50 Vt. 622 | Vt. | 1878
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The only question presented for decision is as to the liability of the indorser, H. W. Lewis, upon the facts stated in the exceptions. H. W. Lewis was an accommodation indorser, and, as bearing upon the question of his legal liability, it is pertinent to consider what obligation he assumed as between himself and the holder of the note by such an indorsement. Hosmer, J., in speaking of such an indorsement in Buck v. Colton, 3 Conn. 129, says, that the contract of the indorser is not absolute but conditional. It is merely this; “If you use due diligence in demanding the money, and the maker refuses to pay it, and you will give me reasonable notice of this, I will pay you.” This rule is substantially the one laid down by the text-books upon bills of exchange and promissory notes, and in the reported cases as defining the nature and legal effect of the contract of indorsement by an accommodation indorser. And upon the question as to who must give the notice, it was held in Harris v. Robinson, 4 How. S. C. 336, that it would be sufficient if given by any person duly authorized by the holder. It is not claimed that any notice was in fact given of the non-payment of the note by the plaintiff or by Copeland, who was the owner and holder of the note. But it is claimed that the letter that the indorser wrote to the plaintiff, and which was received by it the day the note became due, was, in legal effect, a waiver of notice.
It is to be borne in mind that at the time that letter was written and received, the bank had no interest in the note, and it was not
Judgment affirmed.