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Myers v. Alaska Housing Finance Corp.
68 P.3d 386
Alaska
2003
Check Treatment

*1 MYERS, Eric F. taxpayer and resident Alaska, State of individually both representative aas of other Alaska taxpayers,

residents and Appellant, ALASKA HOUSING FINANCE CORPO

RATION; and Northern Tobacco Sec Corporation,

uritization Appellees.

No. S-9941. Supreme Court of Alaska.

April *2 General, Anchorage, Bruce Attorney

sistant Juneau, General, and Attorney Botelho, M. Vassar, Wohlforth, John- Johnson, M. Robert Appellees. Brecht, Anchorage, for son & Justice, FABE, Chief Before: BRYNER, EASTAUGH, and MATTHEWS, CARPENETI, Justices.

OPINION

CARPENETI, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION section article Alaska Constitution dedicating fu- from legislature prohibits purpose. any special directly to ture state's legislature sell But can the on a based that is future to a immediately then and of a lawsuit conclude We proceeds? appropriate to receive selling the involved lawsuit settlement the tobaceo from three is constitutional present case appropriation (1) legislative reasons: assets, power to sell includes power traditional (2) settlements lawsuit (3) legisla- revenue, and sources manage the responsibility has ture risk. PROCEEDINGS AND FACTS II. other Alaska, numerous along with In 1998 past and territories, settled states claims, provided smoking-related smoking-relat- continuing release tobacco largest four claims, against ed Settlement The Master manufacturers. manu- tobacco provided Agreement ato annual make would facturers which fund projected The state perpetuity. portion mil- $36 million $16 between to receive through annually lion Divi- Alaska a director Myers, Eric Society and Cancer American sion lob- programs, of tobacco-control proponent Maassen, Maassen, Ingaldson Peter J. significant spend a bied the Gruenstein, Peter Anchorage, P.C., anti- on the tobacco portion Appel- Anchorage, for Hickey, & Gruenstein appropri- initiatives. lants. gener- million ated $1.4 substantially less initiatives, to such al fund Attorney Gardner, Assistant D. Douglas Funding for requested. million McKinnon, than the $8.2 As- Juneau, H. General, Joseph rural upgrades school and construction was a later amended complaint his request competing priority, part superi- because a enjoin the NTSC bond or court recently had sale. concluded that then-existing funding education scheme vio Following argument oral Myersg's re- lated the state constitution and the federal quest for declaratory judgment, Superior Rights Civil Act of 1964.1 *3 Court Judge Dan Hensley A. ruled that To fund the extensive improve- school chapter 180, SLA 2000 was constitutional. ments, legislature could have appropriat- Although he noted that the anti-dedication ed funds from the general fund or applied clause to revenue, all state which could proposed have a bond measure that money included settlements, lawsuit required have approval. voter In- Judge Hensley concluded that reducing the stead, legislature, viewing the state's present to value and it payments to future from the tobacco lump a sum did not violate the anti-dedica- asset, settlement as an sought to sell it for a tion clause. He reasoned that the settlement lump sum representing value of was an asset unlike types traditional of reve- the future revenue stream from the settle- nue used for government annual state fund- proceeds ment. The from the sale could ing; that the form of the settlement peri- as then immediately be appropriated to finance odic lump instead of a sum was a the rural school improvements. mere fortuity; that settlements providing for legislature The 130, devised chapter SLA periodic payments fungible were lump accomplish to objective this without of settlements; sum and that because the con- fending constitutional principles. Chapter payment tinued of the settlement was not 180, SLA 2000 authorized the commissioner guaranteed, legislature must be able to of revenue to sell the right forty receive manage the state's assets to avoid risk. Be- percent of the annual revenue from the set cause of slippery slope argument that the tlement to the Alaska Housing Finance Cor legislature could reduce asset consisting poration (AHFC), "anticipated to be at least of a future revenue present value, stream to $93,000,000."2 The also autho it, sell and appropriate proceeds immedi- rized AHFC to create a subsidiary corpora ately, Judge Hensley emphasized that his tion and issue revenue bonds secured ruling was limited to lawsuit settlements as a forty receive percent of the tobacco particular type of Myers revenue. appeals settlement.3 then appropri this decision. $164,876,000 ated from the anticipated pro Judge After Hensley's decision, the NTSC ceeds of the school, bonds for university, issued $116 million of revenue bonds secured port, and construction, harbor renovation, forty percent of the improvement.4 future revenues from the tobacco settlement. AHFC created a subsidiary corporation, The NTSC received $93 million and the re- the Northern Tobacco Corpo- Securitization mainder was pay used to the costs of issu- (NTSC). ration public NTSC held hear- ance. The million $98 is now apparently ings to discuss the proposed sale of the to- being used for school and harbor construc- baceo settlement revenue stream. In early projects tion appropriated by chapter 131, October 2000 the NTSC board of directors SLA 2000. authorized the issuance of the bonds. At nearly time, Myers same filed this suit III. STANDARDOF REVIEW seeking a declaratory judgment chapter 180,SLA prohibition violated the on This requires case us to decide if dedication of funds IX, found in article see- enactment chapter 180, SLA 2000 violates tion 7 of the Alaska Myers Constitution. article section 7 of the Alaska Constitu- State, 1. Kasayulie 130, v. 7, 10, §§ Ch. 3AN-97-3782 Ci. SLA2000. Super., 1, September 1999). 131, 4. Ch. SLA 2000. § Ch. SLA 2000. ap whether considered have twice We judgment independent our useWe

