Appeal, No. 187 | Pa. Super. Ct. | Nov 21, 1905
Opinion by
Tbe defendant is a beneficial association, composed of members voluntarily associated together for mutual benefit and protection, under constitution and by-laws framed and adopted by themselves. The certificate of membership in the society has printed upon the back thereof articles 5 and 6 of the by-laws which prescribe the conditions of membership and also the conditions upon which a member shall become entitled to such benefits as may be mentioned in his application and certificate of membership.
For a proper understanding of the question raised by the defendant in its motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, a verdict for the plaintiff having been directed by the court below, it will be well to quote the entire section 3 of article 6 printed upon the back of the member’s certificate:
“Sec. 3. Any such member who shall through sickness or accident become disqualified from attending to his usual vocation, or other employment or occupation, and shall be under medical treatment for a period of not less than seven days, shall be entitled to receive from the society such weekly benefits or sums of money as may be specified in his certificate of membership. He shall be entitled to such weekly benefits as long as he shall be disqualified from attending to his usual vocation or other employment or occupation, and shall necessarily be under medical treatment, provided, however, that such member shall first present to the society his own certificate and a certificate from the attending physician, who must be a reputable and practicing physician and a graduate of a recognized medical college, which certificate shall set forth the date, cause and character of the sickness or accident, and contain correct answers to all such questions as may be asked in blank certificates to be furnished by the society upon application therefor, and such certificates from the attending physician and member made upon the blank or blanks furnished by the society as
The principal question here is whether the plaintiff is entitléd to recover for four weeks’ sick benefits, without having complied with the requirements of this section 3, in that he did not furnish to the society his own certificate or application and the certificate from the attending physician required by the provisions of said section. It is agreed that the proper blank certificates were furnished in time to entitle him to sick benefits for one week.
No opinion upon the motion for judgment non obstante veredicto was filed and no decree of the court in regard thereto is shown in the appendix of the appellant’s paper-book. We take it for granted, however, that the motion was regularly dismissed, as appears among the docket entries. There is also a memorandum signed by the trial judge: “ And now, August 10, 1905, the court grants the defendant an exception to its dismissal of defendant’s motion for judgment upon the point reserved, non obstante veredicto, and entry of judgment for
The by-laws of a mutual beneficial association must, in the very nature of the case, govern among its members. To those who have associated themselves together, these by-laws are the law by which they are to be governed. They necessarily assent thereto in becoming members. If the by-laws are, in the judgment of anyone seeking to become a member, unreasonable and under any conditions impossible of compliance therewith, he has the remedy in his own hands by refusing to become bound thereby. The general principle, we take it, is well stated in 2 P. & L. Dig. of Dec. 2180, under “ Beneficial Associations “ To entitle a claimant to sick benefits, he must show affirmatively a strict compliance with the by-laws.”
The plaintiff’s condition, it is true, at the beginning of his sickness was such as rendered it extremely hazardous to have literally complied with the by-law in question, but there is no requirement, as we understand it, that he should write the answers to the questions contained in the statement furnished him, with his own hand, or that he should even write his own name. Conditions may be readily imagined under which that would have been physically impossible, but it was not impossible for his physician, his nurse or any member of his family tp have complied with the conditions, in answering all the questions and in signing the certificate for him and stating the facts which rendered it impossible for him to sign his own name. Such a compliance with the by-laws would have put the society upon inquiry and would have enabled them to make such examination as they may have desired as to his condition, and that seems to be the real object of the requirement as to the certificate of the member himself.
The principle involved herein was early decided in Breneman v. The Franklin Beneficial Association, 3 W. & S. 218, in which “ it was contended that the plaintiff was physically unable to apply for the benefits of the society at an earlier period than he had done; and that on that ground he was entitled to an allowance previous to his application. The court gave judgment for the defendants on the ground that the plaintiff might have made his application for relief through a
Here the by-law in relation to the application and the prerequisites to obtaining sick benefits were printed upon the back of the certificate of membership.
It is not necessary to multiply authorities upon the general proposition that the members of a voluntary organization are bound by the constitution and by-laws thereof. There is nothing here to indicate that the plaintiff did not fully understand,
The plaintiff’s testimony shows that he was taken ill March 1, 1904. Notice was sent to the defendant society of his illness and, in consequence of that notice, he received a blank application for sick benefits which, as shown upon the application itself, was dated March B, 1904. It was not received by the society until March 29 and was then approved by I. W. Cooley, presumably an officer of the society, for the amount of $10.00. The plaintiff, therefore, had the blank application sent by the society, in accordance with his own notice, in his possession for nearly four weeks, without any attempt at compliance with the provisions of the by-laws, although, as we have already seen, they were by no means impossible of compliance.
In this view of the case, the first assignment of error, which relates to the admission, under objection, of testimony tending to show the condition of the plaintiff at the time of his sickness, becomes comparatively unimportant. If the court had admitted the testimony, as offered, for the purpose of determining, as a matter of law, the reasonableness of the by-law in which the defendant claimed to be exempt from payment, no harm would have been done, if the defendant’s motion for judgment had been granted, and it is probable that the testimony was admitted with this view. We cannot say, therefore, that it was wholly irrelevant at the time it was offered, although, if a motion had been made by the defendant subsequently to strike it out, it should, we think, have been granted.
The plaintiff not only failed to forward his own application for sick benefits but neglected to comply also with the requirement of the by-laws which provides for the furnishing of a weekly certificate from the attending physician of a member’s sickness. There is no pretense that this was impossible or that it was unreasonable, The benefits are to be paid weekly
There remains but a single question for consideration, which is thus stated by the appellant: “ Whether, where the society was ready and willing and offered, before suit was brought, to pay the plaintiff for one week immediately preceding the date of the physician’s certificate, as the by-law provides, and again offered (it) to him in the affidavit of defense and at the trial,' and the plaintiff refused to accept the same or to enter judgment for that amount, he is entitled to the said one week’s benefits.” There was no tender of the money to the plaintiff at any time, and in his testimony he denies that there was even an offer to pay him that amount. The case of Westmoreland &c. Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235" court="Pa." date_filed="1889-11-11" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/westmoreland-n-gas-co-v-dewitt-6239590?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6239590">130 Pa. 235, is not in any way analogous. In that case the money was actually present and the defendant admitted he had said that it would be altogether unnecessary to show the money. He doubtless could have taken judgment upon the affidavit of defense for-the amount allowed, although there is no tender of judgment therein, and taken issue with the defendant for the remainder, but he was not bound to do so. An offer of judgment for one week’s benefits at the trial would, if accepted, have prevented the plaintiff from proceeding for the balance of the amount claimed by him. If the defendant had wished to stop costs, it could have paid the amount admitted to be due into court, but it did not do so and chose to assume the risk of the final result. We are of opinion, therefore, that the plaintiff is not only entitled to judgment for one week’s benefits but also for costs.
Upon consideration of the whole case, we are of opinion that the plaintiff was bound by the provisions of the by-laws contained in the third section of the sixth article, requiring him to make application for sick benefits immediately after the receipt of the blank sent him by the society, and that he was
The judgment of the court below is, therefore, reversed and set aside and judgment is now entered for the plaintiff against the defendant'for the sum of $10.49, as of the date of the verdict — January 20, 1905 — together with interest thereon from that date.