{¶ 1} Plаintiff-appellant, Margaret C. Nagel, appeals from the trial court’s decision denying class certification in her complaint against defendant-appellee, the Huntington National Bank. Because we conclude that the trial court incorrectly determined the merits of the underlying case when it ruled that Nagel was not a member of the class she was seeking to represent, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand this case for further proceedings.
{¶ 2} The following facts are undisputed. On May 2, 1995, Nagel secured a personal line of credit with Huntington. On or about December 22, 2001, Nagel paid off the loan in full. On March 29, 2002, the satisfaction for the payoff was recorded with the Cuyahoga County Recorder.
{¶ 3} On December 19, 2006, Nagel filed a class-action complaint against Huntington alleging violation of R.C. 5301.36, namely, that Huntington failed to file an entry of satisfaction of mortgage with the Cuyahoga County Recorder within 90 days of full payment of the mortgage. Nаgel seeks automatic damages ($250), interest, and costs as allowed under R.C. 5301.36(C).
{¶ 4} On March 27, 2007, Nagel filed a motion and brief in support for class certification seeking to represent a class of all persons who, from September 19, 2000, paid rеsidential mortgages in full and Huntington did not file an entry of satisfaction of mortgage with the Cuyahoga County Recorder’s office within 90 days of loan payoff.
{¶ 5} On August 24, 2007, a hearing was held on the motion for class certification. On November 5, 2007, the trial court issued аn opinion and ruling denying Nagel’s motion for class certification on the basis that Nagel did not meet the factors found in Civ.R. 23. Specifically, the trial court concluded that Nagel was not a member or an adequate representative оf the class she was seeking to represent and that her claims were not typical of the group because her release was timely mailed and Huntington was entitled to a presumption of timely delivery.
{¶ 6} It is from this order that Nagel timely appeals and asserts one assignment of error, which states:
*131
{¶ 7} “I. The trial court erred in denying plaintiffs motion for class certification. The trial court erred in making a ‘finding’ that plaintiff will lose on the merits of her claim where that was a merits issue the class wаs being certified to answer.
Ojalvo v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ.
(1984),
12
Ohio St.3d [230] 320 [12 OBR 313,
{¶ 8} A trial court has broаd discretion in determining whether to certify a case as a class action and an appellate court should not reverse a class-action determination absent an abuse of discretion.
Marks v. C.P. Chem. Co.
(1987),
{¶ 9} Before an action may be certified as a class action, the trial court must make seven affirmative findings: (1) an identifiable class must exist and the definition of the class must be unambiguous, (2) the named represеntatives must be members of the class, (3) the class must be so numerous that joinder of all the members is impracticable (numerosity), (4) there must be questions of law or fact common to the class (commonality), (5) the claims or defenses of the reprеsentative parties must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class (typicality), (6) the representative parties must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (adequacy), and (7) questions of law or fact сommon to the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
Hamilton,
{¶ 10} When a trial cоurt considers a motion to certify a class, it must assume the truth of the allegations in the complaint, without considering the merits of those allegations and claims. See
Ojalvo v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ., 12
Ohio St.3d at 233, 12 OBR 313,
{¶ 11} Here, the trial court’s decision to not certify the class was clearly based on the merits of the underlying case. The trial court ruled that Nagel had not satisfied the second, fifth, and sixth requirement of class certification and thus was not a member of the class, based on the finding that Huntington had timely mailed her mortgage release.
{¶ 12} Questions going to the merits of the action are not to be determined at the class-certification stage.
Ojalvo,
{¶ 13} Here, we find that the trial court’s decision to not certify the class constituted an abuse of discretion because it was based on the merits of the underlying claims. However, even if we were to find that the issue of “mailing vs. filing” was somehow intrinsically related with the definition of “who is a member of the class,” we would still reverse for the following reasons.
{¶ 14} R.C. 5301.36 requires that “[wjithin ninety days from the date of the satisfaction of a residential mortgage, the mortgagee shall record the fact of the satisfaction in the appropriate county recorder’s оffice and pay any fees required for the recording. The mortgagee may, by contract with the mortgagor, recover the cost of the fees required for the recording of the satisfaction by the county recorder.”