tion. violated propriation issues.5 constitutional decide question presented clause, case neither but In State here. presented one similar DISCUSSION IV. purporting an act Alex, decided we v. appeal is assessment," than presented rather "special issue The sole dedicate license, the anti-dedication whether violated tax or violates the tobacco applied clause because clause against dedicat- In Sonneman prohibition revenue.9 source any special anti- of state act violated ing Hickel, a source that an we held the anti-dedication abili first discuss limited the We because purpose. clause dedication determine funding then interpretation, request agency ty of one state Highway Marine settle- by produced dedicating from revenues *4 unconstitutional, cases, unconstitu the In both Sys tem.10 of the sale that the finally conclude and clearly future allocation with acts dealt tional reduced revenues; involved case neither of outright is constitutional. sale value and present value present to to reduction Accordingly, stream. of a directly resolves nor Sonneman Alex neither Its Clause Anti-Dedication A. The present in the complex question more Interpretation case. provides IX of article 7 Section almost clause is anti-dedication Alaska The proceeds of part "[the that relevant Only constitutions. among state unique to dedicated not be shall license tax or which indi provision, a similar Georgia has of drafters The purpose."6 any special provisi Alaska of the source rectly was preserve it to adopted clause anti-dedication Georgia portion of relevant The on.11 spend for state responsibility of control appro provides: "[Nlo clause anti-dedication governor. legislature in the ing pro any object the allocate shall priation " up are set [that] funds special more '[Tlhe part fund or or tax any particular ceeds deny other it becomes more difficult 12 thereof." percentage where reached point until requests interpret has Court Supreme Georgia The has legislature nor governor neither In only once. provision anti-dedication ed its of the finances over any real control Arnall, Georgia Authority v. Ports helps State clause The anti-dedication state."7 all of appropriating a bill passed appropriation annual preserve of the a lease received rentals de governmental and ensures model the State Railroad Atlantic & Western requesting restricted not be will partments paying purpose Authority Ports all sources.8 funds 1982). (Alaska State, 210 P.2d Dep't 9. 646 Energy v. Servs. Halliburton 5. See 2000); (Alaska Chiro n. 46 41, 50 2 P.3d Labor, State, 966 P.2d 895 v. practors Justice at 940. P.2d 10. 836 1995). (Alaska appar clause anti-dedication for the The idea pro- IX article 7 of section remainder 6. The Constitution, State Model ently came from funds dedicated exceptions to the vides three virtually identical clause anti-dedication whose Fund, feder- certain Permanent prohibition-the Victor See Georgia Constitution. that of existing upon programs programs, and al 142 Convention neither Constitutional the section-but Fischer, Alaska's ratification date of VII, art. (1975); Constitution of these State argues Model appeal party States: United applies. exceptions Constitutions § in 1 7.03 Abigail (Michael & L. Shore and State National 936, 938 P.2d Hickel, 836 eds.2001). 7. Sonneman O'Donnell Con Proceedings Alaska 1992) (quoting 6 (PACC) 111 App. V at Convention stitutional VI(a); IX, III, Ga. Const. para. § art. Const. 12. Ga. 1955)). (Dec. 16, VII, para. IV. § art. or 1945 at 940. id. 8. See

