NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LETTER CARRIERS, AFL-CIO, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Defendant.
Civil Action No. 19-2617 (JEB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
November 6, 2019
JAMES E. BOASBERG, United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant United States Postal Service has unilaterally reformed the duties and functions of letter carriers in the Annandale, Virginia, Post Office, requiring them to spend less time in the office and more time on the street. To boot, USPS is currently rolling out these test reforms at several hundred other post offices. Plaintiff, the National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO (NALC) — a labor union that represents postal employees — now moves for injunctive relief to block this new workplace initiative. NALC alleges that these actions constitute a breach of the parties’ operative collective-bargaining agreement and several Postal Service regulations. Later this month, the parties are scheduled to arbitrate this dispute under the terms of the CBA. But the Union asks this Court to intervene now, on the ground that Defendant‘s reforms are currently injuring its members’ physical health, damages that arbitration cannot remedy. It therefore seeks a preliminary injunction pending arbitration. Because such relief is unnecessary to protect the integrity of the arbitral process, the Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction to grant an injunction and will deny Plaintiff‘s Motion and dismiss the case.
I. Background
NALC represents city letter carriers employed by the Postal Service. See ECF No. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 1. USPS, in turn, is an independent agency of the Executive Branch, see
In particular, Article 34 lays out the procedure for testing potential changes in “work measurement systems or work or time standards.” ECF No. 2 (Plaintiff‘s Motion for Preliminary Injunction), Exh. 2 (Exhibit A – 2016 CBA), Art. 34(B). Article 34(C) provides that when USPS “determines the need to implement any new nationally developed and nationally applicable work or time standards, it will first conduct a test or tests of the standards in one or more installations.” And if a dispute arises involving the interpretation of the CBA, the parties’ agreement sets out a grievance procedure that includes national-level arbitration.
The conflict here centers around the Postal Service‘s Consolidated Casing Initiative (CCI), which is meant to streamline its operations. See Compl., ¶¶ 29–63. Ordinarily, a carrier‘s daily duties include both office time and street time.
According to Defendant, this model of doing business is outdated and has created operational inefficiencies, inflated costs,
On April 24, NALC responded by initiating a national-level grievance, alleging that the Service‘s actions violated the CBA.
This reform, the Union argues, has taken a heavy toll on some of its Annandale members.
At an impasse, the parties initially agreed to arbitrate their dispute on December 18, 2019, see ECF No. 21 (Arbitration Notice) at 2, and they have recently agreed to move up the date to November 22.
II. Legal Standard
The Union‘s Complaint and its Motion are coterminous, as they both raise exactly the same issue — whether the Court can enjoin the Postal Service from carrying out its initiative before the late-November arbitration. See Compl. at 12 (Prayer for Relief);
In considering such Motion, the Court must “treat the complaint‘s factual allegations as true and must grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.‘” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citation omitted) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). The Court need not accept as true, however, “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” nor an inference “unsupported by the facts
Under
III. Analysis
USPS offers two arguments to support dismissal. First, it asserts that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief. See Def. MTD at 11–17; ECF No. 18 (Defendant‘s Reply) at 1–6. Second, even if jurisdiction exists, Defendant contends that the Union has not carried its heavy burden to show that it is entitled to a preliminary injunction. See Def. MTD at 17–23; Def. Reply at 6–10. The Court‘s analysis begins and ends with jurisdiction, which does not exist here. It will first set out the legal framework governing this type of challenge in labor-law disputes and then apply it to the facts at hand.
A. Legal Framework
As a starting point, the Norris-LaGuardia Act generally withdrew the federal courts’ jurisdiction to enter injunctions in labor disputes. See
No court of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this chapter; nor shall any such . . . order . . . be issued contrary to the public policy declared in this chapter.
