Nathaniel HATCHETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF DETROIT, City of Sterling Heights, County of Macomb, Hilton Napoleon, Kenneth Williams, Michael Reece, Scott Lucas, Richard Van Sice, Jeffrey Plaunt, Carl Marlinga, and Eric Kaiser, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 10-1718.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Aug. 17, 2012.
491 Fed. Appx. 567
In Baker‘s Rule 26(B) application, he states that around “ninety days following” the Ohio Court of Appeals‘s ruling, he sought out the help of a friend outside the prison to obtain transcripts of the trial. This shows that Baker was aware of the lower court‘s opinion much earlier than December 2004—contrary to his implausible argument that he gained constructive knowledge of the opinion after he had begun to take steps to appeal it. In fact, as the Ohio Court of Appeals held, appellate counsel sent him a letter on August 30, 2004 instructing him that the best avenue for relief was to file an application to reopen the appeal. But Baker did not retain counsel until November 22, 2004 and did not file the application to reopen the appeal until December 21, 2004, more than the ninety days Rule 26(B) allows. Additionally, under Ohio law there was no requirement to attach transcripts to the notice of appeal. In fact, the submission of transcripts was not permissible. Ohio S.Ct. Prac. R. 3.1(D)(1) (noting that all that is permitted to be submitted is “[a] date-stamped copy of the court of appeals opinion and judgment entry being appealed ... [and] appellant may also attach any other judgment entries or opinions issued in the case, if relevant to the appeal. The memorandum shall not include any other attachments.“). There can be no finding of prejudice on these facts.
C
Finally, Baker fails to establish a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” resulting in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393, 124 S.Ct. 1847, 158 L.Ed.2d 659 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). To succeed, Baker would need to present “new reliable evidence ... that was not presented at trial.” 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S.Ct. 851. Baker has failed to show any new evidence that would satisfy this standard. In short, Baker can show neither cause nor prejudice, and all of his claims are procedurally defaulted.
V
The district court‘s judgment denying Baker‘s petition for habeas corpus relief is AFFIRMED.
Linda Denise Fegins, City of Detroit Law Department, Detroit, MI, Lauren Du Val Donofrio, Marc D. Kaszubski, O‘Reilly Rancilio, Sterling Heights, MI, Marcia L. Howe, Johnson, Rosati, Labarge, Aseltyne & Field, Farmington Hills, MI, Mary Massaron Ross, Plunkett Cooney, Detroit, MI, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before: GUY, KETHLEDGE, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge.
In 1998, a Michigan court convicted Nathaniel Hatchett of carjacking, armed robbery, kidnaping, and first degree criminal sexual conduct. Ten years later, the Innocence Project at Thomas M. Cooley Law School uncovered a DNA report, potentially favorable to the defense, that the prose-
I.
In November 1996, a young man attacked a woman as she was getting into her car in Sterling Heights, Michigan. He threatened her life, drove her to a side street, raped her, and left her as he drove off in her car. The victim called the police and went to the hospital, where the staff collected semen from her underwear.
Three days later, Officer Kenneth Williams of the Detroit Police Department spotted Nathaniel Hatchett, along with four passengers, driving the victim‘s car. Officer Williams stopped Hatchett and questioned him at Detroit police headquarters, where supervisor Hilton Napoleon was present. Williams then turned Hatchett over to Sterling Heights police officers Richard Van Sice and Jeffrey Plaunt, who questioned Hatchett for several hours. Finally, Hatchett confessed to the rape.
Before Hatchett‘s trial, DNA testing showed that the semen collected from the victim did not originate from Hatchett or the victim‘s husband. Hatchett alleges that Officer Van Sice and Eric Kaiser, the assistant prosecutor handling his trial, each received the results from the husband‘s DNA test. Neither Hatchett nor his attorney, however, received notice that the husband was excluded. Despite these results, Kaiser minimized the significance of Hatchett‘s DNA exclusion during his closing argument, saying, “we can‘t speculate whether another person, her husband, the Lone Ranger created vaginal deposits that were eventually tested[.]” [Trial Tr. at 250-51.]