bond debt.13 Georgia The Supreme Court language of the Constitution limiting all ex held that appropriation was unconstitu penditures for the state in any year one tional for two independent reasons: because the revenues of the state derived from all it violated provision concerning the cre during sources year, and declaring that ation of state debt and because it violated the the revenues shall not anticipated.2 provision prohibiting dedication of Thus, not, Wright not, did support could funds.14 validity of a sale of future lease revenues Arnall, however, respect is of Georgia's limited use in pro resolv- anti-dedication ing present case. Like vision. cases, our earlier Arnall dealt with the appropriation of future sum, neither the text of our anti-dedica- revenues and did not decide whether the sale tion clause nor the relevant provides case law of a future income stream reduced to a direct question answer to the before us. value violated the anti-dedication clause. argues "favorably" Arnall B. The Tobacco Settlement Revenue Is Wright cited v. Hardwick15 and that this Subject the Anti-Dedication supports the constitutionality of the sale of a Clause. stream of In Wright, revenue. Georgia ruled that "outright made an sale of rentals generally applied to to be received from the lease of the Western the tobacco settlement revenue: "[Allthough & Atlantic Railroad." The Georgia Su *5 the speaks Constitution in terms of tax or preme approved Court of the sale because license, the Supreme Alaska Court, " in State legislative the act [did] not seek to autho Alex, interpreted phrase that to include all 17 rize the creation of debt." revenues, which would money include argument is unconvincing be from lawsuit settlements." This conclusion is cause it misconstrues Arnall and overstates consistent with existing case law. the scope Wright. First, of Arnall did not Alex, In State v. we held in the context of a favorably cite Wright. Arnall distinguished tax-like assessment on the sale of fish on Wright in its analysis creation-of-debt behalf of regional aquaculture association, made no mention Wright of in its anti-dedication that "the prohibits constitution the dedication lysis.18 ana Second, Wright did not sup any of source of revenue.22 expressly We port the contention that the sale of rentals agreed with an Alaska Attorney General's from the railroad lease was constitutional opinion that states: Georgia's under provision, anti-dedication for Section 7 of Article IX Wright of the was decided Con- Georgia before adopted its given stitution can be provision.19 anti-dedication Wright was intended effect and serve its 1921, repeatedly expressed decided in purpose well before the anti-dedica only if the provision "proceeds tion words any of appeared first tax in or Georgia Constitution of fact, interpreted 1945.20 license" are appellant to mean what their Wright argued that the clearly framers intended, i.e., sale of to sources any of public future rents revenues. violated the annual appropria tion model of the Georgia constitution, but Accordingly, it is our conclusion that the stated, the court "No scheme or policy fiscal any dedication of source of revenue: for the state appears express tax, direct or license, rental, sale, bonus-royalty, 713, 246, 13. 201 Ga. (1947). 41 S.E.2d 247 19. See id. at 255. 14. Id. ('This 20. Id. provision [anti-dedication] was not (Ga.1921). 15. contained in 109 S.E. prior 903 constitution of this State 1945."). to Arnall, $.E.2d

