*1 Code provides for a “$10,000 fine of or the amount specified the of- fense, greater” whichever is for a felony.
For all the foregoing reasons, I would follow Wagner and reverse the defendant’s conviction in its entirety. MYRE, Minor,
MARY ANGELA Myre, William her Father and Next Friend, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF EDU CATION OF SENECA TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
La Grundy Counties, Salle and Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee.
Third District No. 81—405 Opinion 9, 1982. August filed *2 ALLOY,J., dissenting. Jenkins, Ltd., Klein, Chicago, Dempsey, Thorpe
Gerard E. of of and Goodin, Aurora, appellant. Ben A. of for Vickers, Ottawa, Vickers, appellee. for
John F. of Brusatte & PRESIDING BARRY opinion JUSTICE delivered the court:
The issue in this case is the trial court erred substantive whether for the high relief to a former school student granting injunctive of law. right school violation of her to substantive due process board’s below, For the we do not decide that issue. explained reason the circuit filed a Mary Angela Myre, plaintiff, complaint 10, 1980, that her alleging court of La Salle on November County im- when she was rights to substantive due had been violated process and, as a consequence, to in-school properly subjected suspension opportu- affect her adversely missed certain examinations which could from The measure resulted nity college for admission. foot- found in at an out-of-town having possession been beer Mary’s time, at the 31, 1980. a school senior game Mary, high ball on October form her dis- given admitted the offense and was a choice as to which After discus- suspension. would take-in-school out-of-school cipline sing the matter with her parents, Mary chose in-school suspension a as five-day period, specified in the student handbook for alcohol/ use, and a two-month restriction on attending extra-curricular Following activities. special meeting the Seneca Township Board (defendant father, Education herein) Mary’s board ap- proved the Mary began measures. her five-day serve 6,1980. in-school on suspension November 10, test, By November had II Mary biology missed stood to miss examinations in family living accounting before comple- tion of the suspension However, in-school period. on date she sought and obtained temporary injuctive relief from the circuit court. In addition to enjoining school from preventing her from taking exams for the remainder of the suspension in-school the court period, Mary ordered that make all permitted up missed examinations. were, fact, examinations taken by Mary. On December the suit for I of injunctive (count plaintiff’s relief complaint) proceeded Although to a trial on the merits. she had re- tests, grades ceived for the accounting family living biology exam At ungraded remained the court’s the conclu- pending ruling. sion of on January court found the rule testimony under Mary that, had been was a but disciplined valid one as applied herein, to the circumstances it deprivation constituted a of her *3 rights 16, 1981, to due the process. substantive On court en- January tered its order relief the granting permanent injunctive ordering and school to for grades credit all examinations given pursuant T.R.O. The court further that count III plaintiff’s ordered of com- in plaint, requested attorney pursuant which she fees of Ti- “§1983 Code, amended,” tle 42 of the United States as would be heard at a later date. 26, 1981,
On to add plaintiff’s complaint was amended February that of Title 42 brought count I was and 1988 of pursuant “§§1983 Code,” brought the and count III was being pursu- United States that ant on held to section 1988. The fees was on the hearing attorney $1,850 same that Mary they date. Counsel for testified had billed *** for excess of of work at fees, representing “in 51 hours attorney hour,” an in The court took about and court costs. $40 $45 $101 the testimony argu- matter under advisement at the close of all ments of in of on June counsel, judgment Mary entered favor $1,850 $1,918, representing 1981. The court’s order awarded plaintiff for for fees and court costs. attorney $68 2, 1981, the its notice of Plaintiff filed appeal.
On board filed July 27, 1982, filed in 10. this cross-appeal July January plaintiff on On
443 a motion the therefor two asserting court to dismiss board’s appeal, in- jurisdiction lack of over the issue of appellate bases: 16, 1981, granted relief which on and mootness. junctive January was thereto response took both the motion dismiss and the board’s We the with case. 2, 1981,
Plaintiff that the notice of July appeal, contends board’s order, 5 sought appeal which made reference to the June specific only Therefore, court argues, from the order of fees. she this only attorney jurisdiction lacks the issue of the permanent injunction. over board, hand, on 2 of the other takes the the notice position July per- was the order appeal sufficiently encompass January broad of In injunctive support manent relief. of this the board position, points contend, language which, sufficiently the notice they apprised that the intended to the rulings board entered appeal January. essence, the notice of as appeal reads follows: “You *** *** *** notified Defendant from the of the appeals order *** *** *** Circuit Court June, entered on the 5th of said 1981. By *** *** *** order the Judge found all issues in favor of Plaintiff *** *** affirmed the prior oral granting order plaintiff’s petition Permanent Injunctive Other Relief.”
