85 Md. 235 | Md. | 1897
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal is from an order of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City sustaining certain exceptions to the auditor’s account distributing the assets of the estate of C. L. Gwinn & Company, who on the 5th of September, 1895, executed to Ferdinand C. Dugan a deed of trust for the benefit of its creditors. The appellants, at the date of said deed, were the lessors of the premises occupied by said company, which was indebted to the appellants in the sum of $314.37 for rent in arrears and unpaid. On the day after the execution of said deed the appellants issued a distress warrant to satisfy the rent in arrears, and caused the same to be levied upon sufficient property of said company then remaining upon the demised premises to pay their claim for rent and the costs of the distress. On August 28th, 1895, the James Robertson Manufacturing Company obtained a judgment against the said Gwinn & Company, which was assigned to Patrick Kennedy. On the day of the entry of the judgment execution was issued thereon and laid in the hands of the sheriff, who, on the same day, seized the property, which was subsequently conveyed by said deed to said Dugan, trustee. The Court below did not assume jurisdiction of the trust until the 7th of September, 1895, the second day after the execution of said deed, and the day after said distress had been levied and eight days after the sheriff had levied on said property. On the 17th of January, 1896, certain employees of said Gwinn & Company filed their petition in the Court bélow, claiming they were under the provisions of sec. 15 of Article 47 of Code, entitled in the distribution of the property and estate of said company to have their claims for “ wages contracted not more than three months anterior to the execution of the deed of assignment” paid first in full out of such property, after payment of all proper costs, expenses, &c. The deed of assignment by its express terms makes the same provision for employees and servants as that contained in section 15 of Article 47 of the Code. The auditor in stating his
Section 15 of Article 47 of the Code provides, “ that wages, &c., contracted more than three months anterior to the execution of an assignment, are first to be paid in full out of such property or estate after payment of the proper and legitimate costs, expenses, taxes and commissions, and are preferred to all claims against the property and estate of such insolvent person or body corporate, except the lien claims of such persons as shall hold liens upon said property or estate recorded at least three months prior to such assignment, adjudication or decree.” This Court has on more than one occasion been called upon to construe the
The appellants insist that notwithstanding the Act of 1888, ch. 383, they are entitled to priority in the payment of their claim for rent, and urge that although the Act in question was passed in 1888, yet no attempt has ever been made to place such a construction upon its provisions as that contended for by said employees, who are appellees here. • The mere fact, if true, that the Act has remained dormant for a number of years detracts nothing from its true meaning and effect. The Act has, however, been before this Court upon three different occasions, in 72 Md. 24; 80 Md. 139; 82 Md. 565, and the same construction as to the priority of the claims for wages of employees in the distribution of the assets of insolvents’ estates, has been adhered to. We find nothing in the record of this appeal which tends, in any respect, to suggest the adoption of a rule of construction different from that which has been am nounced in the cases cited, and we think that the meaning of the Act of 1888 is free of doubt or uncertainty. The
It is not essential in the determination of this appeal that we pass upon the other questions in the record, as the em-' ployees are the only parties to the controversy who for the reasons stated are entitled to participate in the distribution, of the trust fund. It results from what we have said that the order of the Court below must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed.
Order reversed with costs and cause remanded for further proceedings.