163 Pa. 467 | Pa. | 1894
Opinion by
When the plaintiff received the bill of lading for the car in question, and the draft for $228 on Holloway & Co., it was entitled to demand the money from Holloway & Co., or, they failing in its payment, it could demand the car of feed from the railroad company defendant, on payment of freight and charges. While it is true that Holloway & Co. -were not the nominal consignees, they were the real consignees, as was evidenced by the draft drawn on them and the notice clause in the bill of lading, viz, “ Notify Holloway & Co.” In -point of fact Holloway & Co. were notified and they paid the draft. This would ordinarily entitle them to the bill of lading, and with it and the paid draft, they could demand and would be entitled to receive, the car of feed from the defendant railroad company. But in order to make payment of the draft Holloway & Co. borrowed the money from- the plaintiff in this way. They drew a draft of their own on Dr. J. G. Hillegas of Pennsburg, Pa., for $331.60, attached it to the original bill of lading from the Kratochwill Milling Co., who were the shippers of the car in the first instance, and the plaintiff bank discounted this new draft and passed the proceeds to the credit of Hollowajr & Co.’s account with them. ■ Then Holloway & Co. drew a check for $228 against their account and delivered it to the plaintiff who charged their account therewith. It is necessary to consider this transaction with much care in order to determine its true character and effect. As a matter of course the bank not only knew precisely what was done, but they directly participated in the arrangement and became a most active party to it. Under the original bill of-lading they were the owners of the car load of feed. Being in that position they permitted Holloway & Co. to draw their draft on Hillegas for a still larger amount than the original purchase money of the feed, and thereby to assume the position of consignor of the car and its contents to Hillegas as consignee. This was the exercise
Returning to the subject of Holloway & Co.’s intervention in the control and disposition of the car load of feed, we must note the fact that on July 9, 1888, when the draft on Hillegas was drawn, the car was on the way in the course of its transhipment. It was subject to the control of the plaintiff as holders of the bill of lading, and they were at liberty to exercise that right either directly by themselves, or through the intervention of any agent whom they might select for that purpose. The car, being on the road, would naturally proceed to its destination at Lansdale, Pa. But in order to have it delivered to Hillegas, it was necessary to await its arrival at Lansdale and then re-ship it to Hillegas, or to divert it on the road by an order to that effect. In point of fact this car never went to Lansdale or to Pennsburg. The latter was the station nearest to Hillegas. It was diverted by the order of Holloway on July 24th, and consigned by him to Heiser & Lutz at Stevens’ station, Lancaster county, where it arrived on July 26th. Holloway & Co. drew a draft on Heiser & Lutz in favor of the National Bank of Lincoln, Pa., for $246.80, and sent it to the bank with a written order for the delivery of the car to Heiser & Lutz. On the arrival of the order and draft the bank notified. Heiser & Lutz, who at once paid the draft, took up the order, and then taking the order of the consignors, Holloway & Co., and the paid draft, delivered them to the railroad company and received,the car of feed. Thus the consignor of the car ordered its delivery to the consignee and sent the order tc
The witness, Horace Lloyd, cashier óf the plaintiff bank, being examined in behalf of the plaintiff, thus testified : “ Q. Was this first draft of $228 paid by check ? A. Mr; Holloway paid it by check. Q. After discounting the draft of $331.60 which is now attached to the bill of lading, what did you do with both of them ? A. The draft for $331.60 was sent to the Perkiomen National Bank of East Greenville, the nearest point to the destination. Q. Was it paid? A. No, sir, it was not. Q. When was it returned to you? A. August 31st. Q. What year? A. 1888.” ;
After testifying to the course of dealing between the bank
The witness then proceeds to state that the bank still held unpaid the draft from November, 1887; another one from Dec. 14, 1887; another one from Dee. 16, 1887, which was an original draft never paid; another one from January 5, 1888; another from Jan. 7,1888; two others from Jan. 31, 1888; another from Feb. 1, 1888 ; another from Feb. 15,1888; another from June 6, 1888; another from June 8, 1888; another from June 16th; another from same date; another from June 25th; another from June 27th; another from July 3d; all of them unpaid and still on hand. All of the foregoing were held from times prior to the one of July 9, 1888, involved in this suit. ■ Others followed afterwards in the same course of dealing and with the same results. All were unpaid until in January, 1889, when this most extraordinary method of doing business came suddenly to an end by the failure of Holloway, and at that time the amount of these unpaid bills of lading and drafts which accrued against this one transportation company only was $4,863.66, and there were, besides, other large claims of the same character against other railroad companies upon similar transactions. As a matter of course the car loads of goods against which these bills of lading and drafts were drawn did not remain on the railroads, but were allowed by the plaintiff to go wherever Holloway chose to send them, and the bank, trusting to him 'for payment, parted with the control which they might have exercised through their bills of lading, gave no notice to the defendant that they held or ever- had any such bills until January, 1889, and then came forward with an enormous bill of nearly • $5,000 which was the result exclusively of their own gross negligence. Such conduct on the part of the plaintiff was not merely evidence of laches, it was laches itself of the grossest character; it was conclusively proved by the plaintiff’s own witnesses called and examined’on their behalf, and was therefore an entirely undisputed fact in the case, and the jury should have been so instructed.
Further evidence was given by the plaintiff’s witness Horace
No testimony could be more convincing, in truth conclusive, of the fact that the plaintiff bank allowed Holloway to assume control over the car loads of goods consigned to him, after they had received the bills of lading and drafts attached. They
Further proof from the same witness of the plaintiff is quite conclusive in this connection: “ Q. You knew he was handling the car? A. Yes, sir. Q. And that this was perishable material, that it was being sold to somebody; that it was not lying there all these years ? A. I supposed the railroad company had no right to deliver it; I -thought they might store it. Q. You knew he was handling these cars? A. Yes, sir. Q. And when a draft that you would discount came back dishonored, you knew he was handling that car in some way. You were not looking after it, were you? A. No, sir. Q. And you were not notifying the company that you held a bill of lading covering that car ? A. As I say, he would put us off by saying he had sold it, diverting it in some way.”
In the face of such testimony as this it seems grotesque to assert, or ’to argue, that the bank was at liberty to hold its original bill of lading for an indefinite time, months or years, without any presentation or even notice to the railroad company, upon the theory that the company was bound to hold the goods and store them awaiting the advent of a bill of lading of the mere existence -of which they never had the slightest knowledge. Especially is this so in view of- the fact that the great
The learned court below submitted the question of laches and agency to the jury with-instructions that if they found either they should render a verdict for the defendant. Of course this could only be done upon the theory that there was sufficient evidence in the case to justify such a verdict. But in our opinion there was no disputed question of fact upon either of these subjects, and there was therefore nothing to leave to the jury. The evidence was'altogether undisputed.’ It was given by the plaintiff and was. entirely uncontradicted. In fact it was simply overwhelming and there was nothing to countervail it.
At the end of the plaintiff’s téstimony the defendant’s cottnsel asked for a compulsory nonsuit, and we think a nonsuit should have been granted. The tenth point of the defendant requested a binding instruction to the jury to render a verdict for. the defendant, under all the evidence. We are clearly of opinion that this point should have been affirmed. Specifically' we sustain the third, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh assignments of error, and incline to sustain the fifth, but it is not necessary to discuss it.
Judgment reversed.