We agree language board that this is in substan tial compliance with the notice of Rule requirement Supreme Court 303(c) (73 303(c)) Ill. 2d R. even it though may faulty. technically Generally, the appeal notice of is to view liberally construed with a to its purpose. (Burtell v. First Ill. Corp. (1979), Charter Service 76 2d 394 380.) N.E.2d Errors made in of or specifying dates appealed ders from have been held not to appeal bar where whole, substance the notice of appeal, as a in fairly clearly forms the other party judgments sought. over review is (In re Estate Malloy (1981), 76; 96 Ill. 3d App. N.E.2d Hamer v. Board Education (1978), App. 66 Ill. 3d 383 N.E.2d In our 231.) opinion, the notice of herein appeal satisfies the minimum as requirements rule in that it men liberally construed clearly grant tions the of injunctive relief as a for the appeal. basis Whether the reference to June 5 was error it should Jan because have been (the uary date of the court’s oral order on issue of permanent injunctive relief) or whether the refer June 5 date intended to *4 to the court’s of only fees, award failure to attorney specify January omission, 5 was an error of dispositive is not of the question of of adequacy appeal. Rather, notice of the docu give ment—to fair notice the issues to advanced appel was, lant-must be met. In this case it plaintiff has failed 444 event to
any demonstrate any prejudice from resulting the board’s failure to specify the date of the grant court’s of injunctive relief. Ac- cordingly, we will not dismiss this appeal lack of appellate jurisdic- tion.
The plaintiff’s second contention for dismissal is based on the doctrine of mootness. The argument mootness requires the recitation of a few additional facts appear in an affidavit attached to plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. The plaintiff was graduated high from school in June 1981. She was accepted for did commence attend ing college in the fall 1981 semester at Western Illinois University, Macomb, Illinois. Since has plaintiff taken the already high school ex aminations, grades, received her and has been accepted into a college choice, her the argument continues, any decision of this court con trary to that reached in the circuit court could practical have no effect upon either party. agreeWe with plaintiff’s argument.
It is significant to this issue that the trial court specifically found the rule itself was not invalid. We It agree. rule, harsh but the broad discretion accorded school authorities enables the rule to be tai- lored to the specific circumstances of the particular student dis- being ciplined under it. We therefore agree with the trial court that the only basis for grant of relief to this was her complaint that the rule as applied to her deprived rights. of her exists, however,
There no present between the controversy parties concerning the issue injunctive relief. Certainly we could not order plaintiff to “untake” the exams. An order of this court reversing the court’s order that credit given for the exams have, best, at only highly speculative consequences, since plain- tiff is effect, already college. the issue of this plaintiff’s rights to substantive due process is moot.