After the passage of the NLGA, however, Congress enacted the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA), which granted federal courts jurisdiction over suits alleging breach of collective-bargaining contracts. See
To accommodate these competing mandates, the Supreme Court carved out a “narrow” exception to the NLGA‘s proscription against enjoining labor disputes where an injunction is necessary to protect the integrity of the arbitration. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 238, 253–55 (1970) (upholding order enjoining strike pending resolution of arbitrable dispute through grievance process in collective-bargaining agreement); see also Indep. Oil & Chemical Workers of Quincy, Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 927, 930 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[T]o preserve the framework of collective bargaining, parties are sometimes thrown back to the courts.“) (citing Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 249–53). Six years later, the Court emphasized the narrow application of the Boys Markets exception, concluding that the justification for such an injunction is not to remedy a breach of the collective-bargaining agreement, but rather to hold the parties to their agreement to arbitrate. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 428 U.S. 397, 407–09 (1976) (“[A]side from the enforcement of the arbitration provisions of such contracts, within the limits permitted by Boys Markets, the Court has never indicated that the courts may enjoin actual or threatened contract violations despite the [NLGA].“).
Although Boys Markets and Buffalo Forge both arose in the context of an employer‘s seeking to enjoin a union from undermining arbitration, courts have applied these principles in the reverse situation — that is, when a union seeks an injunction against the employer. See, e.g., Niagara Hooker, 935 F.2d at 1377; Local Lodge No. 1266 v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276, 277, 283 (7th Cir. 1981); Lever Bros. Co. v. Int‘l Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115, 123 (4th Cir. 1976) (“Further, the rule contained in this case is obviously a two-sided coin. An injunction to preserve the status quo pending arbitration may be issued either against a company or against a union in an appropriate Boys Markets case . . . .“).
Typically, to obtain injunctive relief, a plaintiff must convince a court that the traditional requirements of equity — probability of success on the merits, irreparable injury, a balance of hardships, and the public interest — support the award. See Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 283. But where, as here, a court faces a request for a Boys Markets preliminary injunction, it must first account for the jurisdictional limitations set out by the NLGA. See, e.g., Columbia Local, Am. Postal Workers Union v. Bolger, 621 F.2d 615, 617 (4th Cir. 1980). Either way, a court “must avoid reaching the merits of arbitrable disputes.” Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, Teamsters Local Union No. 71 v. Akers Motor Lines, 582 F.2d 1336, 1342 (4th Cir. 1978).
When a court is deciding whether to issue an injunction against an employer, its focus must be on preserving the arbitration process. See Niagara Hooker, 935 F.2d at 1377 (finding that unilateral implementation of random drug testing challenged in grievance arbitration not subject to injunction). To grant such relief under the Boys Markets exception, therefore, a court begins by determining whether the underlying dispute is “subject to mandatory arbitration under the labor contract.”
To put a finer point on it, “[t]he arbitration process is rendered meaningless only if any arbitral award in favor of the union would substantially fail to undo the harm occasioned by the lack of a status quo injunction.” Id. at 1378; see also Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 282 (explaining that courts inquire whether “employer‘s action frustrates the arbitral process or deprives the union of an otherwise effective arbitral remedy“) (emphasis added). Consider, for example, the Fourth Circuit‘s decision to uphold an injunction that prevented a company from moving its entire operations out
The arbitral process, however, is “not rendered ‘meaningless[]’ . . . by the inability of an arbitrator to completely restore the status quo ante or by the existence of some interim damage that is irremediable.” Niagara Hooker, 935 F.2d at 1378; see United Rubber Workers v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 61 F.3d 1347, 1354 (8th Cir. 1995) (“The fact that the arbitration decision will not be able to restore perfectly the status quo ante is not enough; the injury must be irreparable and must ‘threaten the integrity of the arbitration process itself.‘“) (quoting Niagara Hooker, 935 F.2d at 1377). Indeed, mere incidental harms that occur during the pendency of the arbitration do not frustrate the arbitration process, even if an arbitrator is unable to remedy them. See Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 285 n.12 (“While awaiting a decision by an arbitrator on his grievance, an employee frequently suffers some injury that is not compensated by the contract remedies (in contrast to tort damages) typically awarded in arbitration. Although such injury is, in this sense, irreparable, it has never been understood to form the basis for injunctive relief against the employer.“) (citation omitted) (citing Payne, supra, at 198–200). Instead, “the irremediable injury in question must be such as to threaten the integrity of the arbitration process itself.” Niagara Hooker, 935 F.2d at 1378 (emphasis added); see also Am. Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Serv., 372 F. Supp. 2d 83, 91 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Thus, ‘[a]n injunction in aid of arbitration is appropriate . . . only when the actual or threatened harm to the aggrieved party amounts to a frustration or vitiation of arbitration.‘“) (quoting Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 286).
