— In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for legal malpractice, the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Molloy, J.), dated March 30, 1990, as denied their motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint on the ground of collateral estoppel.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiffs commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for legal malpractice, alleging that the defendants had negligently represented them in an action brought by a competitor alleging unfair competition. Among the allegations in the complaint is the claim that the defendants’ negligence caused the plaintiffs to fail to respond to discovery requests which resulted in the issuance of a conditional order of preclusion and the award of summary judgment to their competitor on the issue of liability. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint in the instant action on the ground that it was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The court denied the motion, and we now affirm.
The defendants contend that a determination was made in the underlying action that the plaintiffs did not have a meritorious defense and that the plaintiffs are therefore precluded from relitigating the same issue in this action. Thus, the defendants allege that the plaintiffs cannot establish an essential element of a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice, that is, that they would have prevailed in the underlying action but for their attorneys’ negligence (see, Carmel v Lunney,
