ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS (DKT. NOS. 14, 21)
On August 13, 2016, plaintiff Jennifer Myers filed a civil complaint alleging that defendants Americollect Inc. and Aurora Health Care Inc. had violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and the Wisconsin Consumer Act (“WCA”). Dkt. No. 1. On October 26, 2015, defendant Aurora Health Care Inc. responded to the complaint with a motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 14. On November 5, 2016, defendant Americollect Inc. filed an answer, Dkt. No. 18, and on November 6, 2015, Americollect joined Aurora’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 21. The parties have fully briefed the motions, and the court has heard oral arguments. For the reasons stated below, the court will deny the defendants’ motions to dismiss.
I. FACTS
In February of 2014, the plaintiffs minor child — “K.M.”—received health services from defendant Aurora, Dkt. No. 1-2 at 2. In May of 2014, Aurora sent a bill, dated May 15, 2014, for those services; the bill was addressed to the minor child, K.M., and not to the plaintiff. Id. In early August 2014, Aurora sent a second bill— this time addressed to the plaintiff, not to the minor child. Dkt. No. 1-3 at 2. Later in August of 2014, Americollect sent a letter addressed to the minor child, dated August 16,2014, announcing, ‘Tour balance is past due.” Dkt. No. 1-1.
The plaintiff alleges that she “was upset” by the bill her child received from Aurora and the letter her child received from Americollect, “and took time off work to visit an attorney.” Dkt. No. 1 at ¶22. She alleges that the bill and the letter also “confused and upset” her minor child, because the child “worried that she might be responsible for the alleged debt after she becomes 18 years old.” Id. The complaint does not indicate the minor child’s age (although it does state that she remained a minor as of the date of the filing of the complaint — August 13, 2015), or describe the type of services received (routine or emergency).
On August 13, 2015, the plaintiff filed a civil complaint alleging that the defendants violated the FDCPA and the WCA.
On October 26, 2015, defendant Aurora filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion- to dismiss, Dkt. No. 14, and a supporting brief, Dkt. No. 15. On November 5, 2015, defendant Americollect answered the complaint. Dkt. No. 18. On November 6, 2015, Americollect filed a motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 21. Americollect “joins” Aurora’s motion and “will rely” on Aurora’s pleadings to support its motion.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Standard for Motions to Dismiss
Defendant Aurora asks the court to dismiss Count II, the WCA claim, and Ameri-collect joins the motion. Americollect also asks the Court to dismiss Count I, the FDCPA claim. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Lodholtz v. York Risk Servs. Group, Inc.,
“To state a plausible claim, a plaintiff is not, however, required to plead specific or detailed facts.” Modovi Dairy Sys., Inc, Empl. Benefit Plan v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wisconsin, No. 15-CV-826,
B. The plaintiff has stated a claim against Americollect under the FDCPA that is plausible on its face.
Count I of the complaint alleges that in sending the August 2014 collection letter to K.M., Americollect violated the FDCPA.
The FDCPA serves “to eliminate abusive debt collection by debt collectors,” 15 U.S.C. § 1629(e), and “is intended for the protection of unsophisticated consumers.” Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding LLC,
The letter from Americollect to K.M. explicitly states, “This is a communication from a debt collector. This is an attempt to collect a debt.” Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2. Thus, for pleading purposes, the plaintiff has satisfied the first element of an FDCPA claim against Americollect.
Title 15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits the “use [of] any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” Section 1692f forbids “unfair or unconscionable means” of collecting debts. The debt collector may not make a “false representation of — the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; or any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2)(A), (B). Debt collectors may not “threaten] to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken;” they cannot “use ... any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer;” and they cannot attempt to collect “any amount ... unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(5), (10); § 1692f(l).
The plaintiffs theory is that Ameri-collect falsely represented the legal status of the debt by asserting or suggesting that K.M., a minor child, was liable for the medical debt. At oral argument on the motion to dismiss, counsel for Americollect responded to this allegation in several ways. First, he argued that the account at Aurora had, in fact, been in K.M.’s name, not in the defendants. Dkt. No. 26 at 2. Second, he argued that he did not know of any court which had held a collection agen
Counsel for the plaintiff responded that none of these arguments were relevant for purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 2-3. He argued that the FDCPA was, in essence, a strict liability statute which prohibited any false representation, period. He asserted that all of Americollect’s arguments went either to affirmative defenses or factual disputes more suited for determination by a fact-finder, or the court oh summary judgment, than to granting a motion to dismiss. Id.
While the court expressed discomfort with the expense that would be incurred in allowing a federal case to proceed on the basis of a single collection letter (and in the case of Aurora, a single bill), counsel for the plaintiff was correct as to the analysis the court must conduct at the pleadings stage. Section 1692e “applies even when a false representation is unintentional.” Gearing v. Check Brokerage Corp.,
While, at a later stage in the proceedings, Americollect may attempt to “show[] by a preponderance of the evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c), the Rule 12(b)(6) stage is not the point at which the court considers such arguments. Although somewhat conclusory, the plaintiff has alleged the bare minimum required to state a claim against Americollect under the FDCPA. The court will deny Americol-lect’s motion to dismiss Count I.