We also find that the present case does not as an qualify excep- tion to the mootness doctrine. (See ex People rel. Wallace v. Labrenz (1952), 618, 411 Ill. 769; 104 N.E.2d Environmental Protection Agency v. Pollution Control Board (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 410 98; N.E.2d August Skoglund H. Department Co. v. Transportation (1978), 67 Ill. App. 849; 3d 384 N.E.2d Sosna v. Iowa (1975), 419 U.S. L. Ed. 2d 553.) S. Ct. Since the matter is moot further any comment on the merits of the trial court’s order would be improper because such comment would have advisory (See effect only. Madison Park Bank v. Zagel (1982), 231.) 91 Ill. 2d we Accordingly, dismiss the issue of this appeal substantive as moot. attempted
The board has to resist plaintiff’s argument mootness by characterizing the other issue raised on appeal attorney —whether
445 fees were granted the trial improperly legal court—as a “collateral consequence” our requiring consideration of the entire appeal. (See v. Chebny (1979), 419, Stuart 68 Ill. 3d App. 352.) 386 N.E.2d plaintiff has responded argument by citing this Doe v. Marshall (5th 1980), 118, Cir. 622 F.2d as for a court’s con authority reviewing sideration of the correctness of awarding fees a find attorney despite ing of mootness on the merits. agree
While we generally with rationale of Marshall the issue of fees is not a attorney legal collateral consequence would save the substantive issue on appeal from dismissal under the mootness, doctrine of we are not bound to the ultimate disposition ob tained in Marshall, which was to remand the matter to the trial court for a proper determination of involved, fees. attorney Marshall as here, a student who had been granted injunctive relief and had com pleted high during school of the pendency appeal. The Fifth Cir cuit Court of Appeals disposed process substantive due issue by finding the matter moot and vacating the order of injunction. The not, court did however, remand for dismissal of the complaint. There fore, legally and factually, the plaintiff Marshall awas “prevailing party” purposes of 42 U.S.C. sec. 1988 (1976) despite the applica tion of the mootness doctrine to the due process issue. Illinois,
In however, it is well settled that a finding of moot ness requires, in addition to vacatur of from, the order appealed re mandment to the circuit court for dismissal of the complaint. Wheeler v. Aetna Casualty Surety & (1974), 184, Co. 57 Ill. 2d 311 N.E.2d 134.
Once the complaint dismissed, there can be no “prevailing party” because the parties, in the eyes law, are restored to the positions they had occupied prior to commencement of the suit. Appli- cation of the Hlinois rule to the instant case means that the plaintiff was not at law a “prevailing party,” even it though fact must be conceded that she was. Undeniably, plaintiff was successful in that she obtained the injunctive relief she sought in the circuit court. The tests given, have been grades credited and their served in that the test scores could be considered for college admission.
Since we find that the plaintiff was a “prevailing
party”
fact, we are faced
ultimately
question
of whether the plain
tiff in this case has demonstrated a violation of her
rights
civil
suffic
ient to state a claim under 42 U.-S.C.sec. 1983 (1976)for which attor
ney fees could be
find
awarded under 42 U.S.C. sec.
(1976).
1988
We
that she has not. (See Woodv. Strickland (1975),
308, 326,
420 U.S.
43 L.
214, 227,
Ed. 2d
95 S.
992,
Ct.
1003.) Wood,
In
the Supreme
stated that section 1983 was not intended to
Court
vehicle for
judicial correction of errors committed
school administrators in the
respecting
exercise of their discretion
matters of student
so
as
errors
not
long
such
do
rise
level of violations of specific
case,
it
guarantees.
constitutional
this
is clear to us that the only
violation
was a violation of
complained
general
such,
due
rights
process.
substantive
As
the error she
complains
does not rise to the level of a violation of specific
guar-
constitutional
antees.
Tinker v.
Moines Independent Community
See
Des
School
(1969),
District
393 U.S.
21 L. Ed.
(viola-
2d
Accordingly, permanent injunction and re- awarding verse and vacate the order of June 5 fees. attorney This cause is remanded to the circuit court with directions to dismiss the complaint.
Reversed and remanded.
