance or utility payment compensation to Rev. Engzau. Id. ¶¶ 17–18.
In September 2017, USCIS issued a request for evidence (“RFE”) pertaining to, among other things, Rev. Engzau’s compensation. Id. ¶¶ 22–23. USCIS raised two compensation- related issues. ¶¶ 24–25. First, USCIS noted that the documents NCP submitted revealed that Mizo—not NCP—compensated Rev. Engzau in violation of the requirement “that the petitioner compensate the beneficiary, not a third-party organization.” ECF Nos. 1-5 at 4; 19-2 ¶ 24; 23-1 ¶ 7. Second, USCIS stated that “even if third-party compensation were permissible, no evidence of medical insurance was found, and the wage and tax statement reflects that Mizo [] provided a salary less than $16,786.” ECF No. 1-5 at 4.
NCP responded to USCIS by submitting a letter from Reverend Karen Chamis. ECF No. 19-2 . ¶ 26. Rev. Chamis explained that “based on [the Presbyterian Church’s] connectional theology [] [NCP] petitioned for Rev. Lal Engzau to serve at the Mizo church.” ¶ 27. Rev. Chamis submitted additional documents to USCIS, including: (1) a portion of a residential dwelling lease listing Rev. Engzau and his wife as tenants and showing rent of $1,450 per month for May 2015 through April 2016; (2) an addendum to the residential lease dated April 2016 extending its terms through May 2017; (3) a 2016 IRS Form 1095-A (Health Insurance Marketplace Statement) reflecting health insurance coverage for Rev. Engzau and his wife, and reflecting annual total costs of about $6,000; and (4) dental insurance cards for both of them and a dental health plan application summary. Id. ¶ 28. NCP also submitted a bank account statement showing more than sufficient funds to pay Rev. Engzau’s salary going forward. ECF No. 23-1 ¶ 8.
In January 2018, the Director of the USCIS California Service Center denied NCP’s renewal petition. ECF No. 19-2 ¶ 31. The Director concluded the record did not credibly establish that NCP intended to provide Rev. Engzau the petition’s proposed compensation for two reasons. First, NCP had not shown it, as the petitioner, intended to compensate Rev. Engzau because it did not “control[] the funds of [Mizo] or can otherwise legally require that [Mizo] provide any particular amount or form of compensation to the beneficiary.” ECF No. 1-1 at 4–5. Second, the Director found that NCP had not shown that it could pay Rev. Engzau the stated compensation because “[e]ven if [Mizo] acts on [NCP’s] behalf, the fact that [NCP], through [Mizo], did not provide the beneficiary a salary of $16,786 in 2016 in accordance with the terms of the prior petition casts doubt on [NCP’s] intention to provide the beneficiary a salary of $33,000 in accordance with the terms of the instant position.” Id . at 5. The Director added that NCP’s other evidence did not “acknowledge or address the [intended compensation] inconsistency,” id. , nor establish, by preponderance of the evidence, that NCP “intend[ed] to provide the beneficiary the proposed compensation.”
NCP appealed the denial to the USCIS Administrative Appeals Office (“AAO”). ECF No. 19-2 ¶ 38. NCP acknowledged the “inconsistent reporting of the compensation package” between the initial Form I-129 petition and the renewal petition. Id. ¶ 41. But it explained it had “changed its compensation guidelines in between the two filings which created some appearance that the compensation packages were very different and that Reverend Engzau was not getting paid what the church said it would pay him.” Id. Though its original proposed compensation package to Rev. Engzau included separate line items for his wages, housing, and utilities, NCP changed the compensation structure in 2016 to combine his wages, housing, and utilities into one salary payment, rather than breaking out housing and utilities as separate line items. Id. ¶ 42. NCP also explained that its decision to petition for Rev. Engzau’s visa rather than Mizo was a “matter of ecclesiastical governance and therefore religious exercise.” Id. ¶ 45. And NCP requested an exemption from USCIS’s requirement that Mizo, rather than NCP, act as the petitioner because that requirement substantially burdened its exercise of religion under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). Id. ¶¶ 45–47.