C. The plaintiff has stated a claim for relief under the WCA that is plausible on its face.
Count II of the complaint alleges that both Aurora and Americollect violated the Wisconsin Consumer Act.
“Debt collection” includes “any action, conduct or practice of soliciting claims for collection or in the collection of claims owed or due or alleged to be owed or due a merchant by a customer.” Wis. Stat. § 427.103(2). “Merchant” includes “a person who regularly advertises, distributes, offers, supplies or deals in ... services, money or credit, in a manner which ... results in ... a consumer transaction.” Wis. Stat. § 421.301(25). A “debt collector” is “any person engaging, directly or indirectly, in debt collection,” including those “who sell[ ], or offer[ ] to sell, forms represented to be a collection system, device or scheme, intended or calculated to be used to collect claims.” Wis. Stat. § 427.103(3). A “claim” is an “obligation or alleged obligation arising from a consumer transaction.” Wis. Stat. § 427.103(1).
Aurora is a debt collector, in the context of this case and under the WCA, because it provided services that resulted in a consumer transaction, attempted to enforce an obligation or claim arising from that transaction, and attempted to collect a debt when the consumer did not initially pay. And as the court already has noted above, the letter from Americollect to K.M. explicitly states, “This is a communication from a debt collector. This is an attempt to collect a debt.” Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2. The question, then, is whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate a prima facie case that the defendants engaged in any of the acts prohibited by the WCA.
1. The plaintiff has alleged facts against Americollect that are plausible on their face.
The plaintiff alleges that on or around August 16, 2014, Americollect sent a notice addressed to K.M. Dkt. No. 1-1. The letter indicated, ‘TOUR BALANCE IS PAST DUE,” and indicated that a debt existed to Aurora Health Care, in the amount of $1,410.20. Id. at 1. The letter stated that the debt arose on February 19, 2014, and informed the recipient that she could “notify” the defendant “within 30 days after receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof.” Id.
Courts construe the WCA in accordance with the policies of the FDCPA. Because the plaintiff has stated a viable claim against Americollect under the FDCPA, for similar reasons, it has stated a claim against Americollect under the WCA. As the court held above, while Am-ericollect may not have known about the debtor’s status as a minor at the time it sent the letter, the Rule 12(b)(6) stage usually is not the time at which courts consider defenses to the allegations. The
2. The ’plaintiff has alleged facts against ' Aurora that are plausible on their face.
The plaintiff asserts that Aurora sent two bills. First, on or around May 15, 2014, Aurora sent a bill to K.M., showing a patient balance of $20,652.63 for visits occurring in February of 2014. Dkt. No. 1-2. The “account name” for this bill is the name of the minor child. Id. Second, on or around August 7, 2014, Aurora sent a bill addressed to the plaintiff, totaling $1,195.65 for services to K.M. that occurred in May of 2014. Dkt. No. 1-3. The “account name” on this bill is the plaintiff’s name. Id. This bill appears to be for different services from those reflected in the May 2014 bill, and from the services for which Americollect attempted to collect.
According to the plaintiff, the May 15, 2014 bill constituted an effort to enforce a right to payment that Aurora knew or should have known did not exist, because the patient was a minor child. The plaintiff also asserts that Aurora reasonably should have expected that the bill would threaten or harass the plaintiff and her minor child. In terms of damages, the plaintiff alleges that she “was upset” by the bill “and took time off work to visit an attorney.” Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 22. She also alleges that the bill “confused and upset” her minor child, because the child “worried that she might be responsible for the alleged debt after she becomes 18 years old.” Id.
Although minimally pleaded, it is plausible that the bill addressed to K.M. violated the above sections of the WCA; a plausible reading of the bill is that it sought to recover a debt from a person who might not be liable for a debt of that kind.
Aurora argued at the hearing on the motion to dismiss that under some circumstances, a provider is allowed to collect for medical services provided to a minor. Dkt. No. 26 at 2. Aurora also-argued that the account was in KM.’s name, ' and that there might be reasons why the plaintiff intentionally set it up that way.- Finally, counsel argued that the plaintiff was not the proper party to bring the claim — the bill went to K.M., and not the plaintiff. Again, as with Americollect, Aurora’s arguments may be appropriate at summary judgment, or before a fact-finder at trial. But at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the plaintiffs claim — though conclusory — is sufficient. A court can “find mány of plaintiffs allegations conclusory,” and still “conclude that she has done just enough to state a claim under the FDCPA and the Wisconsin Consumer Act.” Eichman v. Mann Bracken, LLC,
For these reasons, the court will deny Aurora’s motion to dismiss Count II.