16. 41 at 254. Wright, 21. See 109 S.E. at 909. 17. (quoting Id. Wright, 909). 109 S.E. at Id. at 254. 1982). 646 P.2d 210 of the prohibition interprets Myers limited is whatever royalty, broadly concludes clause existing anti-dedication when those to Constitution is unconstitution- required chapter SLA ratified or that was Constitution with the inconsistent programs.[23] its effect because in federal al participation clause. anti-dedication of purposes attor of the opinion informal recent A more tobacco the sale argues that Myers con that stated specifically ney general appropri- the annual conflicts settlement money from dedication prohibited stitution legis- effectively reduces model ation "[T)he prohi settlements: civil those because state assets lature's control to applies funds dedicated against bition unavail- become revenues anticipated future fines, civil penalties from money received not that we should argues He also able. settlements...." indirectly accomplish legislature allow anti-dedication The conclusion directly. Because do it cannot what the tobacco applies clause dedicate cannot legislature admits pro- legislature a current only that means tobacco forty percent dedicating future from hibited argues Myers directly, secure bonds Thus, the purpose. particular ato revenues accomplish be able legislature should leg- prohibit clause anti-dedication expedient of simple by the effect the same set- tobaceo appropriating islature than the more tlement tobacco settlement. year forthcoming fiscal immediately But the issue. a bond secure not dis does Myers apparently But Instead, sold this. not do did power to sell legislature has pute value. reduced selling an building, and like a asset a state the sale whether becomes then question as be viewed could asset income-producing unconstitutional the tobacco with the inconsistent as a dedication same is the effect because the tobacco ways same If the state stream. *6 revenue settlement issue. repay the bond it col on which asset property a real owns and outright rents, selling property the lects Right the Future the of The Sale C. effectively elimi money the appropriating Payments the Tobacco Annual previ of revenue aas source the rents nates Impermissible Not an Is Settlement Like legislatures. ously available Dedication. money, has loaned wise, if the state case of this outcome Determining the the of repayment the interest the competing between to choose requires us eliminates the income appropriating and loan dedi on prohibition the values: pay loan from future of revenue the man power to legislative the and funds cated ap considerations same The ments. assets. appropriate age and property sold if the state ply sell state to allowing the argues that Myers has legislature Clearly the basis. installment de the settlement the and assets manage the state's power to some the anti-dedication of purpose feats year in the proceeds those appropriate the tobacco argues that The state clause. may con actions though such even received legisla asset, which a state is purposes flict with sale, legisla sell; upon the free to ture is clause. The su proceeds. may appropriate ture anti-dedica interprets sale between distinguished perior court that narrowly and concludes tion "tradi other tobacco of simply an asset-a and concluded of revenues" kinds tional action, in action- chose or thing in property, agree We was constitutional. transaction appropri- sell can legislature which superior court. with 429. Att'y vol. Op. Gen. Informal 24. 1986 Att'y 9 at Op. Gen. 1975 Formal ate violating without anti-dedication matter fortuity. Clearly, if the settlement clause. If proposition accepted, there had been a lump sum arrangement, legis- is no problem dedicated funds because the lature would be immediately free to appro- legislature simply has sold an asset ap priate the proceeds, and there propriated the generated. No fu would be no problem. anti-dedication clause ture impacted revenues are because the to Although Myers argues that the state could bacco settlement longer no exists as a state negotiated have sum, for a lump there is no produce asset that will future revenues. The reason to it would have been suc- conclude supports its interpretations with the Indeed, cessful. the omnibus nature and the opinion of attorney general leg that the significant complexity of the pro- islature's action was constitutional.25 vided incentive accept the settlement superior the form expressly any event, offered. limited its form of ruling the issue in this settlement should not case-the sale dictate consti- tutionality tobacco settlement legislature's disposition stream. The it. superior court reasoned that the sale of the tobacco settlement was constitutional be- Third, lawsuit settlemerits, even those in cause of four distinctions between the tobac- volving periodic payments time, over co settlement revenues and traditional kinds commionly considered to be assets proper (1) of state revenues: lawsuit settlements are ty as distinct from taxes or licenses.27 Set discrete and (2) have a non-recurring nature; involving tlements payments over time are the form of the lawsuit periodic settlement as comparable lump with sum settlements payments