STOUDER, J., concurs. ALLOY,dissenting:
JUSTICE majority opinion I dissent from the in this case. respectfully A case is moot where there is no actual between the controversy the court have no parties, any thereby decision would actual the The rea- upon rights parties. majority effect interests Myre graduated high sons that since Miss has from school and en- is, effect,” tered the constitutional decided below “in college question however, noted, moot. It must that there has never been con- any be the whether she troversy concerning graduate between could parties factual assertions are college. completely or attend Such extraneous which the The controversy parties. has existed between contro- the of the school right has been and continues to be district to versy regulations against Myre by preventing enforce its Miss disciplinary her preventing receiving her the exams and from credit taking injunction record. The trial court’s permanent those exams on her the stopping taking the school from exams prevented the exams entered on her and it mandated that the scores from be all centered controversy along The real has been permanent record. the school’s to authority this student’s record and upon permanent sanctions effect that record. The trial court’s impose mandatory injunction prevent continues in effect and continues to the school dis- trict from making any upon alterations in Miss record based Myre’s action. disciplinary mootness,
The majority’s conclusory finding focusing only upon exams, the taking of the fails to consider the real controversy, being effect of the action on records If, the student. concludes, moot, as the the matter majority reversed and remanded in the oc- thereby leaving parties positions suit, cupied prior then the school district no longer under a injunction. While, mandatory practically speaking, they can no longer exams, make Miss Myre “untake” the absent the injunction there is nothing to them prevent correcting from Miss Myre’s perma- nent records so as to indicate that no credit is to be for the ex- given ams taken during This disciplinary suspension. speculation is not meant encourage board, such action by the in the the major- event ity opinion is upheld, but rather out that the actual merely point been, controversy be, has and continues to this student’s permanent record school board’s mea- authority impose disciplinary sures which have effect record. This con- controversy tinues despite graduation and into entry college. opinion majority dismisses as “highly speculative” any consequence of reversal on our Such a part. ignores view the fact that a student’s permanent high school record may effect, have a continuing pertinence use and in our Such society. records are utilized not only by colleges and uni- versities, at undergraduate levels, post-graduate but also government, the military, private sector employers reviewing an applicant. There is a continuing actual controversy important implications for parties both stemming from a decision on the merits *7 Furthermore, this case. the court has the power grant effectual board, relief to the school for if the trial court’s action is reversed on merits, the as I be, believe it should then the school will permitted to make the corrections in the permanent sought record it has make from the start. The other practical effect is that the school board will know the seeking boundaries its to control authority combat and alcohol in the abuse schools.
The majority opinion attempts to meet a difficult as- question by serting time, that the controversy longer no exists. At the same the opinion seeks to accommodate fair and correct result by depriving the plaintiff of any recovery fees for section 1983 action. treatment of the section 1983 costs question seriously fees and is flawed. as the Clearly, majority does and must accept, plaintiff Myre 448
was a in the prevailing party trial court. She obtained the preliminary injunction and was permitted take the exams and have her scores entered on her record. She is the prevailing substan- party, even if tially, mootness is used to avoid the central issue in the case. result, As a she would be entitled to fees under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1988 Section (1976). permits award for fees and costs to a prevail- ing in a party 1983 action. To sustain a section 1983 claim a plaintiff must defendant, show that a acting law, under color of State deprived him of right secured any by Constitution or laws of the United (42 States. U.S.C. sec. 1983 (1976).) case, In the instant the trial court district, determined that the school acting under State law and regu- lation, deprived Miss of her Myre right constitutional to due process, specifically to substantive due process. The right to due arises process by virtue of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. Section speaks to the “deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by Constitution and laws.” The majority suggest that section 1983 was not intended to cover this par- ticular constitutional violation. The majority, citing Woodv. Strickland in which the United States Supreme Court indicated that courts should be very circumspect matters of school discre- tion, makes a novel distinction between constitutional rights under section 1983. The finds majority there are specific constitutional rights and there are general constitutional rights, and that section former, 1983 was meant to cover the but not the latter. Presumably, judging from the majority opinion, the first amendment provides specific rights, while process the due clauses the fifth and four- teeneth Rather, do not. due process provides only general rights, which are somehow less deserving of and entitled to than protection the more specific constitutional rights. general This and specific dis- tinction utilized by majority is without basis. The language of sec- tion 1983 is “any right Constitution,” secured and the court in Strickland, Woodv. when speaking “specific constitutional rights,” indicating those rights specifically protected by the Constitution. Due process rights, procedural substantive, both are specifically protected Constitution. The court in Woodwas that saying sub- stantive due process should very rarely be used courts to interfere with legitimate discretionary authority given schools in disciplinary matters. The court therein makes no statement or suggestion substantive due process rights “general rights” under Consti- tution and not thereby entitled relief under section 1983.
Nevertheless, the majority adopts such a distinction for the pur- pose of reaching conclusion is not entitled to *8 result, on the finding principal fees. This with the mootness coupled issue, Ei- is a Such a is not available here. compromise. compromise ther fees, and is to her for the trial court Myre prevails entitled found violation of the Constitution is section actionable under 1983, or Miss does not in her Myre prevail claim and is not entitled to fees. The distinction adopted by majority way have its middle without is that the trial adequate position basis. dissent’s court’s decision, a violation of finding process, wrong substantive due was and that it impermissible infringement by was courts in discretionary authority school district matters. The merits of the case should met. To the merits this dissent now turns.
