149 Iowa 608 | Iowa | 1910
This case was before the court on a former appeal, and a judgment on the verdict in favor of plaintiff was reversed on the ground that there was no evidence to sustain a verdict for plaintiff, and that a directed verdict for the defendant should have been sustained on its motion. See 140 Iowa, 533. On the retrial following this reversal only one witness was examined who had not testified on the former trial. His testimony related to the mental condition of the plaintiff during a short period preceding the signing of the receipt and contract of release relied upon by defendant on the first trial. The court submitted the case to the jury on two grounds alleged by the plaintiff in avoidance of the effect of the release: First, alleged fraud on the part of the defendant in procuring such release; and, second, the alleged mental incompetency of the plaintiff to contract at the time the settlement was made. In answer to two special interrogatories submitted by the court, the jury found, first, that plaintiff was mentally incompetent to make such contract; and, second, that the contract was not void by reason of any fraud on the part of the defendant. As the plaintiff has not appealed, we have no occasion to consider the evidence relating to fraud, and, if that question were now before us, we would not do more than reiterate what was said in our opinion on the former appeal as to the insufficiency of the evidence
On the last trial there were four witnesses whose testimony was relied upon as tending to show that the plaintiff was mentally incapacitated to make a binding contract when the agreement of settlement was entered into between him and the agent of the defendant. Three of these, the plaintiff, his wife, and Dr. Houghton, who on one occasion
Plaintiff’s wife testified that she had to assist her husband from place to place about the house; that, on the day of the settlement, he was nervous and his hands trembled, and he was weak physically and mentally; and that she told the claim agent that her husband was not fit to settle with him at that time, and that he did not know his condition. She also said that her husband had in conversation seemed to forget upon what subject he was talking and talked disconnectedly. • It is significant, however, that the wife did not testify directly that plaintiff was mentally incapable of transacting business.
Dr. Houghton’s testimony is somewhat ambiguous because, while testifying in chief, he assumed that he had visited the plaintiff several times prior to the settlement, while on cross examination, after refreshing his recollection, he admitted that he had seen him but once prior to that time, that occasion being a week prior to the making of the settlement, and on this cross examination he admitted that testimony that he had previously given in regard to plaintiff’s nervous condition related to his condition nearly two months subsequent to the settlement, when symptoms of traumatic neurasthenia had appeared. The opinion which he had expressed in his direct examination that plaintiff was not competent at the time to transact business was based upon the facts which he had observed as follows: That plaintiff was unable to sleep and was
The witness Ainsworth, who testified for the first time on the second trial, said that he called at plaintiff’s house four or five times between the date of the accident and the date of the settlement; that plaintiff complained of pain in his head and back; that his wife had to help him about the house; that plaintiff was very nervous and unable to carry on a connected conversation and was very weak; that his hands shook as though he had the palsy; that he appeared to be melancholy and downhearted; and that in witness’ opinion, taking into consideration all the physical and mental conditions he had described, plaintiff was then of unsound mind, and not responsible for his actions.
Now, bearing in mind the fact that the burden rested upon plaintiff to show such mental incapacity that he was not bound by his settlement of his- claim for -damages against the defendant, we think that -there is entire absence of any such evidence as would sustain the finding of the jury that plaintiff was mentally incompetent to make' such a contract. There is no pretense that plaintiff was otherwise unsound of mind than that his mind was weakened by his physical suffering and nervous condition. Under such circumstances, the question of mental capacity to enter into an agreement or exercise judgment or discretion is dependent largely upon the nature of the act itself. Mere incapacity to add up a column
Other alleged errors are strongly pressed on our attention by counsel for appellant, but, as the conclusion above indicated must dispose of the case, we do not now feel justified in discussing them.
For the failure of the trial court to sustain defendant’s motion to direct a verdict in defendant’s favor on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict, the judgment must be, as it is, reversed.