Myers v. Univ. Hosps. Health Sys.Myers v. Univ. Hosps. Health Sys.
Dated: August 30, 2023
HENSAL, Judge.
{¶1} Daniel Myers appeals a judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas that granted summary judgment to University Hospitals Health Care System and University Hospitals Ahuja Medical Center (“University Hospitals“). This Court reverses.
I.
{¶2} In November 2019, Mr. Myers sought treatment from a University Hospitals urgent care facility in Twinsburg. He paid his co-pay while he was there, but the bills that he received did not reflect that payment. Mr. Myers paid two of the bills, but because his statements did not reflect payment of the co-pay, he was billed again. When Mr. Myers did not pay a balance of $55.38, University Hospitals turned his account over to a collection agency. University Hospitals ultimately identified a billing error and issued a refund to Mr. Myers. Nonetheless, Mr. Myers filed a complaint against University Hospitals that alleged fraud, unauthorized disclosure of
{¶3} University Hospitals moved for summary judgment, and Mr. Myers moved for partial summary judgment with respect to his claims under the CSPA and the County Ordinance. Mr. Myers indicated that he did not intend to pursue his claim for unauthorized disclosure of confidential information, and the trial court dismissed it on that basis. The trial court granted summary judgment to University Hospitals, concluding that Mr. Myers had not met his evidentiary burden with respect to summary judgment on his fraud claim and that the undisputed evidence established that University Hospitals was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court also granted summary judgment to University Hospitals on Mr. Myers’ consumer claims. In doing so, the trial court determined that the transaction at issue was between a physician and a patient rather than a hospital and a patient and, therefore, that the CSPA and the County Ordinance did not apply. In the alternative, the trial court concluded that University Hospitals was entitled to judgment on Mr. Myers’ claims if the CSPA and the County Ordinance did apply and, regardless, that University Hospitals’ billing mistake was a bona fide error.
{¶4} Mr. Myers’ appealed, assigning two errors for this Court‘s review. His assignments of error are rearranged for purposes of disposition.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT GRANTED UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL[S‘] MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO MR. MYER[S‘] CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT AND SUMMIT COUNTY CONSUMER PROTECTION ORDINANCE CLAIMS.
{¶6} As an initial matter, this Court notes that Mr. Myers has not separately argued his two assignments of error. Under
{¶7} This Court reviews an order granting summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). Consequently, this Court must “conduct[] an independent review of the evidence without deference to the trial court‘s findings.” Smathers v. Glass, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-4595, ¶ 30. Under
{¶8} Both the moving party and the nonmoving party may rely on affidavits.
When a motion for summary judgment or its response points to evidence set forth in affidavits, those affidavits must be evaluated as would any other evidence permitted by
Rule 56 to determine whether the affidavits demonstrate the existence or lack of genuine issues of material fact. Affidavits are, therefore, entitled to no greater weight than other evidence permitted byRule 56(E) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. Conversely, they are not to be discounted out-of-hand.
Stone at ¶ 14. We also concluded that “neither a moving party nor a nonmoving party is required by
{¶9} In this case, the trial court concluded that Mr. Myers’ affidavit was not “evidentiary quality[.]” In doing so, the trial court characterized it as “self-serving” and observed that it was not corroborated by other factual evidence. As this Court has previously held, however, a party‘s own properly framed affidavit is acceptable for purposes of
{¶10} “The material issues of each case are identified by substantive law.” Byrd, 110 Ohio St.3d 24, 2006-Ohio-3455, ¶ 12. With respect to Mr. Myers’ CSPA claims, the threshold
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED MR. MYER[S‘] MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT, AND UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL[S‘] LIABILITY FOR SPECIFIC VIOLATIONS THEREOF.
{¶11} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Myers argues that the trial court erred by denying his partial motion for summary judgment. Given this Court‘s resolution of his second assignment of error, his first assignment of error is premature.
III.
{¶12} Mr. Myers’ second assignment of error is sustained. His first assignment of error is premature. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run.
Costs taxed to Appellees.
JENNIFER HENSAL FOR THE COURT
SUTTON, P. J.
CARR, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
DANIEL MYERS, pro se, Appellant.
MICHAEL J. RUTTINGER and DAVID A. BERNSTEIN, Attorneys at Law, for Appellees.