Memorandum Decision
T1 Fоurteen-year-old N.A.D. was accused of raping and threatening to kill seven-year-old K.W. while N.A.D. and his sister were sleeping at K.W.'s home. N.A.D. was subsequently adjudicated delinquent for rape of a child and threatening the life of a child. We affirm. ~
T2 N.AD. first argues that he was denied due process because the same judge who ruled on his motion to suppress presided over his trial. Because this issue was not preserved below, he raises it on grounds of plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel.
18 In order to prevail on grounds of plain error, an appellant must show that "() [aln error exists; (M) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (ii) the error is harmful, ie., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant." State v. Dunn,
14 NAD. asserts that the juvenile court judge could not impartially hear his case because the judge had previously hеard evidence of his confession when she considered and granted his motion to suppress. He therefore maintains that it was plain error for the judge not to recuse herself from the trial. However, N.A.D. identifies no settled law supporting his argument. Instead, N.AD. points to case law indicating that a defendant whose motion to suppress was denied before trial need not renew his motion at a bench trial in order to рreserve the suppression issue for appeal where the same judge who heard the motion presides over the trial. See, eg., State v. Griffin,
15 Even if we were inclined to agreе with N.A.D., the inference he asks us to draw from Griffin and similar cases does not constitute settled law sufficient to support a plain error claim. Indeed, not only is N.AD.'s position not supported by settled law, it is actually contradicted by settled law. When a jury hears a case, the court is required to conduct the trial "so that inadmissible evidence is not suggested to the jury by any means." Utah R. Evid. 108(d). However, "judges in bench trials are presumed tо be less likely than juries to be prejudiced by [inadmissible] evidence." State v. Adams,
16 For the same reasons, NAD. cannot prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In order to prevail on grounds of ineffective assistance, a defendant must demonstrate, first, "that counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonаble professional judgment" and, second, "that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial-iLe., that it affected the outcome of the case." State v. Litherland,
17 N.A.D. next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call an expert witness to testify regarding the ef-feets of N.A.D.'s medication. N.A.D. relies on our supreme court's ruling in State v. Hales,
T8 Unlike Hales, NAD. has not shown either that his counsel failed to adequately investigate the effect of his mеdication or that an expert would have provided helpful testimony if called as a witness. The record indicates that N.A.D.'s counsel had enlisted "Wasatch Mental Health Professionals" as prospective witnesses, although those witnesses were not ultimately identified or called to testify. This belies N.A.D.'s claim that his counsel did not consult with experts regarding his health issues and medication. But even if counsel's investigation was inаdequate, the record does not indicate what an expert would have testified to if called. N.A.D. points to his mother's testimony that he was taking medication, that he could not sleep without it, and that it was very diffiсult to wake him after he had taken it. But unlike Hales, who provided an affidavit by an expert indicating what the expert would have testified to if called at trial, N.A.D. has provided us with nothing to indicate that an expert wоuld have corroborated or added to his mother's testimony, and the record does not even identify the precise medication NAD. was taking. Cf. State v. Charles,
T9 Finally, NAD. argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court's adjudication. "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if [we] otherwise reach[ ] a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
$10 NAD. acknowledges that K.W.'s testimony supports the juvenile court's adjudication but argues that this testimony was insufficient in light of testimony from N.AD.'s mother that his medication would have caused him to sleep deeply all night and from N.A.D.'s ten-year-old sister that K.W., rather than N.A.D., was the aggressor. "However, the juvenile courts are given wide latitude based upon not only the court's opportunity to judge credibility firsthand, but also based on the juvenile court judges' special training, experience and interest in this field, and devoted attention to such matters." In re C.C.R.,
{11 In sum, Utah law does not rеquire a judge who has gained knowledge of inadmissible evidence by presiding over pretrial matters to recuse herself from conducting a bench trial. Thus, N.A.D.'s plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel claims relating to this issue fail. Furthermore, NAD. has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his counsel's decision not to call an expert witness to testify regarding his medication, and therefore, his ineffective assistance claim relating to this issue likewise fails. Finally, the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court's delinquency adjudication. We therefore affirm.