402 Pa. 501 | Pa. | 1961
Lead Opinion
Opinion by
These cases arise out of a convention of five thousand or more of plaintiffs membership that was held in Philadelphia, between September 6 and 11, 1960.
In the first case the complaint in equity, filed on September 9, averred that a small faction of the Convention, including the defendants, disrupted the meetings by yelling and screaming in the aisles and not only prevented the delivery of inspiring sermons but during an adjournment caused the election of defendants to the principal offices of the Convention despite the approval by full Convention vote of 3500 to 500 of a nominating committee’s slate of officers; the defendants and their cohorts then made it impossible for Dr. Jackson, President of the Convention, to continue its business. The court below, also on September 9, granted the prayer of the complaint and issued a preliminary injunction upon affidavits, enjoining defendants from obstructive conduct and requiring a bond.
No hearing was held on this injunction within five days after granting it and hence it must be deemed to have dissolved, under Buie 1531 (d) of the Buies of Civil Procedure. It also became moot when the Convention adjourned on September 12, since by its terms it was pitched to the continuation of the Convention and had no life after. See Wortex Mills v. Textile Workers’ Union of America, CIO, 369 Pa. 359 (1952), 85 A. 2d 851.
On September 12 defendants filed an answer and counterclaim, to which plaintiff filed preliminary objections. The court below sustained them, although it mistakenly referred to them as defendants’ objections, and dismissed both the complaint, as moot, and the counterclaim, as raising a legal rather than an equitable position which in any event would involve the court in regulating or interfering with the internal affairs of a foi*eign corporation. The defendants appealed.
“The general rule is that wMle courts of one state have power to assume jurisdiction of actions by nonresidents against foreign corporations, they will not ordinarily interfere in controversies relating merely to the internal management of the affairs of the foreign corporation. Wettengel v. Robinson, 288 Pa. 362; Cunliffe v. Consumers Association of America, 280 Pa. 263; Loan Society of Phila. v. Eavenson, 241 Pa. 65; Mad
“In the instant case, the Baptist Convention is a District of Columbia corporation. The only contact this state had with it was that its annual convention was held in Philadelphia and service thus was obtained here. This fact does not sufficiently outweigh the principle that we refrain from interfering with the internal affairs of this corporation. No great hardship should result from this conclusion since the courts of the District of Columbia are open. Nor is the plight of the parties worsened from a geographic point of view. Many of the parties and proposed witnesses are not
Since the injunction was automatically dissolved and the merits within its embrasure are moot, and since the only preliminary objection was that of .the plaintiff to the defendants’ counterclaim, we take this to be the objection inadvertently referred to by the court below as “defendants’ preliminary objections” and affirm the order sustaining it and dismissing the complaint and the counterclaim. 'Costs to be paid by appellants.
In the second case a complaint only was filed, alleging that plaintiff was a delegate to the Baptist Convention; that defendants had served as Treasurer and General Secretary, respectively, until the opening of the Convention, when they failed of re-election; that they were called upon to turn over the books and records of the Convention to their successors in office on demand following appropriate resolutions; and that the Convention is a corporation organized under the laws of the District of Columbia.
The court below enjoined defendants from acting as officers and from interfering or disposing of the books and records. Preliminary objections were filed and a hearing on both complaints was had. The court sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed the complaint in an opinion and by an order covering both complaints, since the legal issues were the same, excepting only that the issue over books and records in the second complaint did not fall moot with the end
Hence we affirm the dismissal of the second complaint, at the cost of the appellant.
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
When a foreign corporation comes into our Commonwealth and invokes the jurisdiction of our courts of equity and secures a preliminary restraining order, it should not then be permitted to withdraw from the very jurisdiction that it invoked and thus defeat the power of our courts to do complete equity and justice for both litigants.
I also do not think the doctrine of forum non conveniens should bar a counterclaim against a foreign corporation which institutes suit in this jurisdiction. However, if a majority of my colleagues feel that the doctrine of forum non conveniens can be applied in such a situation they should, nevertheless, remand these cases so that the court below can make a correct finding as to whether the doctrine should be invoked in light of the particular facts of these cases. In Plum v. Tampax, Inc., 399 Pa. 553, 160 A. 2d 549 (1960), when we reversed the ruling of the court below and remanded the case, we used the following language, “Proper application of the doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens necessitates that the court below make a finding as to the availability of other forums and then exercise its discretion after considering all the factors.” (Emphasis supplied.) I fail to see how a valid finding could have been made or discretion properly exercised since the record fails to indicate that the court below