instead of lump sum is a matter simply reducing them to value. (8) fortuity; lawsuit settlements are more closely comparable to state assets than to Fourth, legislature must be al taxes or other traditional sources of state manage lowed to state assets so as to control revenue; (4) the tobacco settlement en- Myers risk. does appear dispute tails some risk that must be has the authority to manage manage. able to agree We the state's affairs in accordance with judg court. ment on avoidance, risk but argues he First, lawsuits and corresponding settle there is little risk associated with the tobacco ments have a non-recurring nature unlike revenue stream as evidenced other sources of state revenue upon relied the bonds' ratings. To the extent Myers Alaska's annual appropriation Law process. asks us to decide the financial soundness of suit settlements are not traditional sources of (whether the tobacco settlement *7 significantstate revenue.26 sufficiently risky to liquidation), warrant we Second, the form of the settlement peri- as decline. policy That is a choice legisl for the odic instead lump of a ature.28 sum a is general, attorney general's nues, opinion is only category under which lawsuits "great entitled weight," attorney fall, because the only accounted for of 1.2% total state - general charged is "the officer law with advis Spring Revenuze, revenues. 2001 Araska Der't or ing the charged officers with the enforcement of Tax Division Revenuz Sources Boox 9. the law meaning as to the State, of it." Allison v. 813, (Alaska 583 P.2d 1978) 816-17 n. 15 (quot E.g., Bandow, Bandow 1346, v. 794 P.2d 1349 ing Dist., Smith v. Mun. Ct. Glendale Jud. 167 of (Alaska 1990) (holding that a malprac- medical 534, 931, Cal. 334 P.2d (Cal.App. 935 tice consisting annuity paid of an in 1959). " monthly installments was "in 'property' fact in deciding how to property divide that in a divorce 26. For in Alaska's example, fiscal 2000, oil year action). revenue, investment revenue, and restricted revée- (Le., funds, trusts, nue federal funds, dedicated statutorily and funds) restricted 28. See Municipality accounted Anchorage Repasky, v. 34 of approximately 302, of (Alaska 94% total state 2001) P.3d revenues. Un- 315 (holding that court's restricted revenues accounted for approximately decision appropriately policy adheres to choice of total 6% revenues. Of those legislature unrestricted reve- made); already has Elliott v. nues, just over two-thirds were Settje, 317, (Alaska taxes and 27 2001) P.3d (holding licenses. Other miscellaneous unrestricted reve- that charged is general policy with Bonds Is of Issuance The NTSC's D. in narrow the state's argues that Myers Constitutional. ais anti-dedication of the terpretation reduce can If the state slope: the tobacco of slippery Assuming that the sale to a stream revenue constitutional, state ar was immediately appro was consti issue value, it, bond and that the NTSC's gues sell present in one sen Myers Although asserts tutional. could proceeds, priate effectively act legislature's tence almost maneuver same perform 8, re IX, which section article of an cireumvented stream, the existence provided issue, general bond consent quires voter legisla example, the buyer. For interested Accordingly, point. develop the not he does oil the state's might sell ture waived.30 the issue consider we pro appropriate royalties and gas and no argues that Myers immediately. ceeds not waived Myers had Even if settle the tobacco exists between NTSC distinction that the correct is argument, the state royalties as gas lease ofl and requirements and ment within bonds issued the beyond the IX, is argument Myers's sec Although article assets. the constitution. can contract validity of that the state provides tion Because case. scope of this majority of by a royalty revenues gas ratification only with oil debt selling future provides voters,31 by this section posed article is not value reduced to issue agency a state exception for the constitu opinion on case, express no we agency's only secured bonds transaction.29 sort of tionality of that value of the future factor-whether The fourth physical joint preference for concerning decision rationally predicted be can law). income stream See only apply custody; court's role per- required might the state and whether Meekins, 650 P.2d also Malone gov- with its conflict duties that form contractual doctrine). 1982) question (political determining help in not duties-does ernmental More- asset. is an stream the revenue whether de- test to proposes a five-factor dissent 29. The value, in fluctuate that assets a truism over, it is income stream a future whether termine that the statuto- to believe reason there is no comport disposition proposed of its mechanics give anything but did ry regime in this case Constitution's the Alaska with less-certainty the value more-not the dissent's opinion considers Today's clause. Finally, the income. question is no length, there factor first con- the state's between dissent sees conflict The remain- satisfied. factor is that the second duties, it is governmental duties and tractual answering the not assist ing factors do three agree- Nothing the master illusory: whether the court: