Before: *1 KOZINSKI FRIEDLAND and , Circuit Judges, and ARTERTON , [**]
District Judge. While the Social Security Administration (SSA) is “responsible for making the determination or decision about whether [a claimant meets] the statutory *2 page 2 definition of disability,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1), Dr. Betat’s chart note contained information about Marsh’s condition and capacity that went beyond a mere statement of disability. These findings informed his assessment that she “appear[ed] to be disabled.” The ALJ therefore erred by neither considering Dr. Betat’s opinion nor providing reasons to reject it. “In order to reject an examining physician’s opinion, the ALJ has to give clear and convincing reasons.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1159–60 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, SSA’s position was not substantially justified. See, e.g., Tobeler v. Colvin, 749 F.3d 830, 834 (9th Cir. 2014) (“To avoid an award of EAJA fees . . . the government must show that its position was substantially justified at each stage of the proceedings.”).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. * * The Honorable Janet Bond Arterton, United States District Judge for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.