57 Misc. 2d 301 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1968
Defendant General Motors has moved to dismiss three of the four canses of action set forth in the complaint herein. In his first and second causes of action, plaintiff alleges that defendant General Motors invaded his right of privacy hy investigating his private life and committing other offensive acts. For the purposes of this motion, it is conceded that General Motors, through its agents, made threatening telephone calls to plaintiff, tapped his telephone, attempted to entice him with women, “ shadowed ” him in "various places and caused him to he investigated hy interviewing numerous of his acquaintances who could provide defendant with information about him. It is alleged that all of this was done to silence plaintiff as a critic of defendant General Motors and its products. It is also conceded that these acts were carried on in many States, including New York, and in the City of Washington, D.C. Plaintiff was then a resident of the District of Columbia. The same afore-mentioned conduct is allegéd in
Defendant moves here to dismiss the first cause of action, or alternatively, to consolidate it with the third cause of action. At the threshold, a question arises as to which law this court is to apply to the facts alleged in the first cause of action. As noted, in the first cause of action, plaintiff claims that his right to privacy was violated by defendant’s acts in numerous States (expressly excluding New York) and that the law of each of the States wherein this conduct occurred should be applied to that particular conduct. In his papers, however, and in his oral argument, plaintiff appears to agree with defendant’s contention that primarily the law of the District of Columbia should apply. Defendant so contends because this was the situs of plaintiff’s residence, and therefore the chief place where the injuries to plaintiff’s feelings through defendant’s invasion of his right of privacy occurred. In part, the question of whether District of Columbia law alone applies, or the law of the various States mentioned, is to be individually applied, is not necessary for this court to determine, because the court finds that the law recognizes that the right of action which plaintiff states in his first cause of action exists in all of those jurisdictions.
As to plaintiff’s first cause of action, defendant emphasizes that there is a distinction between invasion of privacy by publication— that is, making public facts about plaintiff’s private life — and the intrusion into the privacy of plaintiff’s life — a right to solitude or to be “ left alone ” as it is commonly called. Defendant urges this distinction, contending that the District of Columbia does not recognize any right of privacy of the latter type. With this, the court disagrees. No District of Columbia case has been cited to this court by the defendant
Much more serious problems are raised by the defendant’s motion to dismiss the second cause of action. Defendant argues that any common-law cause of action for invasion of privacy in New York is precluded by the line of cases commencing with the leading case (Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538) to the effect that any cause of action is limited by statute to commercial cases (Civil Rights Law, §§ 50, 51). Indeed, plaintiff Nader makes no claim here under these statu
However, there is presented a constitutional right of plaintiff to privacy — a right to be left alone. The right of privacy stands on high ground, cognate to the values and concerns protected by constitutional guarantees (see U. S. Const., 4th, 5th, 14th Amdts.; Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S. 406; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1; Afro-American Pub. Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F. 2d 649).
Under the circumstances, the court is constrained to allow the second cause of action to stand on constitutional grounds.
Accordingly, the motion is denied.