104 Tenn. 81 | Tenn. | 1900
This is an action for damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff as the result of being ejected from a car of tbe Nashville Street Eailway. There was a trial before a jury and verdict and judgment for $2,500, and the street car company has appealed and assigned errors.
The plaintiff entered the transfer station of the road through a turnstile on College street, paying the usual 5 cents fare, to take a car for South High street, where he lived. He entered a High street car.. There is a conflict of evidence as to the point where this was done.
There are virtually but two errors assigned — one tbat tbe verdict of $2,500 is excessive, and tbe other tbat tbe Court wrongly instructed tbe jury and refused to give in charge certain propositions which were requested. Tbe propositions criticized are, in substance, tbat if tbe plaintiff boarded tbe car after it left tbe transfer station, and if tbe conductor, when be boarded bis car between tbe transfer station and car shed, rang tbe motorman to proceed before approaching tbe plaintiff for bis fare, this would not constitute a waiver of tbe rule and regulation requiring a passenger to pay an extra fare if be got on tbe car after it left tbe station, for tbe conductor would have tbe right to assume tbat tbe plaintiff would observe tbe rule in this respect when bis fare was applied for. In this connection be was also asked to charge tbat if tbe jury found from tbe evidence tbat
We are of opinion the criticism of tbe appellant as to tbe charge of tbe Court and tbe refusal to charge tbe special requests, are well taken. We are of opinion that it was error to charge that tbe mere starting of tbe ear upon its journey with tbe knowledge of tbe method of plaintiff in boarding it, and that be had paid bis fare, was an acceptance of the plaintiff as a passenger and
In the next place, tbe conductor may have very well assumed that plaintiff would pay tbe fare, as be bad been notified be would have to do, and acting on this assumption started tbe car in order that other passengers might not be delayed. If the plaintiff had been the only person on tbe car, there would have been more strength in tbe position taken. "But there were other persons on tbe car whose rights and convenience were also to be considered and protected, and it was not improper that the conductor should start the car and trust to arranging with plaintiff Ms right of passage without detaining other passengers.
We are also of opinion that the Court erred in not charging the special request to the effect that the rule of the company requiring passengers to enter the cars while in the station house was a reasonable one. It is apparent that it was a rule which greatly facilitated the transfer of passengers and dispatch of cars. It did away entirely with the necessity of passengers carrying tickets, and made their right of passage depend entirely upon whether they had entered the cars in the station house. Whether entering by another
Now, we have, upon the defendant’s own theory, this state of facts. The plaintiff, a mere boy 19 years of age, had entered the station through the turnstile, paying the regular fare which entitled him to ride on any of the lines converging in that station. When he entered he saw that the High street car, which he intended to ride upon, had started out of the station house proper, but had stopped immediately beyond the station line, and only a few feet from it, and within the company’s inclosure. He knew that unless he entered that car he would be required to wait twenty minutes, and seeing it standing waiting he
Tbe only other assignment of errors it is material to mention is that tbe verdict and judgment is excessive in amount. Tbe charge of tbe Court as to tbe measure of compensatory damages is not complained of. Tbe trial Judge said upon tbe subject of punitive damages:
“If you find for the plaintiff and also find that tbe conduct of defendant’s servants was wanton, reckless or malicious, you would have tbe right besides damages compensatory, to award vindictive or punitive damages, or what' is commonly known as 'smart money.’ ” We do not understand that this charge is excepted to as incorrect, but tbe contention is that it is not a case for punitive damages, and that tbe amount given is far in excess of compensation for tbe actual injuries received. Tbe extent of tbe injuries received is a matter of much controversy in tbe evidence. It appears that the plaintiff fell into a pit some four feet deep. It appears that his hip was injured by the fall, and the passage of blood from him indicated unmistakably internal injuries. Tie is shown to have been somewhat feeble and subject -to fits. He was taken with pneumonia a short time afterward and came near dying, and there is testimony that tbe severity of the attack was to some extent due to tbe injuries he bad received, and tbe condition of his system in consequence of
It' being a proper case, in our opinion, for punitive damages, we are not disposed to disturb the verdict, and- the judgment of the Court below is affirmed with costs.