On appeal, the AAO affirmed the Director’s determination that NCP failed to establish its intent to provide the proposed compensation to Rev. Engzau. ¶ 52. In conducting its review, the AAO considered the 2015 and 2016 W-2s and 1040s; the 2016 1095-A; Mizo’s May 2015 to October 2017 lease listing Rev. Engzau and his wife as occupants and reflecting monthly rent of $1,450 per month; Rev. Engzau’s electricity bill payments; and the dental insurance cards and February 2017 health insurance plan summary. ECF No.1-2 at 4–5.
The AAO found that NCP had established it paid Rev. Engzau’s 2015 salary and housing costs. at 5. However, the AAO held there was no evidence NCP compensated him for his utilities or health insurance and that, according to its calculations, the total amount of documented compensation was more than $4,000 less than the prorated offered compensation. Id. As to the 2016 compensation, the AAO found that Rev. Engzau received $32,000 in the form of salary and housing, but that there was no evidence NCP compensated him for his utility costs. Id. The AAO noted that the “Form 1095-A indicates that healthcare premiums exceeding the offered amount were paid” but “the record does not include evidence that these premiums were paid by the Petitioner or that the Beneficiary was reimbursed.” Id. Accordingly, the AAO found that documented compensation to Rev. Engzau in 2016 was more than $11,000 less than offered. Id.
The AAO also considered NCP’s representation that it had changed Rev. Engzau’s compensation package to combine his salary, housing, and utilities into a $32,000 salary with $13,500 in medical insurance benefits. The AAO found that the compensation restructuring did “not resolve the discrepancy between the actual compensation and [NCP’s] attestation on the [2014] petition,” id., and that NCP “did not file an amended Form I-129 in 2016 to reflect these changes” to Rev. Engzau’s compensation, id. at 5 n.1. Given that the renewal petition raised the offered compensation to “$33,000 in salary and $14,000 for medical insurance,” the AAO held “the evidence of the Beneficiary’s past compensation detailed above does not establish how the Petitioner intends to provide the increased compensation offered in the instant petition.” Id. The AAO affirmed the Director’s decision but noted it “need not address the issue of the source of the compensation.” at 5 n.2 .
C. This Lawsuit
NCP, Mizo, Rev. Engzau, and his wife (“Plaintiffs”) sued in November 2018. ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs argue that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director of USCIS, USCIS, and the United States (“Defendants”), violated RFRA and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), by denying Rev. Engzau’s renewal petition. Id. ¶¶ 40–47; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1; 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq . They seek a declaratory judgment that Defendants’ decision was in error, that Defendants must approve the renewal petition, and that NCP may petition on behalf of nonimmigrant religious workers, even if the minister will serve a local congregation like Mizo. ¶¶ 48–51. Finally, Plaintiffs request an order of mandamus directing Defendants to reverse their denial of NCP’s visa renewal petition for Rev. Engzau and approve it. ¶¶ 52–53, at 16.
Legal Standard
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if a dispute over it “might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law,” and a dispute is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
, 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must “go beyond the pleadings and
by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
,
Analysis
A. RFRA
Plaintiffs argue that the Director’s denial of NCP’s renewal petition and the AAO’s
affirmation of that decision violate RFRA. “In 1990, the Supreme Court held in
Employment
Division v. Smith
,
RFRA accomplishes this goal by “prohibit[ing] the federal government from
‘substantially burden[ing]’ a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability unless the government can demonstrate that ‘application of the burden to
the person–(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.’”
Kaemmerling v. Lappin
,
1. Standing to Challenge the Director’s Determination
Defendants make a threshold challenge to Plaintiffs’ standing to challenge the Director’s
finding that NCP violated the third-party payment prohibition and the intent to compensate
requirement. ECF No. 19-1 at 24–26. A party invoking federal court jurisdiction must show
they meet the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of Article III standing.
Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins
,
Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the Director’s decision. That is so because the
AAO’s decision, which binds the parties and represents the agency’s last word, superseded the
Director’s initial determination.
[3]
Even if the Court found that the Director’s decision was
unlawful, such a finding would not affect the petition denial because the AAO independently
found that denial was warranted.
[4]
Thus, any injury Plaintiffs suffered from the petition denial is
neither traceable to the Director’s decision nor redressable by invalidating the decision. This
means Plaintiffs do not have Article III standing to challenge the Director’s decision. To the
extent Plaintiffs request review of the decision to avoid future petition denials based on third-
party compensation, their asserted injury is speculative and insufficient to support standing.
See
Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. USA
,
2. The AAO Decision
Turning to the AAO decision, in determining whether the decision violated RFRA, the
Court “first must determine if [Plaintiffs have shown] a substantial burden on [their] religious
exercise.”
Kaemmerling
,
First, the government’s action here implicates NCP’s religious exercise by interfering
with NCP’s decision to employ Rev. Engzau as its minister and compensate him as it chooses.
The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence is instructive to understand the rights
secured by RFRA.
See Roman Catholic Archbishop of Wash. v. Bowser
, No. 20-cv-3625
(TNM),
In that context, the Supreme Court has recognized a “ministerial exception,” grounded in
both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, that precludes the government from
interfering with a religious organization’s selection of its ministers.
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C.
,
Though neither the Supreme Court nor the D.C. Circuit has held that RFRA incorporates
the ministerial exception, the Court has no doubt that RFRA protects the free exercise rights the
exception secures. To begin with, the Circuit has held that RFRA precluded a Title VII claim
because “the Government’s interest in eliminating employment discrimination is insufficient to
overcome a religious institution’s interest in being able to employ the ministers of its choice.”
E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ. of Am
.,
Second, NCP’s appointment of Rev. Engzau was grounded in NCP’s sincerely held beliefs as a member of Presbyterian Church USA. [7] The Church’s Book of Order provides that its responsibilities include “commissioning, sending, and support of such mission personnel as will spread the good news of the grace of Jesus Christ to the world and foster the growth and development of God’s people.” [8] To that end, a presbytery serving immigrant communities may, “if it determines that its strategy for mission with that group requires it, recognize the ordination and receive as a member of presbytery a new immigrant minister who furnishes evidence of good standing in a denomination.” ECF No. 23-1 ¶ 3. NCP filed the visa petition for Rev. Engzau in accordance with the Book of Order, so he could serve the Mizo congregation. ¶¶ 4–6; ECF No. 1-4 ¶ 2.
Third, Plaintiffs have shown that the AAO’s decision substantially burdened NCP’s
religious exercise. As noted, “[a] substantial burden exists where the state conditions receipt of
an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on
an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.”
Sample v. Lappin
, 424 F. Supp.
2d 187, 193 (D.D.C. 2016) (citation omitted);
see Thomas
,
Defendants argue that the reasoning of an unpublished Tenth Circuit decision,
Iglesia
Pentecostal Casa De Dios Para Las Naciones, Inc. v. Duke
,
In contrast, the AAO’s decision here did not turn on a failure by NCP or Mizo to document how they paid for Rev. Engzau’s health care or utility costs. Given how NCP chose to structure the compensation, the specific types of proof the AAO required did not—and could not —have existed. And unlike in that case, the parties agree that NCP provided evidence that it and Mizo had more than enough funds to pay Rev. Engzau a $32,000 salary for the next year. For these reasons, in this case, the AAO’s decision crossed the line into substantially burdening NCP’s free exercise right to decide how to compensate Rev. Engzau.