The record following discloses the facts. undisputed night On October and a female friend attended Mary Myre an out-of-town game football between Yorkville and Seneca high schools. Mary Myre, time, at the was a senior 17-year-old at Seneca Township High Shook On the night game Yorkville, of the football in Mary Myre was found in possession of beer the Yorkville high school parking lot. She was arrested Yorkville police, on a posses- sion of alcohol charge. also, The police, night notified Seneca High School principal Schmink, David attending who was the football game. Mr. Schmink went to the parking lot where he met by plaintiff Myre and several mistake, officers. Miss admitted her and similar previous mistakes, and wondered what would be done about it Mr. Schmink. He informed her the matter would be de- cided at time, another after further discussion with her. The following Monday morning, Schmink met Principal with her and the other stu- dent who had caught possession been of beer at the football game. After the meeting, he imposed a five-day suspension from school on Miss Myre and a two-month prohibition against extracurric- attending ular activities.
The rules regulations Board, adopted by School pursuant to section 24—24 of the (Ill. School Code Rev. Stat. ch. par. 24), pertinent part, stated: 24— “The following considered serious positive violations of con- structive student behavior:
* * * Possession, 11. use or distribution of alcoholor drugs. ALCOHOL/DRUGS
* * * Following 4. the determination of the use of controlled sub- alcohol, stances cannabis and/or actions following will be taken:
First Offense
The student will be from suspended (5) school for five days >> *** regulations The rules and also for provided various methods of disci- pline offenses, to be utilized for major included was the “in-school sus- That pension.” suspension was stated as follows: “Students on an in-school suspension will to a cer- assigned be tain room for all periods. class During suspension, in-school all work is to be done and tests that are completed; any missed cannot made up, although work made The daily may up. rights student forfeits all to attend after school activities. Par- ents will be notified of all in-school suspensions.” Following of the in-school imposition suspension, Myre’s Miss parents were notified and written telephone notice. An of the appeal father, taken suspension Myre’s was and meetings were held him between and the and principal superintendent. The school board special meeting also held a to meet with Miss father to Myre’s con- sider the It suspension. approved. was reviewed 6, 1980,
On Mary began November to serve her in-school suspension. She remained in a room designated during all class peri- ods and did not regular attend classes. She was not allowed to take scheduled regularly tests exams and would not have al- been lowed, rules, under the to make them up either. She a received zero for tests and exams during which occurred her suspension. On the third of her scheduled day five-day suspension, Mary Myre, by her fa- friend, relief, ther as next petition injunctive filed a requesting to temporary restraining injunction prevent order and preliminary the school from from keeping Mary Myre taking regularly board court, scheduled tests and exams. The circuit ex issued a acting parte, the school to take her tests directing permit Mary Myre TRO board she had up any and exams and to allow her to make tests and exams missed The school district suspension. complied because the court’s orders. amended begin, plaintiff before trial on merits was
Shortly III, her adding asserting a count a cause of action under petition by The trial (1976), rights pro- U.S.C. sec. 1983 civil statute. amendment, I scheduled, count despite ceeded as based right constitutional petition, alleging deprivation plaintiff’s .the trial, superin- At due process. due substantive process, specifically regula- the rules and concerning testified high tendent of the school was a com- suspension that an in-school tions. He stated and the country, purpose schools in the throughout mon procedure environment, to en- in the school stay it was to have students behind studies, even classroom courage pursue them to use their initiative He also classes. though attending regular were from they prevented alcohol regarding at the policy how the board had arrived explained in school or at school and the of those items drugs prohibition that the personal opinion functions. He further stated his pa- a student from exams and tests was to obtain preventing taking causing suspension. rental cooperation addressing problem regarding testified that the rule superintendent possession use of alcohol or in March and the drugs adopted policy allowing an in-school instituted in 1980. suspension was
Further ef- testimony relative to the its suspension, purposes fects in Principal the case was received from Schmink. He testified that Miss Myre’s during failure take tests her would suspension not nor it her prevented graduation, have have hindered *10 admission to Western Illinois Eastern Illinois University, University, or Northern Illinois Her University. high scores on entrance exams schools, assured her of according have admission to these him. He also stated that the of an in-school is to purpose suspension the punish student and to motivate him or her. 5, 1981, trial, court,
On January after the in an oral opinion, stated its in the findings case. The court held that the rule in ques- tion, valid, for disciplining possession or use of alcohol was in that it sets forth the violations the punishment for a violation. The court found no infirmity However, constitutional with the rule on its face. the court ruled that as applied Mary in the cir- case, cumstances of this the rule right violated substantive due under the process ruling Constitution. This was based the upon court’s conclusion that the punishment was harsh for the con- unduly duct in Miss Myre engaged. reaching In this conclusion the rule, court the construed a requiring five-day suspension posses- alcohol, sion of calling have been enacted for the of the au- thorities’ attention to or alcohol conditions of a more chronic nature. The court felt that rule was not to cover a situa- adopted the tion where a student is found with a beer or two at a school football game. The court concluded that the rule as did not fit the applied problem which the court felt it designed Noting address. that effect principal punishment prevent of was to the student 452
from taking tests, exams and the court found that such academic sanction was improper when the conduct giving rise to the was not directly related to academic matters. Based finding its disparity between the engaged conduct in by the plaintiff and the dis- cipline board, meted out the court found that Myre’s sub- stantive due process rights had been granted violated. It permanent injunctive relief, preventing the school from barring plaintiff from taking the exams during scheduled suspension ordering the grades from those exams be reflected on her school re- cord.