question before steps maxim- obligates to take sold is an asset stream obligated income state is stream. the income ize receipt with the constitution. AHFC's consistent to interfere not stream. income any limita- there third factor-whether what sale is factor-whether The fifth ques- transferability the interest tion on the be, conveyance purports to determining it is whether help in not tion-does determining help in to the revenue-does even as- But constitutionally asset. saleable More- asset. is an the revenue whether helpful, dissent suming factor rests of the factor dissent's over, application XVI- Section case. incorrectly applies it in this XVI- Part conclusion incorrect on its earlier (1) agreement lim- Ti(p) the master pre- II(p) the master (2) only and ("rights") to the state its its benefits in the assigning interest state from vents *8 assign may its not provides that settle- master Because the proceeds. a on whether is silent agreement. It enforce prohibit the state agreement does not settle- assign may its settling state proceeds, the settlement assigning interest in Myers not has that also We note ment funds. legislature chose why the irrelevant XVI- argument to Section related advanced it did. that mechanism agreement, a suffi- master settlement II(p) of the argument. I/M, & n. 12. 1183 reach P.3d at not to 12 in itself cient reason 30. See Stosh's Borough, 12 N. Star v. Fairbanks See Stosh's I/M IX, part: 2000) (When provides, § (Alaska "a 8 1180, art. Const 12 Atraska & n. 1183 P.3d autho- unless be contracted in the debt shall cursory statement "No given a point or unless improvements capital brief, by point not be law for will rized portion argument veterans, housing loans by law for (quoting Adamson authorized appeal.") on considered voters qualified majority and ratified Alaska, n. 3 889 P.2d 819 Univ. question." on the who vote State 1991). revenues.32 Because the NTSC bonds were fortuity of the payout settlement's solely secured by the tobacco provisions, settlement rev and on the fact that lawsuit settle- enues, the bonds generally un ments expressly permitted are viewed as assets. But it are IX, der article section 11. seems to me that opinion too quickly accepts at face value the state's assurances v. CONCLUSION that purchase and sale actual- ly sells the state's current to its tobacco Because sold the tobaceo revenues; and in approving this settlement and then appropriated the result- sale, opinion gives too much emphasis to ing income, it did violate the the settlement's unusual and fortuitous na- anti-dedication clause. Although selling the ture. tobacco settlement revenue stream is an indi- qualities rect method of producing an relied on very today's effect opinion simi- may lar prohibited indeed suggest that dedication of those fu- sale's future revenues, ture capable of being anti-dedication treated as a present clashes with asset. legislature's But anything almost can appropriation conceptualized power. We as an virtually conclude asset: that all fu- ture having any events potential tobacco settlement impact constitutional on because legislative revenue could expressed appropriation power estimat- includes values, ed economic power assets, assets, to sell labeled as re- lawsuit settle- ments are not present duced to value, traditional sources of public "securitized." surely And revenue, a future and the revenue stream's unusu- responsi- has the al nature or unanticipated bility appearance to manage state's risk. According- not, horizon does ly, standing alone, we justify AFFIRM call- superior ruling. court's ing the revenue stream a presently salable asset; nor BRYNER, is there Justice, reason suppose, FABE, with whom assuming that Justice, joins, Chief revenue stream is in fact dissenting. asset, every sale purporting to dis- BRYNER, Justice, with FABE, whom pose of it value actually Justice, joins, Chief dissenting. comply with the clause. agree I opinion's initial presence conclusion While the of these factors pro- that the tobacco settlement qualifies vide an appropriate point embarkation as a source of covered inquiry, presence their cannot Alaska Constitution's anti-dedication clause.1 eliminate the need for a hard look at all other But I have serious doubts about the relevant court's circumstances. main conclusion chapter 180, SLA my view, we must examine the charac- sells this revenue without violating the anti- ter of particular revenue stream at issue dedication clause. Because superior and the mechanics of proposed disposition court did not address the give issues that rise to ensure the sale's constitutional integrity: my doubts and the record contains insuffi is, to ensure both that a marketable cient information to them, resolve I would asset exists and that the proposed sale would vacate the summary judgment order and re actually market it in way the anti- mand to court for pro further dedication clause allows. At least five fac- ceedings. tors seem relevant in examining these issues: Today's opinion approves * the state's sale of The source and nature of the future rev- its tobacco settlement rights based on their enues and how the law traditionally discrete and nature, non-recurring on views similar revenues.