With that legal backdrop, the Court now proceeds to an analysis of the facts presented here.
B. Application
At the outset, the Court concludes that the contractual dispute here — viz., whether the Postal Service‘s roll-out of its CCI violates the CBA — is arbitrable. See Indep. Oil, 864 F.2d at 930. Neither party disputes this point, and binding arbitration is scheduled to begin later this month. See Arbitration Notice at 2.
So the Court now moves on to the more nettlesome inquiry: whether injunctive relief is necessary to preserve the arbitral process. See Niagara Hooker, 935 F.2d at 1377. In arguing the affirmative, NALC posits that if an arbitrator finds that USPS violated the CBA, he cannot fashion a remedy that would completely compensate the letter carriers. See ECF No. 15 (Plaintiff‘s Reply) at 13–17. In other
To begin, NALC does not contest that an arbitrator can remedy its members’ economic harms. See ECF No. 23 (Hearing Transcript) at 12. The parties, not surprisingly, disagree on whether Defendant‘s initiative is even responsible for such harm. NALC, for example, maintains that the reform has led to increased hours and overtime for street carriers. See Pl. PI Mot. at 8. The Annandale Postmaster rejoins that the increase in overtime is not due to the initiative itself, but rather to staffing issues. See Def. MTD, Exh. 4 (Declaration of Barbara Gauthier), ¶ 10. The Postal Service also points out that most overtime is voluntary and that several of the “declarants who complain about extended hours had actually signed up for additional overtime.” Def. MTD at 21 n.4 (citing Gauthier Decl., ¶¶ 11–12). The Union also notes that six carriers at the Annandale office have retired, resigned, or transferred to another station. See Pl. Opp. at 13. In response, Defendant points out that the Union offered evidence of only one carrier who stated that the initiative directly influenced her retirement plans. See Def. Reply at 6 n.4.
The Court, however, need not wade into these waters. Even assuming NALC is correct about the source of its members’ harms, if the Union were to prevail in arbitration, an arbitrator could award backpay and damages to the street carriers for their economic injuries. See Union Food and Commercial Workers Union v. Kroger Co., 778 F.2d 1171, 1176 (6th Cir. 1985); F. Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, Ch. 18 15–22 (8th ed. 2016) (explaining that arbitrators can order reinstatement, full back pay, front pay, and benefits); see also Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting that general rule in this Circuit is “that economic harm does not constitute irreparable injury“). Under these circumstances, the arbitration process would not be rendered a “hollow formality.” Niagara Hooker, 935 F.2d at 1379.
The bigger issue here, however, is the alleged non-economic injuries — i.e., the physical toll from increased pavement pounding. See Pl. PI Mot. at 8–10; 14–16; Hearing Transcript at 12. For example, NALC contends that Annandale‘s street carriers are now spending more time handling heavier satchels and are thus “experiencing physical exhaustion, ailments, pain and mental stress.” Pl. PI Mot. at 8–9. One carrier, for example, “suffered a groin strain,” while “another had to see a doctor for a foot ailment.”
Compounding matters, the Union says, is the Postal Service‘s decision to set a later start time for its street carriers. See Pl. PI Mot. at 9. Plaintiff maintains that this delay will create inconveniences both during and outside of working hours. During the workday, NALC asserts that its members will be more exposed to the heat of summer afternoons and will have fewer daylight hours to deliver mail in the fall and winter.