The issue is whether the circuit court erred in its conclusion that the disciplinary action by the school board violated plaintiff Myre’s substantive due process As the rights. court noted in Hamer v. Board Education 66 (1978), 7, Ill. 3d 11: App. of
“It has been established that rights incident to a public edu
cation are property rights entitled to both substantive and pro
cedural due process protection. (Knight v. Board
Education
(1976),
603, 607,
38 Ill. App.
299,
3d
348
302.)
N.E.2d
It is also
apparent
that further educational and employment opportuni
ties can
impaired
or,
school
poor
record
the same
token, enhanced
aby
good
(See
record.
Lopez (1975),
Goss v.
725,
U.S.
42 L. Ed. 2d
95.
729.)” (See
S. Ct.
also
Donaldson v. Board
Education
(1981),
Ill.
3d
App.
“School so. School officials are rightly hesitation and reluctance—and form punishment to determine what of best paid trained and in a transgression. They a are particular addresses student’s far than what to position judge better is a to decide black-robed determine, do They with a disobedient child at school. can best instance, for whether a or an after-school detention suspension will Be- be more effective in student’s behavior. correcting cause their their the of and closeness to situation— expertise we not them fear to challenges because do want to court every their given act—school officials are wide discretion in their actions.” disciplinary
The circuit court in the instant case utilized a two-step analysis in reaching its conclusion that the of against possession rule or use alco- hol or drugs, applied Myre, arbitrary as was and capricious and violated her right interpreted to substantive due It first process. the against possession rules of or as drugs and use alcohol a measure designed bring to the of attention authorities acute or alcohol conditions in a student. The court stated that the rules did not seem to be specifically adopted to the cover situation where a student caught at court, beer two a football game. on that ba- sis, then concluded that the application of the rule Miss con- Myre’s duct not was within the scope of it the.intended adopted. was Having concluded that the being rule was to a applied it, situation not intended adopted board that court then stated its opinion punishment that the imposed (the suspen- five-day sion being without able to take or make tests up exams) un- harsh, duly light of the minor nature of the offense. so conclud- ing, the court placed some apparently emphasis on fact that the violation occurred at an extracurricular activity punishment while inherent in the suspension had an effect on academics. I re- verse.