{¶ 15} This court has prеviously held that “the ‘filing’ of a document is distinct from the ‘service’ of a document.” See
Rimmer v. Citifinancial, Inc.,
Cuyahoga App. No. 89407,
{¶ 16} Here, the trial court found that Huntington was entitled to a presumption of timely delivery based upon the following evidence: (1) the check for the filing fee was signed on February 11, 2002; (2) the satisfaction was signed and notarized on January 4 or 7, 2002
1
; and (3) two other certificates of mortgage satisfaction that were prepared on the same date were timе-stamped by the appropriate county recorder’s office on February 26, 2002, and February 27, 2002, respectively. The trial court, relying upon
Gilbert v. Fifth Third Bancorp,
{¶ 17} The trial court’s reliance on Gilbert was misplaced. In Gilbert, Fifth Third presented evidence that it had a computer tracking system that noted the date of printing and of shipping and that the actual shipping date was manually entered into the tracking system. Id. at ¶ 33. Here, Huntington presentеd no independent corroborating evidence that Nagel’s release was actually mailed. Huntington did not use certified mail or obtain any proof of mailing. 2 Huntington did not establish that the envelope was properly addressed, had sufficiеnt postage, and was properly deposited in the mail on February 11, 2002 (the same date the check was signed). 3 Indeed, Ms. McKee, the financial representative who handled Nagel’s release, testified that she had no personal knowledge if Nagel’s release was actually mailed, since Huntington does “not keep track of when we actually mail [the releases].” She also testified that she had no personal knowledge of when the check was issued other than she saw a copy of the check. Huntington’s claim that Nagel’s release was timely mailed is based solely on the fact that two other mortgage satisfactions with the same date on the check were *134 filed in Delaware County and Clinton County on February 26, 2002, and February 27, 2002, respectively.
{¶ 18} Accordingly, for the aforementioned reasons, we find that the trial court erred when it found that Huntington was entitled to a presumption that Nagel’s release and satisfaction was timely filed with the county reсorder’s office. The only evidence of delivery is the “recorded” and “time-stamped” copy of Nagel’s release on March 29, 2002. This file-stamped date is presumed to reflect the actual date of filing or recording. See
Rimmer,
{¶ 19} When an appellate court finds an abuse of discretion, it should not proceed to formulate the class or issue itself but should remand the matter to the trial court for such a determination. See
Marks v. C.P. Chem. Co.,
{¶ 20} Nagel’s sole assignment of error is sustained.
{¶ 21} Huntington offers two cross-assignments of error, as follows:
{¶ 22} “Cross-Assignment of Error I. The trial court erred when it concluded that the one-year limitations period of R.C. 1109.69 did not bar the claims of appellant and her proposed class members.
{¶ 23} “Cross-Assignment of Error II. The trial court erred when it concluded that appellant met the burden of proving the predominance and superiority as required by Civ.R. 23(B)(3).”
{¶ 24} As an initial matter, we note that R.C. 2505.22 permits the filing of assignments of error by an appellee who has not appealed in circumstances where the appellee is seeking to protect the judgment of the lower court. See
Parton v. Weilnau
(1959),
{¶ 25} First, we find that the statute of limitations for this case is governed by R.C. 5301.36, which is six years, and not R.C. 1109.69, which is one year. Nagel’s suit against Huntington alleges violations of R.C. 5301.36. The Ohio Supreme Court has ruled that the applicable statute of limitations for actions for statutory damages under R.C. 5301.36(C) is six years. See
Rosette v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
*135 {¶ 26} Huntington’s first cross-аssignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 27} Next, we find that the trial court did not err in finding that Nagel met her burden of demonstrating the factors of predominance and superiority necessary for class certification. While there may be individualized legal issues, there is but one question of law that clearly predominates in this case, specifically, whether Huntington violated its duty to record a satisfaction of mortgage within 90 days from the date of payoff. A single adjudication as a class action is the mоst efficient and fair manner by which to resolve the matter.
Schmidt v. Avco Corp.
(1984),
{¶ 28} Huntington’s second cross-assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 29} Nagel’s sole assignment of error having been sustained, and Huntington’s two cross-assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Notes
. There is a discrepancy in the record as to when the release was notarized.
. See
Dudukovich v. Lorain Metro. Hous. Auth.
(1979),
. See
Gilbert,