32. Alaska provides § Const. art. IX, 7; relevant 1. Araska Alex, § Const. art. see State v. part: "The contracting restrictions on debt do (Alaska 1982) P.2d 203, 210 (construing the anti- *9 apply not to debt through incurred the issuance dedication clause to include "the any sources of revenue public bonds enterprise public or revenue"). public corporation of political the State or a subdivi sion, when security the is the revenues of enterprise the corporation." or present set- transferability of the state's ing right e to the state's Whether rights. time of at the fully vested tlement revenues sale. right is vested the state's 2. Whether rule, law, e contractual or Whether in the master right to share state from The state's prohibits provision ap- funds pre- agreement's or settlement to the its current poses factor fully This stepping into vested. pears to be buyer from vents treating right as apparent no obstacle state's shoes. current, marketable asset. can e future value the revenue's Whether and whether predicted rationally the settlement the law or 3. Whether contrac- perform obliges the state sale transfer agreement bars the with might conflict duties tual from transfer- the state law bars No state duties. governmental basic under ring to receive conveys e the state's Whether point parties agreement, and right to or a the revenue right to limiting the forbidding or law to no federal the state. from the revenue it- agreement the settlement But transfer. eye with that, examined I when believe fails to The state limitation. imposes a self factors, master settlement these toward restriction, supe- neither the this discuss implementing legislation agreement, gives it opinion court's nor this rior court revenues,2 and its settlement state's sale poten- it is my view Yet attention. serious agreement and sale purchase tially critical. potential serious reveal and NTSC AHFC master XVIIl@(p) of Part theory. in the state's flaws ben- the intended explicitly limits agreement settling states to the agreement efits of the reve- nature The source provi- and this agreement; joined in the nue stream from settling states prohibits expressly sion exclusively almost opinion focuses Today's rights under assigning their enforcement at issue factor. The this agreement: tobacco settlement by the here is established portion No (p) Intended Beneficiaries. law opinion notes that agreement; rights provide Agreement shall this as as- legal traditionally treats settlements any person or by, to, be enforceable or suggest points These sets. Settling or State not a entity that reve- in future interest current the state's Settling State Party. No Released regarded agreement can nues under convey any right assign or otherwise seems caution But a note of as an asset. Agreement. of this any provision enforce invariably treat not necessary: law does to re face, language appears this On its as transferrable agreements legal settlement funds destined that all settlement quire agree- some settlement it deems property; exclusively by the state be collectible Alaska transfer because non-transferrable ments seems Alaska; language further violate agreement contemplated a third assigning to from preclude the compromising interest. Settlements right to demand the state's instance, like NTSC party are rights, for support future child agree any other benefit payment, Moreover, settle- other generally barred. master ment, directly non-transferrable agreements ment Although (MSA) agent. escrow agreement's example, a lease For terms. own their the state might not bar paragraph non-assign- this express containing an selling to NTSC interest the lease could render upon their funds party. a third retain freely transferrable say that state, seem it does receipt by the below, may exist there case, as discussed in its shoes party third put a cannot limit- policy reasons contractual both SLA 2. Ch. *10 by assigning right perform to collect essential, di constitutionally man- rectly from the agent. MSA escrow governmental dated duties. provision appear would to allow settling a view, my policy a concern of this latter state only right to sell acquire settle kind arises purchase under and sale payments ment through the state. As dis agreement and deserves serious attention. fully below, cussed more this distinction Although superior opinion court and the could have critical constitutional implicat describe the tobacco payout settlement's pro-

