63 N.H. 166 | N.H. | 1884
A sufficient answer to the defendant's claim, that an attorney at law is an employe within the meaning of the statute (G. L., c. 249, s. 42) enacting that no person shall be charged as trustee for any funds which are held by him "in the capacity of clerk, cashier, or other employe of the principal defendant, and which have been received in the ordinary course of such employment," is the statute itself; for of whatever signification the term *167
"employe" may be susceptible (see Gurney v. Railway Co., 2 N. Y. Suprm. Ct. (T. C.) 453, Wilson v. Gray,
These considerations, and the further one that statutes conferring exemptions are to be strictly construed, make it entirely plain, in our opinion, that the exemption in question must be confined to the specific employes named in the statute, and to others of a like class or description; and it of course follows, both from the nature of his office and the character of his employment, that an attorney at law, as such, is not ejusdem generis, and does not answer the limitation.
And if this construction required additional support, we think it might be found in the probable cause of the exemption (see Bank v. Railroad,
Trustee chargeable.
STANLEY, J., did not sit: the others concurred.