3. The court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the WCA claim against Aurora.
In addition to arguing that the plaintiff failed to state a claim against Aurora under the WCA, Aurora argues that the court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Aurora.
Aurora pointed -out in its brief that the plaintiffs brought their federal question claim only against Americollect. Dkt. No. 15 at 15. Thus, the court has original jurisdiction over Americollect, because the initial claim arises under federal law. “[T]he district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same ease or controversy ..., ” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (emphasis added).
Section 1367(a) states that “in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within [their] original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.” Section 1367 gives federal courts the discretion to decline that supplemental jurisdiction in certain circumstances. A district court may decline supplemental jurisdiction, for example, if the “claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). A district court also may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction “in exceptional circumstances,” when “there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). Aurora asks the court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for both of these reasons, arguing that the question of whether or not a minor can be held liable for a debt like the one at issue in this case, is “a novel ... issue of State law.”
The court first notes that one way or the other, it likely will have to consider the question of whether a minor child could be held liable for a debt like the one at issue here. Even if the court were to dismiss the ease against Aurora, Americollect likely would raise the same defense. If, in fact, the question is a novel issue under Wisconsin law, it won’t be any less novel as a result of Americollect raising it than it will as a result of Aurora raising it.
In fact, there is some Wisconsin law on the issue. Under Wisconsin law, a “minor” is “a person who has not attained the age of 18 years.” Wis. Stat. § 990.01(20). There are cases that hold that a minor can be held liable for certain expenses under the “doctrine of necessaries.” A creditor can hold a minor “liable for payment of ... medical expenses” under limited circumstances. Madison Gen. Hosp. v. Haack,
A minor also may be liable under the theory of unjust enrichment. Id. “The law may require a person enriched’ by a benefit to compensate the person furnishing the benefit when it would be inequitable. to allow retention of the benefit without payment.” Id. (citations omitted). Coupled with the law of necessaries, “the party or parties unjustly enriched by the medical care ... and liable for payment of the medical expenses ... appear to be one or both of [the minor’s] parents.” Id. at 666-67.
A minor also may “be liable for medical expenses when a parent neglects, fails, refuses, or is unable to pay,” but the record must sufficiently “establish the parents’ neglect, failure, refusal, or inability to pay.” Id. at 667. See also David v. Hamburg
Based on the sparse facts available to the court at this point, the court cannot determine whether application' of the above law to the facts would yield an answer to the question of whether KM. could have been held liable for the debt giving rise to the Aurora bill. But there is no need for the court to decide that question to conclude that the question is not so novel or complex that the court should decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction to answer it.
Aurora also argues that it should not be forced to participate in an FDCPA class action when it is not the subject of an FDCPA claim. Dkt. No. 15 at 18. It further argues that it would be prejudiced if it had to go to trial on its WCA claim in the same proceeding where Americollect was defending an FDCPA claim that didn’t include Aurora. Id. Aurora argues that these facts present the kind of “exceptional circumstances” and “compelling reasons” that require the court to decline supplemental jurisdiction. The court disagrees. Right now, there is no class certification motion pending. Even if the plaintiff files another class certification motion, it is not clear to the court that Aurora will have to participate in all of the class discovery. And this would not be the first case in which co-defendants face different claims in the same case.
At this point, the court will not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the WCA claim against Aurora.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court DENIES Aurora Health Care Inc.’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 14). The court also DENIES Americollect Inc.’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 21).
Notes
. According to the complaint, the plaintiff brings this action on her own behalf, for the emotional distress and damages she incurred as a result of the alleged violations of the FDCPA and the WCA. The plaintiff does not bring the action on behalf of her minor child.
. The plaintiff also brought class allegations against the defendants. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 37-42. On August 13, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion to certify the class, Dkt. No. 3, and a supporting brief, Dkt, No. 4. That same day, the plaintiff filed a Rule 7(h) motion to stay the class certification until the Rule 16(b) scheduling conference. On August 14, 2015, the court granted the motion tb stay the ruling. Text-Only Order, Aug. 14, 2015. On February 24, 2016, the plaintiff filed a letter asking the court to allow her to withdraw the motion to certify the class (and representing that the defendants did not oppose the motion). Dkt. No. 28. The court granted that motion without prejudice in a text-only order dated March 1, 2016. The plaintiff may re-file the class certification motion at a later date.
.In its motion to dismiss, Americollect states, "[Tjhis plaintiff has not been injured and is not a real-party-in-interest to bring this WCA or for that matter, the FDCPA action ....” Dkt. No. 21. Aurora does not bring any motion to dismiss Count I, the FDCPA claim, and Aurora does not brief the FDCPA issue, The court interprets Americollect’s motion as also bringing a motion to dismiss Count I of the ' complaint.