Hatchett was convicted after a bench trial and sentenced to 25 to 40 years in prison. On appeal, the State argued that the semen might have originated from the victim‘s husband. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Hatchett‘s conviction.
Ten years later, the Innocence Project at Thomas M. Cooley Law School uncovered the report excluding the victim‘s husband. The court granted Hatchett‘s motion for a new trial, and the State dropped the charges. Hatchett then brought a
II.
A.
Hatchett argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on his claims surrounding his confession. He alleges that Van Sice, Plaunt, and Williams
But we are not the first court to hear Hatchett‘s claim that his confession was coerced. At a hearing before his criminal trial (known as a “Walker” hearing), Hatchett claimed that his confession was coerced and therefore should be suppressed. See generally People v. Walker, 374 Mich. 331, 132 N.W.2d 87 (1965). Williams and Van Sice testified at the hearing. Hatchett chose not to, even though the judge explained to him that his testimony could not be used against him at trial. After considering the evidence, the court found that Hatchett‘s confession was voluntary. Hatchett could have appealed the ruling, but did not.
In this case, the district court held that collateral estoppel barred Hatchett from contesting the voluntariness of his confession. We review the district court‘s application of collateral estoppel de novo. See Wolfe v. Perry, 412 F.3d 707, 716 (6th Cir. 2005). In doing so we apply Michigan law, since “[f]ederal courts must give the same preclusive effect to a state-court judgment as that judgment receives in the rendering state.” Buck v. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, 597 F.3d 812, 816-17 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing
In Michigan, collateral estoppel has normally three elements: (1) a question of fact essential to the judgment was actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment; (2) the parties must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (3) there must be mutuality of estoppel. See Storey v. Meijer, Inc., 431 Mich. 368, 429 N.W.2d 169, 171 n. 3 (1988). But the last element—mutuality—is inapposite to the question whether a determination in a criminal case has preclusive effect in a civil case. See Monat v. State Farm Ins. Co., 469 Mich. 679, 677 N.W.2d 843, 850 (2004). So we consider whether the first two requirements are met here.
Michigan courts treat a factual finding as to voluntariness pursuant to a Walker hearing as a final determination on the merits. See People v. Mann, 89 Mich. App. 511, 280 N.W.2d 577, 578 (1979); People v. Gray, 393 Mich. 1, 222 N.W.2d 515, 517 (1974). There was such a factual finding here, and the issue was actually litigated in the Walker hearing. Thus, the first element of collateral estoppel is met.
But Hatchett argues the second element is not, because he did not have the husband‘s DNA-test results at the Walker hearing. In Hatchett‘s view, those results would have somehow discredited the testimony of Williams and Van Sice. But we do not see how the husband‘s DNA test—which was conducted months after Hatchett confessed—would have shown that Williams and Van Sice used unfair tactics in eliciting the confession. That is particularly true given that Hatchett did not even introduce the results of his own DNA test at the hearing. His argument is simply a non sequitur; and Hatchett otherwise had every opportunity and incentive to contest the voluntariness of his confession at the Walker hearing.
Hatchett also argues that the outcome of his Walker hearing cannot have preclusive effect because his conviction was eventually set aside. But that argument conflates the question whether the police officers
Thus, we see no basis under Michigan law not to give preclusive effect to the Michigan courts’ determination that Hatchett‘s confession was voluntary. And that means he cannot prevail on his claim that the Detroit and Sterling Heights defendants coerced him to confess.
B.
Hatchett also brings several claims relating to his failure to obtain the results of the husband‘s DNA test. The district court granted summary judgment on these claims, which we review de novo. See Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 374 (6th Cir. 2009).
1.