Once a plaintiff establishes a substantial burden, the government must show it has a
compelling interest justifying that action and that the action is the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
,
Plaintiffs note that Defendants promulgated the compensation regulation to improve its “ability to detect and deter fraud and other abuses in the religious worker program.” 73 Fed. Reg. 72,276 (Nov. 26, 2008). And the preamble to the religious worker regulations justified the rules by citing a Government Accountability Office report that highlighted problems with fraudulent applications:
The report stated that the fraud often involved false statements by petitioners about the length of time that the applicants were members of the religious organizations, the petitioners’ qualifying work experience and the positions being filled. The report also noted problems with applicants making false statements about their qualifications and exact plans in the United States. In 2005, USCIS’s Office of Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) estimated that approximately one-third of applications and petitions filed for religious worker admission were fraudulent.
FDNS found that a significant number of the fraudulent petitions identified had been filed on behalf of non-existent organizations.
FDNS also found a significant number of petitions that contained material misrepresentations in the documentation submitted to establish eligibility.
No doubt, the government’s interest in preventing fraud is generally a compelling
government interest.
See Duke
, 286 F. Supp. 3d at1265 (“[P]reventing immigration fraud is
likely a compelling state interest” under RFRA);
see also Bowen v. Roy
,
3. Remedy
The Court will remand this matter to USCIS for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
See
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) (authorizing “appropriate relief against a government”).
The Court declines to order USCIS to approve NCP’s petition because the AAO may still
determine that denial is appropriate, either on the third-party compensation issue not before the
Court or on “new grounds of ineligibility not addressed in the initial decision.” USCIS,
AAO
Practice Manual
§ 3.14(b), available at https://www.uscis.gov/administrative-appeals/aao-
practice-manual/chapter-3-appeals (last updated Aug. 27, 2021). For the same reasons, the Court
finds declaratory relief unnecessary since it has already held that Defendants violated RFRA by
applying it to deny NCP’s visa petition.
See Winpisinger v. Watson
,
B. APA
The Court will grant Defendants’ summary judgment motion as to Plaintiffs’ APA claim.
The APA creates a cause of action to challenge “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and
final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704.
When determining whether an alternative “adequate remedy exists, [courts focus] on whether a
statute provides an independent cause of action or an alternative review procedure.”
El Rio
Santa Cruz Neighborhood Health Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.
, 396 F.3d
1265, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 2005). For example, “relief will be deemed adequate ‘where a statute
affords an opportunity for
de novo
district-court review’ of the agency action.”
Garcia v.
Vilsack
,
Plaintiffs do not have a cause of action under the APA because RFRA provides an
adequate remedy. RFRA provides an independent cause of action that allows for “appropriate
relief against a government.” 42 U.S.C § 2000bb–1(c). The Supreme Court has instructed that
because this language is so “open-ended,” relief under RFRA is flexible enough to be “inherently
context dependent.”
Tanzin v. Tanvir
,
C. Mandamus
The Court will also grant Defendants’ summary judgment motion as to Plaintiffs’
mandamus request. Mandamus is a “drastic” remedy.
Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell
, 812 F.3d
183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2016). “To show entitlement to mandamus, plaintiffs must demonstrate (1) a
clear and indisputable right to relief, (2) that the government agency or official is violating a
clear duty to act, and (3) that no adequate alternative remedy exists.”
Id.
(citations omitted).
“These three threshold requirements are jurisdictional; unless all are met, a court must dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction.”
Id.
For all the reasons already explained, RFRA provides an
adequate remedy for Plaintiffs, and thus this claim must be dismissed. Finally, the Court notes
that Plaintiffs ask it to enter a mandamus order directing USCIS to grant NCP’s renewal petition.
ECF No. 20-1 at 33. But Plaintiffs have not shown a “clear and indisputable right” to that relief,
given that, as also discussed above, the AAO could still deny the petition on grounds unrelated to
the issues addressed in this opinion.
