The trial courts determined that § 628(H) 1 of the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.628(11), was enacted in violation of art 4, § 25 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, which states, “No law shall be revised, altered or amended by reference to its title only. The section or sections of the act altered or amended shall be re-enacted and published at length.” We conclude that § 628(11) constitutes an amendment of the *9 Insurance Code, MCL 500.2103(4)(a)(iii), within the meaning of this constitutional provision and that its enactment did not comply with the provision. We reject plaintiffs’ arguments that Const 1963, art 4, § 25 does not apply because the act containing vehicle code section 628(11) was “comрlete in itself” and that it only amended the Insurance Code “by implication.” Further, we conclude that it is irrelevant that the act did not expressly reference the Insurance Code. We affirm the decisions of the trial courts.
BACKGROUND FACTS
The Insurance Code allows insurance companies to consider speed limit violations in assessing “insurance eligibility points” for the purpose of determining whether and at what premium rates to provide insurance to drivers. See, e.g., MCL 500.2103(1)(h), 500.2118(2)(b), and 500.2120(3)(e). With respect to the issue presented here, two insurance eligibility points may be calculated against a driver “[f]or a violation of any lawful speed limit by 10 miles per hour or less . . ..” MCL 500.2103(4)(a)(iii) (the 2-point rule). Notwithstanding that then-existing provision, the Legislature amended the vehicle code in 1987, and added a provision disallowing the imposition of any insurance eligibility points for ten mile per hour (or less) speed limit violations in one specific instance:
A citation or civil infraction determination for exceeding a lawful maximum speed limit of 55 miles per hour by driving 65 miles per hour or less shall not be considered by any person in establishing automobile insurance eligibility or automobile insurance rates. [MCL 257.628(11) (the 55 mph speed zone exception); see1987 PA 154 .]
Shortly after vehicle code § 628(11) was enacted, the Attorney General issued an opinion regarding its effect *10 on the Insurance Code’s 2-point rule. OAG, 1982-1988, No 6,552 p 438 (December 2, 1988). The Attorney General concluded that the enactment of vehicle code § 628(11) violated Const 1963, art 4, § 25 because it constituted an amendment of Insurance Code § 2103(4)(a)(iii) without any reenactment or republication of the Insurance Code. OAG, supra at 439-440. Accordingly, Michigan insurers have been using the 2-point rule to impose insurance eligibility points for ten mile per hour (or less) speed limit violations in all cases, including those occurring in a 55 mph speed limit zone.
Plaintiffs in these consolidated class actions contend that the Attorney General erred in this determination and that, accordingly, they are entitled to a remedy for adverse insurance decisions made by Michigan insurers in violation of the 55 mph speed zone exception. The trial courts rejected this argument and granted summary disposition in favor of defendant insurance companies.
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiffs claim that Const 1963, art 4, § 25. does not properly apply to the enactment of the 55 mph speed zone exception.
2
Questions regarding the constitution
*11
ality of a statute are matters of law that we review de novo.
DeRose v DeRose,
ANALYSIS
Const 1963, art 4, § 25 provides:
No law shall be revised, altered or amended by reference to its title only. The section or sections of the act altered or amended shall be re-enacted and published at length.
The interpretation and application of this provision is governed by
Alan v Wayne Co,
*12
The
Alan
Court began its analysis by considering whether the case presented a “so-called ‘amendment by implication,’ ” not subject to the constraints of Const 1963, art 4, § 25. The “amendment by implication” exception was first recognized in
People v Mahaney,
The act before us does not assume in terms, to revise, alter or amend any prior act, or section of an act, but by various transfers of duties it has an amendatory effect by implication, and by its last section it repeals all inconsistent acts. We are unable to see how this conflicts with thе [constitutional] provision referred to. [Mahaney, supra at 496].
In contrast, the
Alan
Court determined that the case before it did not present an “amendment by implication.” In so deciding,
the Alan
Court relied on principles stemming from another case authored by Justice Cooley,
Mok v Detroit Bldg and Savings Ass’n No 4,
*13 “[T]he act of 1869 ... undertook... to dispense with some things required by [previous legislation], and to make some changes. It provided that the articles of association need not state the amount of capital stock actually paid in; that it should be contributed in initiation feеs and in weekly or monthly sums as should be provided by bylaws . ...” [Alan, supra at 272, quoting Mok, supra at 521-522 (emphasis deleted).]
The Mok Court determined that its case did not present an amendment by implication similar to that considered in Mahaney and that the amendment had been passed in derogation of the Constitution:
“The [previous legislation] has been, for the purposes of building and savings associations, incorporated in and made a part of the act of 1869, but with several changes and modifications, and these not made by the re-enactment of the changed or modified, but only by indicating the extent of the changes, leaving the parties concerned to fit the new act to the old as best they may ....
“Whаt has been attempted here is, to duplicate an act, but at the same time to accommodate it by indirect amendments to a new class of cases, in disregard of the constitutional provision which requires each act of legislation to be complete in itself, and forbids the enactment of fragments which are incapable of having effect or of being understood until fitted into other acts after by construction or otherwise places have been made for them. No such legislation can be sustained.” [Alan, supra at 272, quoting Mok, supra at 523, 529 (emphasis deleted).]