Hatchett claims that Kaiser withheld and, alternatively, destroyed the husband‘s DNA-test results in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Kaiser responds that he is immune from the claims. Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for functions that are an integral part of the judicial process. See Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2010). This immunity extends to suits “arising out of even unquestionably illegal or improper conduct by the prosecutor so long as the general nature of the action in question is part of the normal duties of a prosecutor.” Cady v. Arenac County, 574 F.3d 334, 340 (6th Cir. 2009). This immunity also extends to suits based upon a prosecutor‘s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to a defendant. See Koubriti, 593 F.3d at 467 (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 n. 34, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976)). Kaiser is therefore immune from Hatchett‘s claim that Kaiser failed to disclose the results of the husband‘s DNA test to Hatchett.
But Hatchett seeks to recast this claim as one for the destruction of evidence. Specifically, Hatchett alleges in his complaint that Kaiser‘s file did not include the results of the husband‘s DNA test. But even if one takes that allegation at face value, a failure to put a document in a particular file is not the same thing as destroying it. And Hatchett otherwise points us to no evidence that Kaiser actually destroyed the husband‘s DNA-test results. To the contrary, the Innocence Project‘s recovery of the results suggests (if not demonstrates) that the results were not destroyed. Thus, Hatchett simply does not present evidence creating a genuine issue as to whether Kaiser destroyed the results of the husband‘s DNA test. His claim fails for that reason; and thus we do not express any opinion as to whether a prosecutor‘s absolute immunity would extend to his destruction of exculpatory evidence.
2.
Hatchett claims that Officer Van Sice violated his Brady rights by failing to disclose the husband‘s DNA-test results to Kaiser. We have held that a police officer must disclose evidence whose “exculpatory value” should be “apparent” to the officer. Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 389. But Hatchett himself concedes that Kathy Kuebler, the Michigan State Police laboratory scientist in charge of the test, left a telephone message with Kaiser‘s secretary to inform Kaiser about the test results. [Appellant‘s Br. at 45.] And Hatchett concedes that Kuebler faxed a copy of the test results to Kaiser‘s office. [Id.] Those concessions defeat Hatchett‘s claim. The Constitution did not require Van Sice personally to
Hatchett also claims that Prosecutor Carl Marlinga and Macomb County failed to train their assistant prosecutors regarding the disclosure of exculpatory evidence. Supervisory attorneys are immune from a suit directly attacking their actions related to an individual trial. See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 345, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009). And a prosecutor‘s office may not be held liable under
3.
Hatchett also claims that the district court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment before all discovery was completed. “We review the trial court‘s ruling on discovery matters for an abuse of discretion.” Evanoff v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 534 F.3d 516, 522 (6th Cir. 2008). The discovery that Hatchett thought necessary pertained only to allegedly deficient training by Macomb County and Marlinga. That claim fails under Connick, regardless of what the discovery would have shown. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion.
The district court‘s judgment is affirmed.
HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Notwithstanding that a Walker1 hearing is limited to the question of voluntariness, there may be situations where compelling evidence of innocence can be used effectively to undermine the denial of coercion, and, consequently, where the withholding of such evidence impairs a criminal defendant‘s opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the voluntariness of a confession. Nevertheless, I agree that the withholding of the husband‘s test results did not affect Hatchett‘s ability to do so in the instant case.
As to Part II-B-1, although the possibility that Kaiser deliberately withheld and failed to file the test results is disturbing, I believe that Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2010), forecloses Hatchett‘s claim.
As to Part II-B-2, I conclude that because the evidence raises a question whether Van Sice informed Kaiser of the test results, the claim against Van Sice should not have been dismissed. There is no disagreement regarding the law. We have held that police officers have an absolute, Brady-derived duty “to turn over potentially exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor‘s office.” Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 381 (6th Cir. 2009). The majority rejects Hatchett‘s Brady claim against Officer Van Sice on the basis of Hatchett‘s concession that Kuebler left a message with Kaiser‘s secretary and faxed a copy of the test results to Kaiser‘s
Thus, because genuine issues remain regarding whether Van Sice fulfilled his obligation to turn over exculpatory evidence to Kaiser, and whether Kaiser already knew of the evidence from Kuebler, I would reverse the grant of summary judgment for Van Sice and remand to the district court for further proceedings.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William L. JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 11-3621.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Aug. 17, 2012.