Dаvid L. Nagel, who had been acquitted for murder by reason of insanity, applied for release from commitment. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the application for release. Nagel appеals, alleging due process violations based on the trial court’s reliance on the presumption of continuing insanity. We remand to the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with this opinion.
In 1981, Nаgel was indicted and tried for the murders of his grandparents, Frank Emmett Marshall, Sr. and Mattie Louise Marshall. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Following Nagel’s acquittal, the trial court found Nagel met the crite *889 ria for civil commitment as set forth in OCGA § 37-3-1 (9.1). Thereafter, Nagel was committed to the custody of the Department of Human Resources.
In 1991, Nagel filed his application for release under OCGA § 17-7-131 (f). The trial court held a hearing on that application at which medical and lay experts testifying on Nagel’s behalf gave their opinions that Nagel was no longer mentally ill or dangerous to himself or others. The trial court denied Nagel’s appliсation for release, relying on the statutory presumption of continuing insanity set forth in OCGA § 24-4-21. The trial court, finding that Nagel had not shown there had been a change in his mental status, held he continued to meet the criteria for in-рatient civil commitment.
1. We look, first, to the nature of and weight to be given the presumption of insanity under OCGA § 24-4-21. That statutory provision establishes that a mental state, once proven, is presumed to continue. At the release hearing, the insanity acquittee has the burden of proving he is no longer insane. OCGA § 17-7-131 (f) (2). The trial court, rather than mental health professionals, has the responsibility for deciding applications for release under OCGA § 17-7-131.
Loftin v. State,
The presumption of continuing insanity is founded on fundamental legal principles and sound policy considerations.
A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the act because of mental illness.
Jones v. United States,
It is proper for courts to “pay particular deference to reasonable legislative judgments.”
Jones,
supra,
A legislature might conclude that public cоnfidence in the in *890 tegrity of the insanity defense would be undermined if the legislature delegated release decisions to medical professionals. Likewise, the legislature might find that public confidence would be undermined if а successful plea of insanity were viewed as lacking probative force in decisions about continuing mental illness and public safety. It has also been suggested that a legislature may appropriately аttach various consequences to an insanity defense “in order to discourage false pleas of insanity.” [Cit.] The Second Circuit has cited the danger of calculated abuse of the insanity defense as a relevant consideration in designing procedures fbr committing an insanity acquittee. [Cit.] The state also has an interest. in protecting society from the insanity acquittee’s potential dangerousness. [Cit.] The fact that a рerson has been found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have committed a criminal act indicates dangerousness. [Cit.] The state has an interest in invoking the judiciary’s expertise in criminal matters. [Cit.]
Benham v. Ledbetter, 785 F2d 1480, 1487 (11th Cir. 1986).
Nagel concеdes, as he must, that under Georgia law the presumption of continuing insanity has some evidentiary weight. Of course, a presumption is meaningless if it does not possess some weight of its own. It must be of sufficient substance such that, standing alone, it cannot be lightly overcome. This does not mean that the presumption of continuing insanity, weighty though it might be, is irrebuttable; “ ‘[i]t will yield to a contrary conclusion, where the circumstances supporting such contrary conclusion exclude the presumption as a reasonable hypothesis by a preponderance of the evidence.’ [Cit].”
Overstreet v. Nickelsen,
If no amount of evidence offered at a release hearing by an insanity acquittee could rebut the presumption of insanity, the processes of рroof in the due process hearing would be an empty ritual. The sole basis for argument would be an appeal to judicial discretion or mercy rather than to a process of proof.
Id.
2. Nagel argues that the statutory presumption of continuing insanity coupled with the rule that the finder of fact is not bound by the opinions of lay or expert witnesses (see
Moses v. State,
167 Ga.
*891
App. 556, 560 (
(a) Because of the evidentiary weight of the presumption under OCGA § 24-4-21, there is an exception to the general rule that the factfinder is not bound by, and may reject, the opinions of expert witnesses. See
Wilson v. State,
When proof of [sanity] is overwhelming, [judges] may not rely solely on the rebuttable presumption of [insanity]. It is a [judge’s] function to determine the credibility of witnesses and the probative value of testimony. [Judges] must weigh the evidence and may nоt arbitrarily ignore it. Proof of [sanity] may be so clear and so overwhelming that a finding of [insanity] cannot be upheld.
Wilson v. State,
Nevertheless, the mere presentation of evidence to the contrary does not necessarily serve to rebut the presumption; such evidence must outweigh the presumption when the trier of fact balаnces that evidence against the presumption.
“A presumption of law, being a circumstantial inference, may become more probable, as existing in fact, by the introduction of supporting evidence, or may become less probable by the introduction of circumstances tending in some degree to *892 overthrow it, but will not necessarily disappear unless [sufficiently] rebutted. . . . [Cit.]” [Cit.] Although numerous theories exist, “it would appear that the еffect of presumptions has been settled in Georgia.” [Cit.] “Most rebuttable presumptions of law in Georgia are rebutted only when the jury is persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence or other required degree of proof to find that the presumed proposition is not there or when the same finding is demanded by the evidence.” [Cit.]
Overstreet v. Nickelsen, supra at 543-544. Thus, it was necessary not only that Nagel present the testimony of experts and other evidence supporting his position, but also that the testimony be of sufficient weight to overcome the presumption.
(b) Because the presumption of insanity serves as “any evidence,” our standard of review of the sufficienсy of the evidence cannot be based on the “any evidence” test. In reviewing the trial court’s findings on the issue of insanity, we adopt the heightened scrutiny set forth in Brown v. State, supra:
Where the standard of proof in the trial court is the “prеponderance of the evidence” this court ordinarily reviews the sufficiency of the evidence using the “any evidence” test. [Cit.] With regard to the [insanity] of the accused in a criminal case, however, this standard of review is inadequate since the presumption of [insanity] would always provide some evidence in support of a finding of [insanity]. . . .
We conclude that an appropriate standard of appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to a [factfinder’s] finding of [insanity] in a criminal case is whether after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was [sane]. . . . [Cit.]
In order for us to implement the foregoing standard of review, the trial court must supply specific findings regarding the evidence of sanity and insanity, and his conclusions based on that evidence. The court must consider expert and other evidence presented at the release hearing, and contained in the trial record, on the issue of sanity or insanity. Regarding expert evidence, the court must carefully consider all credible relevant evidence on either side. Finally, the court must weigh the evidence in light of the dеfendant’s burden to over *893 come the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence.
Here, the trial court gave no indication regarding the basis fоr its decision that the presumption had not been overcome, and, therefore, we cannot determine whether his conclusion complies with our holding in this case. Accordingly, we remand this appeal to the trial court for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with the opinion. Upon appeal, if any, we will apply the aforestated standard of review. 2
Case remanded.
Notes
To the extent that
Moses v. State,
In Wilson v. State; Stevens v. State; and Brown v. State, supra, we applied this standard of review. In Brown and Wilson, we affirmed the jury’s verdict of sanity, overcoming the defendant’s plea of insanity. In Stevens, we reversed the trial court (as finder of fact), concluding that the medical evidence demanded a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity.