— This action was brought to recover a real estate brokers’ commission on the sale of furniture, fixtures, furnishings and a leasehold intеrest of several years in a hotel in Seattle. The employment of the brokers was not in writing. The defendant has appeаled from a judgment against her.
Two questions are presented, (1) was the agreement employing the brokers within the statute of frauds; and (2) did the brokers comply with the agreement so as to entitle them to the commission 1 ? The statute relied on by the appellаnt is subd. 5, § 5825, Rem. Comp. Stat. [P. C. §7745], act of 1905, which says: “An agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker *584 to sell or purchase reаl estate for compensation or a commission” shall be void unless the agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, etc.
The contract in this case is not severable as to the different kinds of property, and appellant contends that, as a lease of real property for a term of years is within § 5825 of the code, the respondents cаnnot recover. She relies on § 2303, Rem. Comp. Stat. [P. C. § 8738], and the cases of
Reilley v. Anderson,
“ ‘Under statute in somе jurisdictions, leasehold interests are to be seized and levied on as realty. But it seems to be the prevailing rule that, apart from statute, such interest should be levied upon as personalty.’ ”
In
Tibbals v. Iffland,
*585 “But the interest conferred by а lease for a term of years, whether for a long or short period, is only a chattel interest (1 Wood, Landlord and Tenant (2d еd.), pp. 143,149; Gear, Landlord and Tenant, § 2), and is generally subject to the law pertaining to chattels.”
And still further in the same case, with reference to the assignment of such a lease, it was said:
“If the respondent was a married man he had the same right to assign and trаnsfer the lease that he had to dispose of chattels generally, without the consent of his wife (Gear, Landlord and Tenant, § 183), аnd if he was unmarried he could, of course, make such disposition of it as he saw fit. It was therefore immaterial whether he was married or not, so far as the right to make the assignment was concerned.”
The case of
American Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Mafridge,
“The contract under consideration, under the rule of law abovе stated, was an assignment of a lease, and does not fall within the statute which requires leases for a term of more than onе year to be in writing.
“We have no statute which requires an assignment of a lease for a term of years to be acknowledged. In
Tibbals v. Iffland,
“ ‘But the interest conferred by a lease for a term of years, whether for a long or short period, is only a chattel interеst (1 Wood, Landlord and Tenant (2d ed.), pp. 143,149; Gear, Landlord and Tenant, § 2), and is generally subject to the law pertaining to chattels.’
“And wе also there held that a married man has the right to assign and transfer a lease without the consent of his wife. Under these rules, the contract in question was a valid contract, capable of being enforced even though it was not acknowledged.”
In the ease of
Taylor v. Basye,
‘ ‘ Thе subject-matter embraces a lease which, under our laws, is a chattel interest (Tibbals v. Ifflland,10 Wash. 451 ,39 Pac. 102 ; American Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Mafridge,60 Wash. 180 ,110 Pac. 1015 ), and certain other personal property concerning which the parties were free to contract irrespective of where it was situated.”
Undoubtedly аt common law a leasehold, whatever its duration in years, was personal property. The rule as stated in 35 C. J. 970, supported by an abundance of cases, is :
“Except in so far as the common-law rules may have been modified by statute, terms for yeаrs, however long, are chattels real, falling within the classification of personal property and governed by the rules of law applicable to other kinds of personal property.”
The statutory requirements of a conveyance do not determine the classification of the property taken as to whether it is real or personal. This rule is correсtly stated in the case of
Orchard v. Wright-Dalton-Bell-Anchor Store Co.,
In this state, while the statute with reference to conveyances, §10550, Rem. Comp. Stat. [P. C. §1909], provides, “All conveyances of real estate or any interest therein, . . . shall be by deed,” the statute applicable to the рresent case says only “real estate” and does not include the words “interest in real estate. ’ ’ And, as stated in American Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Mafridge, supra, an assignment of a *587 lease for a term of years was not required to be acknowledged, because we had no statute providing for it; so here, it cannot be held that an agreement employing an agent or broker to sell or purchase a lease of real property for a term of years must be in writing because we have no statute requiring it. The statute invoked by the appellant relates to no kind of property other than real estate.
Concerning the second question on the appeal, the evidenсe clearly preponderates in favor of the trial court’s finding that the respondents produced the purchaser tо whom the property was sold at the price named in the agreement of employment. This feature of the case is controlled by former decisions of this court, some of which are as follows:
Norris v. Byrne,
Affirmed.
Tolman, C. J., Fullerton, Holcomb, and Mackintosh, JJ., concur.