The Postal Service, for its part, has offered two contradictory responses to the
Now, in that briefing, the Postal Service, in an about-face, concedes that an arbitrator cannot remedy these non-economic harms. See ECF No. 20 (Defendant‘s Supplemental Memorandum) at 1–7. Instead, it posits that these injuries are insufficiently serious such that an absence of remedy would not frustrate the arbitral process.
For starters, Defendant‘s actions do not “deprive[] the union of an otherwise effective arbitral remedy.” Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 282 (emphasis added). Here, at bottom, the purpose of the arbitration is to resolve a breach-of-contract allegation — namely, whether USPS‘s initiative violates, inter alia, Article 34 of the CBA. There is no doubt that the arbitrator will hear the dispute this month and likely adjudicate it by early next year. He indeed may determine that this reform violates the contract and may order the test discontinued. He also may order the Postal Service to restore the status quo ante — that is, direct Defendant to return the carriers to both casing and street-delivery duties. On that basis, the arbitration process would fulfill its intended purpose. Under that scenario, the Union‘s success would be more than an “empty victory.” Bhd. of Locomotive Eng‘rs v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co., 363 U.S. 528, 534 (1960).
Additionally, commentators have noted that “very few employer actions would frustrate arbitration in the sense of rendering it a nullity.” Norman L. Cantor, Buffalo Forge and Injunctions Against Employer Breaches of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 1980 Wis. L. Rev. 247, 283; see
This was the case in United Steelworkers of Am. v. Blaw-Knox Foundry & Mill Mach., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 636 (W.D. Pa. 1970), where the court enjoined a metal foundry‘s unilateral implementation of a policy reducing the number of workers
Similarly, NALC‘s other allegations of irremediable harms do not merit judicial intervention. In Bolger, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court improperly enjoined the Postal Service from proceeding with its plan to eliminate a work shift and transfer employees into new positions within the same Post Office. See 621 F.2d at 616–17. The appellate court concluded that USPS‘s actions did not frustrate the arbitral process because the harms that would take place during the pendency of arbitration, including “reporting time, days off, vacation time and other convenience factors,” did not render the arbitration an empty victory. Id. at 618. This much is true here.
The Court acknowledges that the caselaw is sparse and that some cases have gone the other way. See, e.g., Oakland Local, Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Serv., 1981 WL 2383, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 1981) (holding that removal of rest stools used by mail carriers merited status quo injunction prior to arbitration); Nat‘l Ass‘n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Postal Serv., 1975 WL 12022, at *1 (S.D. Iowa Feb. 5, 1975) (holding that eliminating ten-minute “wash up time” for carriers “clearly” caused irreparable harm because status quo could not be restored afterwards). But their logic runs afoul of the NLGA‘s anti-injunction provisions and does not fit within the Supreme Court‘s narrow exception to this proscription. See, e.g., Payne, supra, at 180 (casting doubt on whether alleged harm in U.S. Postal Serv., 1975 WL 12022, was “so irreparable” that it interfered with arbitral process). In the end, the fact that the arbitral process does not provide every conceivable category of remedy does not render it hollow or meaningless. See Niagara Hooker, 935 F.2d at 1378; Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 285 n.12; see also Indep. Oil, 864 F.2d at 932 (“Dislocations invariably attend any modification in working conditions. If disruption of workers’ lives and habits was deemed sufficient harm on which to bottom injunctive relief, then the exception would swallow the rule, and the courts would be mired hip-deep in matters which Congress intended to remit to an arbitral forum.“).
In short, because injunctive relief is unnecessary to preserve the arbitral process, see Niagara Hooker, 935 F.2d at 1378, the Court concludes that it lacks the jurisdiction to grant such relief in this case.
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court will grant Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss and will deny Plaintiff‘s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. A separate Order consistent with this Opinion will be issued this day.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
United States District Judge
Date: November 6, 2019