School boards are granted power and enforce reason- adopt able rules regulations task pursuance of their mandated maintaining discipline. (Ill. 20.5, ch. pars. Rev. Stat. 10— 24.) The obvious underlying purpose respect- rules 24— ing the possession and drugs use or alcohol students is con- trol and minimize the presence among and effect such substances high school students. Such rules accord with State complete and local criminal laws respecting drug and alcohol use possession area, minors. The extent of the in this problems throughout country State, and their effect students and devastating *12 parents alike is and readily apparent need not be documented. canWe take judicial notice of this unfortunate fact of life in our schools. Cer- tainly, noted, schools, as the trial court in their regula- rules and tions, are concerned about students with acute drug or alcohol prob- However, lems. school administrators are as justifiably concerned about preventing such problems from ever in developing the first place. They concerned about controlling and eliminating pres- alcohol, ence of drugs or in quantities, whatever in and around the school and short, school activities. they are in vitally interested de- terring such conduct from taking place at level at any any and time among their students. The adopted rule the Seneca in board this case, which by its terms applies any possession or use of alcohol or drugs, serves that deterrent purpose. The rule as applied Miss also Myre serves that deterrent purpose and furthers the legitimate and purpose goal of and controlling minimizing the presence and use of drugs and alcohol by students. A school board cannot examine a isolation, situation in divorced of its implications for other students and the overall conduct of the school in general. drug Youthful and al- cohol use are problems which cut across all socio-economic groupings. such, As a sanction which has an grades, effect and aca- thereby demic standing, may very measure, useful deterring especially those students themselves, who or whose parents, place high pre- mium upon academic success in school. Without the bite of a potential grade reduction accompanying a such a suspension, sanction would be a toothless measure indeed. The deterrent function of such discipli- rules nary undermined, would be significantly if not eliminated en- as to tirely, any number of students if there were no effect upon grad- ing at all. The use of an in-school suspension, with loss of complete test and examination privileges, significant serves a and legitimate in the purpose school’s efforts to control and to generally, control the use of dangerous intoxicants, specifically. The school board’s actions in the instant case served those and purposes goals. We find the court’s narrow approach to of the interpretation purpose of the school’s rule to be unsupported fact or On its face logic. and terms, its the rule was and adopted designed to deal with situa- student, tions wherein a in an academic or at setting a school function or activity, was found to be in possession drugs, of alcohol or even a single or a single marijuana cigarette. beer To uphold the circuit court’s construction would contrary plain to the of the language rule and it would be to the schools of the strip power effectively deal with and problems alcohol until were out of hand. It they or, would do no service to the schools ultimately, students their education. such custom alcohol, longstanding drugs however
Possession dam- serious, be, potentially such may prevalent however five-day suspen- The in-school for a school student. high conduct aging on her part for such conduct herein imposed upon sion her. There exists sanctioning method for and reasonable acceptable the rule and its served relationship a rational between effect, any impermis- Nor is there this case. punitive generally severity of the offense and the severity between the sible imbalance goals pun- behind such light purposes of the punishment, *13 of the sanction would showing imposition ishment. No was made that a or her admission to Myre’s graduation have affected Miss adversely contrary. The evidence on such matters was to the university. only arbitrary capricious. The School Board’s action was not to be light problems sought It was rational and reasonable in the rule. addressed comment, conclusion, needs to made concern-
Some be passing court, and ing emphasized by appel- the distinction drawn the trial matters. lee on between academic matters and nonacademic appeal, argument, put, inappro- The is that academic sanctions are plainly conduct which occurs outside the priate punishing improper strictly academic context. Such of the educational compartmentalizing function of our schools to myopic approach evidences strained and goals education and finds no sanction in purposes public sure, to aspect, School Code. Schools have an academic education, one, their edu- primary purpose goal substantial but regulation cation in the sense of the term. The rules and of a broad school, further designed those especially dealing discipline, Prohibiting that broad educational school administrators objective. sanctions, from utilizing implica- academic or sanctions with academic tion, against setting conduct which occurs a nonacademic would them of an at strip maintaining effective tool for both school and at school activities of all natures. As in the instant applied case, it combatting would also them of an tool for strip effective dangers posed by drugs alcohol and of and teenagers. presence the dangers alcohol use are not posed by any confined context, one and the confined ei- measures to battle them cannot be ther, if any argued by success is be made. An such as is approach administer, would most difficult to would run appellee contrary education, the broad educational and would be con- purposes public interests of the schools and their students. It is un- trary best sound.
I find, in summary, the in-school suspension of Mary Myre violated no constitutional right which she possessed and that court’s judgment in her favor should be reversed. With a reversal of the judgment, the award of fees costs, under section based her having prevailed in the action, would also be reversed. al., STEPHANIE INGRAM et Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LITTLE COMPANY OF MARY HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee.-(ROBERT B. McCREADY,
M.D., Defendant.) (3rd First District Division) No. 81-1567 Opinion 2, 1982. filed June on rehearing denial of August Modified
1982.