NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
56470
Court of Appeals of Georgia
March 13, 1979
Rehearing Denied March 16, 1979
149 Ga. App. 334 | 254 S.E.2d 571
BANKE, Judge.
Argued March 6, 1979 - Decided March 13, 1979
Smith & Allgood, Alfred L. Allgood, for appellee.
BANKE, Judge.
The appellant, National Advertising Company, appeals the judgment of the trial court affirming a final agency decision of the Commissioner of the Department of Transportation (DOT) denying its applicatiоn for a permit to erect an outdoor advertising sign adjacent to an interstate highway.
The only issue in this case is the application of
National sought permission to erect a billboard within 500 feet of the west side of the interchange (where there were no exit and entrance ramps), but greater than 500 feet from the point where the ramps merged into the interstate on the east side of the interchangе. The application of the statute adopted by the trial judge, which resulted in National‘s proposed billboard location
1. In its first enumeration оf error, National contends that since the language of
By referencing to the beginning and ending points of the ramps, the effect of the measurеment rule set forth in the second sentence of the statute is to extend the distance from the intersecting road of the interchange within which the placement of outdoor advertising signs is prohibited. See for exаmple Dept. of Transportation v. Spells Sign Co., 141 Ga. App. 350 (233 SE2d 435) (1977). Thus, whenever there is at least one ramp on each side of the interchange, application of this specific limitation does not conflict with the general limitation set forth in the first sentence that no signs be erected within 500 feet of the interchange. The prohibited zone on each side becomes the length of the longer ramp on that side plus 500 feet.
However, a literal application of the measurement
2. The trial judge held that “In the case sub judice, there can be no question that Flat Shoals Road is a part of that interchange and the site in this case is clearly within the blocked-out zone contemplated by the Outdoor Advertising Control Act.” National contends in its second enumeration of error that this interpretation of the statute violates certain established principles of statutory construction. In its reply brief, the DOT discusses other principles of statutory construction which the trial judge‘s order fulfills. After a thorough study of these arguments and the law applicable thereto, we affirm the trial judge‘s construction of the statute. Our reasons are hereinafter stated:
(a) As acknowledged by the parties, there is no statutory or judicial definition of the word “interchange.” The DOT urges adoption of the dictionary definition of interchange as “a junction of two or more highways by a system of separate levels that permit traffic to pass from one to another without the crossing at grade of traffic systems.” Webster‘s Third New Internationаl Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, at p. 1177 (B. Grove Ed. 1961). It contends that under this interpretation the intersecting road, Flat Shoals Road, is an integral part of the interchange and that, accordingly, National‘s permit application was correctly denied.
National contends that even if the dictionary definition “interchange” is adopted, its proposed sign location is not prohibited since there are no rаmps on the
We find it unnecessary to resolve this issue since, as found by the trial judge, under either view Flat Shoals Road is a рart of the interchange, and National‘s proposed location is within 500 feet of this intersecting road. The permit was, therefore, properly denied.
(b) Neither interpretation of the statute presentеd by National attempts to reconcile the apparent conflict created by application of
The DOT‘s interpretation of the statute does reconcile the apparent conflict. The DOT explains that, as stated in the first sentence of subsection “r,” the statute envisions one 500-foot blocked-out zone around the entire interchange and that the second sentencе of the statute simply provides instructions for determining that point at which the interchange begins when there is an exit or entrance ramp or both on either or both sides of the interchange. Thus, whenever the speсific provision is applicable, it promotes the general prohibition of the statute by allowing no signs within 500 feet of the furthermost point. See Dept. of Transportation v. Spells Sign Co., 141 Ga. App. 350, supra.
It is a well established principle of law that even though an interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with the duty of enforcing it is not conclusive, it is entitled to great weight. See Belton v. Columbus Fin. &c. Co., 127 Ga. App. 770, 772 (195 SE2d 195) (1972). The DOT‘s interpretation of this statute successfully reconciles the statutory provisions without resоrting to a strained construction of its words. Nor does it result in a perversion of the legislative intent behind the statute (see Division 3 below). Accordingly, the trial judge did not err in adopting this construction in his ruling, and National‘s second еnumeration of error is without merit.
3. In its third enumeration of error, National complains that the trial judge erred in denying its
In Turner Communications Corp. v. Ga. Dept. of Transportation, 139 Ga. App. 436, 438 (228 SE2d 399) (1976), this court hеld, “‘In all interpretations, the courts shall look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly.’
“The purpose of the рresent legislation is to regulate the impact of the signs on the driver along the interstate.” See also Dept. of Transportation v. Spells Sign Co., 141 Ga. App. 350, 353, supra. In Spells Sign Co., supra, p. 353, we held that “The minimization of distractions by signs in the area of an interchange is precisely the intent and purрose behind the blocked-out zone contemplated in
It cannot be held as a matter of law that National‘s erection of a sign at its proposed location would not create a distraction for eastbound motorists within 500 feet of the interchange (see Division 2, supra) such that their attention would be diverted from the forthcoming merging traffic. The trial judge‘s interpretation of the statute as creating a 500-foot blocked-out zone on both sides of the interchange is not unnecessarily expansive, but rather it facilitates the legislative goal of reducing the distractions created by outdoor advertising signs at highway interchangеs. See also
Judgment affirmed. Quillian, P. J., Webb, P. J., Smith, Shulman, Birdsong and Underwood, JJ., concur.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
On motion for rehearing, the appellant has correctly pointed оut that the Department of Transportation had never issued an administrative ruling interpreting
Motion for rehearing denied.
DEEN, Chief Judge, dissenting.
This is the sixth consideration of the issue in this case. After further study of this matter on rehearing I am convinced that the state hearing officer, Joseph J. Fullbright, Sr. was correct in his decision dated October 31, 1977, when he found “... that the sign site in question in this appeal is not located to be within 500 feet from the point at which the pavement commences or ceases to widen аt the entrance or exit from the main traveled way along the highway, which in this case is the easterly side of the intersection to which said sign is adjacent thereto. Thus a permit may be issued.”
“No sign ... shall be erected оr maintained which: (r) is located outside of the corporate limits of a municipality and adjacent to an Interstate highway within 500 feet of
I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Judge McMurray joins in this dissent.