Nastro Contracting, Inc. v. AgustaNastro Contracting, Inc. v. Agusta
Appeal from that part of an order of the Supreme Court (Williams, J.), entered July 25, 1994 in Sullivan County, which partially granted plaintiff’s cross motion to dismiss various affirmative defenses and counterclaims asserted by defendants and partially denied defendants’ motions for, inter alia, orders requiring plaintiff to submit an itemized statement and compelling plaintiff to commence a foreclosure action.
Plaintiff, a construction contractor, filed a mechanic’s lien and thereafter commenced this contract action to recover the $10,000 balance allegedly due on two contracts for repairs, remodeling and renovation work on defendants’ home and an additional $11,920, alleged to be the reasonable value of extra work performed in connection therewith. Defendants’ answer asserted numerous affirmative defenses and counterclaims based upon allegations of culpable conduct and fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence and wrongful filing and willful exaggeration of the mechanic’s lien. Defendants appeal from an order dismissing a number of their affirmative defenses and counterclaims and partially
Initially, we conclude that Supreme Court properly dismissed defendants’ seventh affirmative defense and second and third counterclaims, predicated upon claims that plaintiff’s principal, Michael Nastro, made misrepresentations concerning plaintiff s professional ability and false promises that he would personally supervise the work. To the extent that they may be read as alleging fraud in the inducement, these claims constitute either a nonactionable promise to perform a future act (see, e.g., Coined v O’Brien,
Further, Supreme Court correctly dismissed defendants’ fourth affirmative defense because a plaintiff’s culpable conduct may not be asserted as a defense to an action for breach of contract (see, McLaughlin, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C1411:l, at 386; Schmidt’s Wholesale v Miller & Lehman Constr.,
We agree with defendants, however, that Supreme Court erred in its denial of their motion to vacate plaintiff’s demand
Crew III, Casey, Yesawich Jr. and Spain, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as partially denied defendants’ motion to vacate plaintiff’s demand for a bill of particulars; motion granted to that extent; and, as so modified, affirmed.