Am. Hosp. Ass’n
,
Conclusion
For the above reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 19, will be granted in part and denied in part, and Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 20, will be granted in part and denied in part. The Court will remand this matter to USCIS for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. A separate order will issue.
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: October 19, 2021
Notes
[1] Defendant Alejandro Mayorkas, who assumed office as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security in February 2021, is automatically substituted for Kirstjen Nielsen under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).
[2] NCP also filed an I-539 petition for Rev. Engzau’s wife, to renew her R-2 Visa for Family of Religious Workers. ECF No. 23-1 ¶ 10. Her petition, in the end, is tied to Rev. Engzau’s R-1 status.
[3] The AAO’s decision is “binding on the parties.” USCIS,
Precedent and Non-Precedent
Decisions of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
, at 2 (Nov. 18, 2013) (explaining effect of
AAO decisions). And it is a final agency decision.
See Herrera v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr.
Servs.
,
[4] “The AAO is independent of the field offices, and exercises de novo review of all issues of fact, law, policy, and discretion. This means that, on appeal, the AAO looks at the record anew and its decision may address new issues that were not raised or resolved in the prior decision.” USCIS, AAO Practice Manual § 3.4, available at https://www.uscis.gov/administrative- appeals/aao-practice-manual/chapter-3-appeals (last updated Aug. 27, 2021).
[5] Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ RFRA claim is barred by the language in the rule’s summary preamble, which states that “[a]n organization or individual who believes that the RFRA may require specific relief form any provision of this regulation may assert such a claim at the time they petition for benefits under the regulation.” ECF No. 19-1 at 5 (quoting 73 Fed. Reg. 72,276, 72,283 (Nov. 26, 2008)). But this language merely invites RFRA exemption requests at the time of petition, rather than requiring them. See Singh v. Carter , 168 F. Supp. 3d 216, 226 (D.D.C. 2016) (declining to impose lower-proceeding exhaustion requirement because RFRA “provides no textual support for the [] position that the plaintiff is required to exhaust administrative remedies”).
[6] Although the Supreme Court only recognized the ministerial exception relatively recently,
see Hosanna-Tabor
,
[7] Though the Court finds that Plaintiffs have met RFRA’s “sincerely held belief” requirement,
under these circumstances, they could likely show that Defendants burdened their free exercise
rights even without linking those rights to a sincerely held belief. In
E.E.O.C.
, the D.C. Circuit
held that the government’s interest in applying Title VII was “insufficient to overcome a
religious institution’s interest in being able to employ the ministers of its choice” but did not
identify the organization’s sincerely held belief.
[8] See ECF No. 20-1 at 11 n.3 (providing link to the Book of Order).
[9] Nothing in RFRA limits a Court’s review to the administrative record, and so the Court will
accept Plaintiffs’ supplementary exhibits. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb
et seq.
;
see also O Centro
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal v. Duke
,
[10] Plaintiffs more evidence to the Court establishing that, in 2017 and 2018, Engzau and his wife received health insurance benefits worth $11,418 and $19,824. ECF Nos. 25-2; 25-3.
[11] Plaintiffs also argue that the AAO miscalculated the prorated compensation amount NCP documented in 2015. ECF No. 20-1 at 29. They claim the documented wage compensation shows an annual rate of payment of $36,663, meaning that they overcompensated Rev. Engzau by about $5,000. Plaintiffs imply that this amount, which is close to the proffered $6,387 in utility payments and Self Employment Contribution Act allowance, went toward Rev. Engzau’s utility costs. Defendants do not contest this point.
[12] The AAO decision “note[d] that [NCP] did not file an amended Form I-129 in 2016 to reflect the [changes] to [Rev. Engzau’s] compensation.” ECF No. 1-2 at 5 n.1. As Plaintiffs point out, the regulations do not require a religious organization to give USCIS notice of a change of their internal compensation structure. ECF No. 24 at 6. And Defendants cite no requirement either.