[¶ 1] Clay Myers appealed from the order denying his motion for change of custody. We affirm.
I
[¶ 2] Tammy Meissner and Clay Myers were divorced in September 1992. Tammy and Clay were awarded joint legal custody. Tammy was awarded sole physical custody of the couple’s three children, Landra, 17, Shanna, 15, and Cole, 13. Clay was awarded visitation continuously in the summers and on alternating holidays. Tammy married John Meissner and they subsequently divorced. Tammy and John have one son together, John Allen, age four, who lives with Tammy. She currently lives in Grand Forks, North Dakota and is employed by Farmers Insurance Group. Clay has remarried and now resides in Anacortes, Washington. He is a self-employed contractor with TransAlliance Field Services.
[¶ 3] In July 1998, Clay filed a motion for change of custody in the district court of Grand Forks County. The stated reason for the motion was that the three children would prefer to live with their father. A custody investigator was agreed to by counsel and appointed by the court. A hearing was held on December 3, 1998 to decide Clay’s motion to modify custody and Tammy’s motion to modify child support filed subsequent to Clay’s motion. The custody investigator recommended a change of custody for two reasons. First, the children believe there is too much reverse parenting going on with Tammy. Secondly, the children believe Tammy does not listen to them, that she is out too much, and she does not protect them. On December 16, 1998, the district court denied Clay’s motion to change custody of the children. Because there was very little information on Clay’s financial status, the district court took the child support issue under advisement pending further information. Clay appealed the denial of his motion for change of custody.
II
[¶4] Tammy contends this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the appellant did not file a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within 60 days of notice of entry of judgment. We are without jurisdiction to consider an appeal after the time for appeal has expired under N.D.R.App.P. 4(a).
Bye v. Federal Land Bank Ass’n,
[¶ 5] “ ‘A motion for extension of time based upon excusable neglect is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the court’s determination will not be set aside on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.’ ”
Nastrom v. Nastrom,
Ill
[¶6] Clay argues changed circumstances exist that warrant a change in custody. Modification of a custody award requires a two-step process.
Mertz v. Mertz,
[¶ 7] The district court found Clay’s remarriage and the preference of the children to live with their father constituted a material change in circumstances. However, the district court concluded these changes in circumstances did not require a change in custody. A mature child’s custody preference may be particularly significant to the trial court in deciding whether there has been a change in circumstances and in deciding what is in the child’s best interests.
Mosbrucker,
at ¶¶ 10-11. Although a child’s preference is a significant factor in the calculus, it is not necessarily determinative.
Klose v. Klose,
[¶ 8] Clay asserts the trial court failed to consider the children’s preference to live with their father in rejecting the motion for change of custody. The record demonstrates the district court did consider the preference of the children, as it made specific reference to the children’s preference in its opinion. However, the district court, in deciding what was in the children’s best interests, found other factors compelling.
[¶ 9] The court observed Clay has overly involved the children in the custody proceedings, causing the children to be concerned with financial matters. The court found Clay discussed the issue of child support and Tammy’s dating with the children. The trial court also focused on the interest in having a stable custodial home.
See
N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(d);
Hagel v. Hagel,
[¶ 10] In a motion to modify custody, the best interests of the child analysis requires two steps not required in an original custody decision.
Id.
First, the best interests of the child factors “must be ‘gauged against the backdrop of the stability of the child’s relationship with the cus
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todial parent,’ because that stability is the primary concern in a change of custody proceeding.”
Id.
(quoting
Barstad v. Barstad,
[¶ 11] In view of the reasoning expressed by the trial court, we conclude it is not clearly erroneous to find it is in the best interests of the children to continue the present custodial arrangement.
IV
[¶ 12] Tammy argues Clay should pay her attorney’s fees for both the trial court and the appeal process because the motion for change of custody was brought in bad faith and Tammy cannot afford the legal bills.
[¶ 13] “An award of attorneys fees in litigation about marital obligations between former spouses does not depend entirely on the merits of each position, although whether one party’s actions unreasonably increased the time and effort spent on the dispute can be a factor.”
Pozarnsky v. Pozarnsky,
[¶ 14] We prefer the trial court to make the initial determination of an award of attorney’s fees on appeal.
McIntee v. McIntee,
[¶ 15] We affirm.