On the basis of its review of Mok and other precedents, the Alan Court concluded that the “amendment by implication” exception should apply оnly in “those limited kinds of cases” in which
because of a special fact situation a court is faced with two accidentally absolutely conflicting statutes requiring a determination that one or the other applies (and thus an amendment or repeal of the other by implication follows in *14 the fact circumstances). These kinds of cases do not result from any deliberate misleading by the Legislature or failure to make all reasonable efforts to make clear in the statutes what is intended, but rather, as we said in Mok, 517 “[i]t is probable that if the requirement has at any time been disregarded by the legislature, the default has proceeded from inadvertence merely” [Alan, supra at 285-286 (emphasis added).]
Plaintiffs here contend that vehicle code § 628(11) constitutes an “amendment by implication” of Insurance Code § 2103(a)(4)(iii) under
Mahaney,
but, considering the analysis
of Alan,
we disagree.
We also reject plaintiffs’ closely related contention
5
that
An amendatory act which purported only tо insert certain words, or to substitute one phrase for another in an act or section which was only referred to but not republished, was well calculated to mislead the careless as to its effect, and was, perhaps, sometimes drawn in that form for that express purpose. Endless confusion was thus introduced into the law, and the constitution wisely prohibited such legislation. But an act complete in itself is not within the mischief designed to be remedied by this provision, and cannot be held to be prohibited by it without violating its plain intent. [Mahaney, supra at 497.]
Similarly, the
Alan
Court quoted with approval from Justice Potter, dissenting in
People v Stimer,
“ ‘The character of an act, whether amendatory or complete in itself, is to be determined [. . .] by comparison of its provisions with prior laws left in force, and if it is complete on the subject with which it deals it will not be subject to the constitutional objection, but if it attempts to amend the old law by intermingling new and different provisions with the old ones or by adding new provisions, the law on that subject must be regarded as amendatory of the old law and the law amended must be inserted at length in the new act.’ ” [Alan, supra at 278-279 (citations omitted; emphasis deleted).]
Under this analysis,
Plaintiffs further contend that, because
Burton .. . stands for the rule that you can amend statute C by putting in statute B words for the purpose of amending statute C so long as you make no specific reference to C ... .
Mok says the constitution requires you tо do the whole job right. Burton says it is good enough to do the job half right....
This Court is convinced the constitution is not satisfied with halfway measures and does not prefer dissimulation to straightforwardness. We adopt the rule of Mok and overrule Burton. [Alan, supra at 281 (emphasis deleted).]
*17
See also
Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of
We note that plaintiffs rely primarily on Advisory Opinion. However, as we have previously noted and as Advisory Opinion itself states, it “does not constitute a decision of the Court and is not precedentially binding .... [It only expressed] the views of the justices and not a judicial determination of the question by the court. .. .” Advisory Opinion, supra at 461 n 1. Of course, we might find Advisory Opinion to be persuasive, but only inasmuch as it does not contravene binding authority. With respect to the arguments plaintiffs would draw from Advisory Opinion, we do not find them to be persuasive; in many respects, the opinion ignores or contravenes principles announced in Alan, decided just a year earlier.
For example, Advisory Opinion found “particularly pertinent” practicаl concerns raised by Justice COOLEY regarding the extensive reenactment and publication requirements that would result from a broad interpretation of Const 1963, art 4, § 25. Id. at 471. However, the Alan Court had considered Justice COOLEY’s concerns as well and, quite directly and cogently, found them to be unfounded in light of technological advances that had occurred since 1865. Alan, supra at 281-286. To the extent that, in this regard or others, Advisory Opinion contravenes Alan, we must, of course, follow Alan.
*18
Further, as defendants point out, the analysis of the majority opinion in
Advisory Opinion
is consistent with
Alan.
Most notably, the statute discussed in
Advisory Opinion,
the no-fault act, was a comprehensive legislative scheme that was determined to be an act “complete within itself” under the
Alan
analysis.
Advisory Opinion, supra
at 477. Thus,
Advisory Opinion
merely applied principles similar to those employed in
Alan
to determine that a statute different in significant ways from that at issue in
Alan
was exempt frоm the requirements of Const 1963, art 4, § 25. As discussed earlier,
We affirm the decisions of the trial courts. The 55 mph speed zone exception of vehicle code section 628(11) was enacted in violation of Const 1963, art 4, § 25 and is without effect. No costs shall be awarded, a public policy question having been presеnted.
Notes
As initially enacted, the section was compiled at MCL 257.628(7).
In one of the two cases, defendant insurance company challenges the jurisdiction of the courts to consider this matter, claiming that the Insurance Commissioner has exclusive or primary jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo.
Glen Lake-Crystal River Watershed Riparians v Glen Lake Ass’n,
We recognize, as pointed out by plaintiffs, that we are not bound by the opinion of the Attorney General. Further, as discussed below, we are not hound by
Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of
The earlier precedents considered constitutional provisions other than art 4, § 25 as it currently exists in our 1963 Constitution. However, the constitutional provisions construed in all precedents on which we rely are substantially similar.
This Court used language suggesting that the “amendment by implication” and “act complete in itself” analyses are, perhaps, one and the same.
Weber v Orion Twp Bldg Inspector,
Instead,