Myers v. LawsonMyers v. Lawson
Case Information
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[Cite as
Myers v. Lawson
,
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO WARREN COUNTY
MICHAEL MYERS, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, : CASE NO. CA2012-07-068 : O P I N I O N - vs - 6/17/2013 :
MICHAEL E. LAWSON, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
CIVIL APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN MUNICIPAL COURT
Case No. 99-04-CVF-0170
John W. Herr, 400 South Main Street, Middletown, Ohio 45044, for plaintiff-appellant Steven M. Runge, 401 South Main Street, Franklin, Ohio 45005, for defendant-appellee
HENDRICKSON, P.J.
Plaintiff-appellant, Michael Myers, appeals a decision of the Franklin Municipal Court, Civil/Small Claims Division, granting the motion of defendant-appellee, Michael Lawson, for relief from judgment. The record indicates that a check for $322.22 was issued on February 25, 1998
from Williams UB Services Inc. to Lawson. Lawson then presented this check to Myers. However, Williams UB Services Inc. stopped payment on the check and, as such, Myers did not receive the money he was owed by Lawson. Consequently, on April 20, 1999, Myers filed suit against Lawson seeking not only reimbursement for $322.22 but treble damages, court costs, and attorney's fees under R.C. 2307.61 [1] based upon the allegation that Lawson's conduct was criminal in violation of R.C. 2913.11. [2] Lawson never responded to the complaint by motion or answer. Thus, on July
6, 1999, the trial court entered default judgment against Lawson and awarded Myers
damages in the amount of $2,255.57 plus interest at a rate of 10 percent per annum and
costs. As a result of the default judgment, Myers garnished Lawson's wages from 1999 until
2002, collecting approximately $700. However, Lawson became unemployed in 2002. Upon
Lawson acquiring new employment in 2008, Myers sought to again garnish Lawson's wages.
On June 21, 2010, Lawson moved for relief from judgment pursuant to
judgment. In its decision, the magistrate determined that this case was an extraordinary 1. R.C. 2307.61 provides, in part, that a property owner may bring a civil action to recover damages from "any person who willfully damages the owner's property or who commits a theft offense" as defined in R.C. 2913.01 and recover damages including compensatory damages, treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees. 2. R.C. 2913.11 provides, in part, that "[n]o person, with the purpose to defraud, shall issue or transfer * * * a check * * * knowing that it will be dishonored or knowing that a person has ordered or will order stop payment on the check * * *." R.C. 2913.11(B).
situation where the interest of justice called for the application of
2012, the trial court rendered its decision on the matter. Pursuant to
{¶ 7} From the trial court's decision, Myers appeals, raising two assignments of error. For ease of discussion, the assignments of error will be addressed out of turn.
{¶ 8} Assignment of Error No. 2: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO THE PREJUDICE OF [MYERS] WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS VALID REASON UNDER CIVIL RULE 60(B)(5) TO GRANT [LAWSON'S] MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT MADE PURSUANT THERETO. In his second assignment of error, Myers argues the trial court erred in granting
Lawson's motion for relief from judgment and setting aside the default judgment on the basis
of
with
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(B); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.
{¶ 12}
"
defense, doubt, if any, 'should be resolved in favor of the motion to set aside the judgment so
that cases may be decided on their merits.'" Robinson v. Miller Hamilton Venture, L.L.C. ,
12th Dist. No. CA2010-09-226,
discretion, and its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of
discretion. Robinson at ¶ 15, citing Veidt v. Cook , 12th Dist. No. CA2003-08-209, 2004-Ohio-
3170, ¶ 14. An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court's attitude is unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable, and is more than a mistake of law or judgment. Blakemore v.
Blakemore ,
pursuant to
the GTE test. Specifically, Myers claims Lawson has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled
to relief under
{¶ 19} Accordingly, Myers's second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 20} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 21}
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW TO THE PREJUDICE
OF [MYERS] IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS AUTHORITY TO SET ASIDE A DEFAULT
JUDGMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH CIVIL RULES 55(B) AND 60(B) WHEN IT SET
ASIDE THE ORIGINAL DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF $2,255.57 PLUS
INTEREST AND COSTS IN FAVOR OF [MYERS] AND INCIDENT THERETO SUMMARILY
ADJUDICATED THE SUBSTANTIVE MERITS OF THE CLAIM UNDERLYING THE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT BY ENTERING A NEW JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF [MYERS] IN
THE AMOUNT OF $700.00 ONLY WHICH WAS DECLARED SATISFIED UPON ENTRY.
In his first assignment of error, Myers contends the trial court erred in entering a
new judgment in the case without first providing Myers the opportunity to present evidence.
As noted above, after determining that the 1999 default judgment should be set
aside under
decision are timely filed," the trial court "shall undertake an independent review as to the
objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues
and appropriately applied the law."
limits procedurally and substantively to its authority under Civil Rules 55(B) and 60(B). In
ruling on a motion for relief from a default judgment, the Civil Rules do not empower a trial
court, as an element of relief, to bar the plaintiff from responding to defenses as would have
occurred if the defendant had timely responded to the summons in the first place.
Here, the trial court performed an independent review of the entire case and
determined that there was insufficient evidence that Lawson intended to defraud appellant so
as to support a claim for treble damages and attorney's fees. Yet, as the case was disposed
of by default judgment in 1999, no evidence had ever been presented upon which the trial
court could make such a conclusion and Myers had no duty to prove his case at the hearing
on the motion for relief from judgment.
Although a trial court may have the authority under
amount of a judgment in order to provide relief to the moving party, the trial court's specific findings in this case make a determination on the merits of the case without first allowing the parties to present evidence. Essentially, the trial court set aside the default judgment in order to sua sponte enter summary judgment in Myers's favor for a lesser amount of damages without allowing him to present any evidence in support of his claim. We can find no support in the Civil Rules or case law that would provide the trial court with this type of authority. Therefore, we find that the trial court exceeded the scope of its authority in sua sponte entering a new judgment in this case without first providing Myers the opportunity to make his case. Accordingly, Myers's first assignment of error is sustained. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
S. POWELL and M. POWELL, JJ., concur.