Appellant Frank Myers appeals the order of the White County Circuit Court finding that appellees David and Venice Yingling are the rightful owners of a tract of land situated in White County. The court of appeals certified this case to this court to resolve a significant issue concerning jurisdiction; thus, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. l-2(b) and (d). Specifically, the court of appeals certified the following question: Does filing a notice of appeal from an unappealable order and subsequently lodging the record in the appellate court bar the circuit court from acting further until the appellate court formally dismisses the appeal? We answer this question in the affirmative.
We begin by looking at the first order, which, as previously stated, does not contain a legal description of the property at issue. In Petrus v. Nature Conservancy,
Under Rule 2(a) (1) and (2) of the Appellate Procedure - Civil, an appeal may be taken from a final decree entered by the chancery court and an order which in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken from, or discontinues the action. We have interpreted this portion of Rule 2 to mean that, for an order to be appealable, it must dismiss the parties from the court, discharge them from the action, or conclude their rights to the subject matter in controversy. Doe v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,323 Ark. 237 ,914 S.W.2d 312 (1996). The order must be of such a nature as to not only decide the rights of the parties, but also put the court’s directive into execution, ending the litigation or a separable part of it. Id.
In a long line of cases, this court has held that a chancery court’s decree must describe the boundary line between disputing land owners with sufficient specificity that it may be identified solely by reference to the decree. Riddick v. Streett,313 Ark. 706 ,858 S.W.2d 62 (1993); see also Harris v. Robertson,306 Ark. 258 ,813 S.W.2d 252 (1991); Rice v. Whiting,248 Ark. 592 ,452 S.W.2d 842 (1970); McEntire v. Robinson,243 Ark. 701 ,421 S.W.2d 877 (1967).
Petrus,
Further, we observed:
While the chancellor and the parties apparently intended to resolve the boundary lines via a future survey, the permanent record in a boundary-line decision should describe the line with sufficient specificity that it may be identified solely by reference to the order. See Harris,306 Ark. at 261 ; Riddick,313 Ark. at 712 . Otherwise, leaving those lines to be established by a future survey may likely result in additional disputes, litigation, and appeals. Again, the case law that requires a chancery decree to fix and describe the boundary lines in a dispute between landowners discourages piecemeal litigation. McEntire,243 Ark. at 704 .
Id. at 726,
Here, the October 10, 2005 order does not include a legal description of the
We now turn to the second order. After the record was already lodged with this court, the circuit court entered the order dated February 16, 2006. We hold that the circuit court had no jurisdiction to enter the second order. Once the record is lodged in the appellate court, the circuit court no longer exercises jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter in controversy. See Gore v. Heartland Cmty. Bank,
Appeal dismissed without prejudice.
Notes
The circuit court’s entry of a controverted legal description could hardly be described as merely ministerial, supplemental, or collateral, such that it might be allowed pursuant to Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 6(e), which provides in relevant part: If anything material to either party is omitted from the record by error or accident or is misstated therein, the parties by stipulation, or the circuit court before the record is transmitted to the appellate court, or the appellate court on motion, or on its own initiative, may direct that the omission or misstatement shall be corrected, and if necessary, that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted.