135 A. 630 | Pa. | 1927
Defendant has moved to quash, on the grounds that the "order appealed from is purely interlocutory" and that "there is no act . . . . . . which authorizes the appeal."
The Act of June 12, 1879, P. L. 177, provides for an appeal "in all cases in equity in which a . . . . . . preliminary injunction has been refused." The present case involves an appeal from an order dissolving a preliminary injunction. The injunction under attack was first granted subject to a motion to continue, which motion was afterward overruled and the injunction dissolved. This state of affairs has repeatedly been treated by us as equivalent to the refusal of a preliminary injunction and as constituting an appealable order within the meaning of the Act of 1879; for recent instances see Lockwood v. Ambridge Borough,
Plaintiff's reply to defendant's motion to quash states that the "main issue" involved is the constitutionality of the Act of May 10, 1921, P. L. 442, and that this "can be disposed of upon the pending appeal and will probably be conclusive of the case."
In Casinghead G. Co. v. Osborn,
In order to bring a case within the above rule, on the theory that a statute, under which the court below has acted, is unconstitutional, it must plainly appear from the facts presented by the record, first, that the complainant is one who has been directly affected by what he claims to be the unconstitutional part or feature of the statute in question (Mesta Machine Co. v. Dunbar F. Co.,
The motion to quash is overruled. *230