Nada HASHEM-YOUNES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANOU ENTERPRISES INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 08-1229
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
Feb. 17, 2009.
777
E.
Gresh next argues that Skaggs and Dalton tortiously interfered with the contract between him and WSA. The district court properly granted summary judgment on this claim for one basic (and good) reason: Gresh has not identified a contract between him and WSA that WSA breached, and Kentucky law requires a breach in order to bring such a claim. See Indus. Equip. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 554 F.2d 276, 289 (6th Cir.1977) (“Two of the necessary elements of [the tort of intentional interference with an existing contractual relationship] are the existence of a contract between the plaintiff and a third party and a subsequent breach of the contract by the third party.“); Harrodsburg Indus. Warehousing, Inc. v. MIGS, LLC, 182 S.W.3d 529, 532 (Ky.Ct.App.2005). WSA never breached the stock option agreement and, as explained above, the parol-evidence rule defeats Gresh‘s attempt to establish the existence of some “broader, oral agreement” among him, Addington and Skaggs.
F.
Also unavailing is Gresh‘s tortious-interference-with-prospective-contractual-relations claim. To succeed, Gresh must (1) identify a prospective contractual relation (2) that defendants interfered with and (3) establish that the interference was “intentional[] and improper[ ].” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B; see also Nat‘l Collegiate Athletic Ass‘n v. Hornung, 754 S.W.2d 855, 857-58 (Ky.1988) (adopting Second Restatement‘s approach). Gresh proffers that he had a “prospective contractual right ... to own 5% of the solid waste opportunities developed by WSA.” JA 69. Yet the terms of the stock-option agreement—which gave Gresh the option to own 5% of the stock in WSA—do not support this contention, leaving Gresh again to invoke unsuccessfully his “broader, oral agreement” among Skaggs, Addington and him. No evidence shows that the defendants interfered with Gresh‘s ability to acquire 5% of the stock in WSA. Gresh admits that he could have exercised his option at any time, and when he exercised his option in 1999, WSA complied with the terms of the agreement, giving Gresh one share of WSA stock for $1,000. Gresh simply has not identified any affirmative action WSA, Skaggs, Dalton or River Cities took to obstruct or restrict his ability to exercise his option and acquire stock in WSA. Because he cannot show actual interference, the district court properly granted summary judgment on this claim.
III.
For these reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Nada Hashem-Younes (“Younes“), a Muslim female of Lebanese descent, is a former at-will employee of the World Trade Center Detroit/Windsor Languages Institute. She was discharged after roughly 80 days on the job for poor performance. Younes sued in district court, charging Defendants-Appellees Danou Enterprises, Inc., Samir Danou, and Barry Whyte (collectively “Defendants“), with discrimination based upon gender, religion, pregnancy, and national origin pursuant to Michigan‘s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act,
The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims. After carefully reviewing the record, the parties’ arguments, and the applicable law, we AFFIRM for the reasons stated in the district court‘s thorough and well-reasoned opinion dated January 18, 2008, 2008 WL 183636. All the relevant facts were thoroughly reviewed and properly considered.
In her Reply Brief to this Court, Younes contends that, after this Court‘s recent decision in White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381 (6th Cir.2008), she no longer needs to satisfy the familiar McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden-shifting framework for establishing prima facie discrimination based upon circumstantial evidence. White was issued after the district court‘s decision, so we briefly address Younes‘s argument here.
In White, this Court held that compliance with the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden-shifting framework is not required in order to establish a Title VII mixed-motive claim at the summary judgment stage. White, 533 F.3d at 400. Instead, an employee asserting a Title VII mixed-motive claim need only produce evidence sufficient to convince a jury that (1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the employee, and (2) “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor” for the employer‘s adverse employment action. Id. at 400 (quoting
Younes presented all of her claims in the district court as single-motive claims pursuant to the general anti-discrimination provision of
As stated, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.