Nadeau v. MERIT SYSTEM COUN. FOR DEPTS. OF SOC. SERV.Nadeau v. MERIT SYSTEM COUN. FOR DEPTS. OF SOC. SERV.
John D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Jean E. Dubofsky, Deputy Atty. Gen., Charles B. Lennahan, Frank L. DeLeo, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., Denver, for defendant-appellee The Merit System Council for the County Departments of Social Services of the State of Colorado.
Brownstein, Hyatt, Farber & Madden, Mark F. Leonard, Denver, for defendant-appellee Harry Havemeyer.
BERMAN, Judge.
The Jefferson County Department of Social Services (Jefferson County Department) and its director, Nelson Nadeau, appellants, appeal the dismissal of their complaint seeking review of action by the Merit System Council for the County Departments of Social Services of the State of Colorado (Merit System Council). We affirm.
On March 28, 1974, Harry Havemeyer, a caseworker with the Jefferson County Department,
The Jefferson County Department and its director then initiated his action, pursuant to
The question presented for review is whether the Jefferson County Department and its director can appeal from a decision of the Merit System Council. The appellants assert that they are “aggrieved” parties within the meaning of
In Otero, supra, the Board of County Commissioners filed a complaint under
“[T]he right to judicial review of the final administrative actions of the State Board of Social Services, under the law of this state, is limited to those parties to the proceeding before the administrative agency whose rights, privileges, or duties, as distinct from those of the State, are adversely affected by the decision. The county as an arm of the State Board of Social Services has no rights or privileges so far as its statutory duties are concerned and hence does not come within the [meaning] of `party.’ Excluded from the provisions of 1969 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 3-16-5, [now
§ 24-4-106, C.R.S.1973 ], the county, and as such, the Board of County Commissioners are without standing to challenge the action of the State Board . . . .”
In support of their claimed right to seek judicial review, plaintiffs point to
“[T]he merit system council shall make the decision concerning the applicant‘s or the employee‘s status, which shall be reviewable in accordance with section 24-4-106, C.R.S.1973.”
And,
“Any party adversely affected or aggrieved by any agency action may commence an action for judicial review in the district court . . . .”
Construing these statutes in the light of the ruling in Otero, supra, the right of the Jefferson County Department and its director to obtain judicial review of the action of the Merit System Council depends on whether they are parties to the proceeding before the administrative agency whose rights, privileges, and duties, as distinct from those of the state, are adversely affected by that action.
By statute, the State Board of Social Services is the state agency for the administration and supervision of programs relating to public assistance and welfare.
The Merit System, including the Merit System Council, is established by the State Department of Social Services pursuant to statute for the purpose of “the selection, retention, and promotion of employees of the county departments.”
It is clear from these statutory provisions that the county departments of social services, and the Merit System Council, are both functional divisions of the State Department of Social Services for the convenient administration of the state program and are not independent entities separate and distinct from the state. See Board of County Commissioners v. Love, 172 Colo. 121, 470 P.2d 861.
It is appellants’ position that since the statutes cited above clearly provide for judicial review of Merit System Council action, and the legislature, on the face of the statute, has not specifically denied the right to seek such review to the county department, that where a county department is adversely affected by a decision of the Merit System Council, it must be granted judicial review. Love, supra, answered this argument, stating: “Since the legislature has not seen fit to grant such power and authority, we necessarily conclude that the [county] commissioners were without standing to bring the instant action.”
The Jefferson County Department, in the instant case, occupies the same position as the Board of County Commissioners in Otero, supra, vis-a-vis the State Board of Social Services, and, in such role, it has no standing to seek judicial review of the action by the Merit System Council.
Judgment affirmed.
ENOCH, J., concurs.
COYTE, J., dissents.
COYTE, Judge (dissenting):
I do not view the Otero case as being dispositive of the issues in this case.
In Otero the issue involved the right of the State Board to adopt rules and establish salary schedules for those who worked in the county welfare offices. Otero is premised upon the fact that by statute,
Here, however, the statutory scheme clearly gives the county director the authority to appoint “such staff as may be necessary . . . to administer public assistance and welfare, medical assistance, and child welfare activities within his county.”
The Merit System Council, although established and a part of the State Department of Social Services, is an independent and impartial body whose members are appointed by the Governor for three year overlapping terms. They are not subject to the will of the State Department of Social Services, except to the extent provided by statute which authorizes the State Department to adopt rules and regulations for the Merit System in matters involving, among others, “discipline, dismissal, separation, reinstatement, and transfers.”
The Jefferson County Department of Social Services, which by statute has the authority to appoint its staff, must also have the power to discharge its staff; and in fact it does as shown by the above rule. The right of the employee to an appeal is safeguarded by statute and by the regulations issued thereunder.