ions.3 "fortuitous," visions as description this hard- ly seems accurate. The agree- Predictability depen- value and ment's opening recitals make it clear that the dency performance on gov- state's is founded on carefully struc- ernmental functions tured to settling address the strong states' and continuing

This factor recognizes in promoting public interests constitutional policies health reducing youth can preclude smoking. sometimes legislation Reflect- ing ongoing these treating interests, future concerns and state revenues as mar- agreement ketable assets: establishes a example, theoreti- the revenue's cally perpetual stream of might future value speculative be so as to whose depend size will defy inversely meaningful prediction, on each thereby preclud- ability state's ing curb statutory smoking: "assetization" revenue, greater achieves, the success a state legislation since the the low- would amount to arbi- er will be payment its future trary stream. action; and irrational alterna- tively, legislative directive not-yet- to sell settling From a perspective, state's this realized revenues at might value im- inverse relationship long makes sense as permissibly constrain the executive branch's the tobacco settlement's benefits imure exelu- prerogatives by foreclosing its future ability sively settling parties, as Part XVI- opinion 3. The court's asserts that it is irrelevant pass through revenues to they the state when to ask whether there is limitation on trans- eventually paid, though they even have osten- ferability of the state's interest in the tobacco sibly already hardly been sold. It seems accu- revenues, since the rate, then, "does not inquiry say XVIII(p) Section is com- help determining whether [that interest] is a pletely silent settling on whether a constitutionally 393, Opinion saleable asset." at assign right its to receive settlement funds. n. 29. But transferability rights of the state's the court Relatedly, notes that does not Myers agreement under the settlement directly bears on specifically any argument raise based on Section scope nature and of the state's current "as- XVIII(p) and has therefore adequately failed to example, set": a limit transferability on Opinion brief the issue. at n. 29. But might altogether preclude any sale of future reve- XVIII(p) Section raises unresolved uncertainties leaving nues, the state with no salable currently concerning the point broader constitutional all; asset alternatively, at might limitation ef- Myers unquestionably has argued: whether fectively preclude the state from its entire state's sale of its future tobacco settlement reve making asset mow, the asset salable currently nues violates the Alaska Constitution's anti-dedi only by agreement an that commits the state to superior cation clause. The granted sum transfer title to its settlement they revenues as mary judgment point, on declaring is, accrue-that a dedication of future state to be Hence, summary constitutional. judgment Since revenues. inquiry transferability into permissible only is relevant if the record resolved existence of a constitutionally all salable asset. material issues in the state's favor and affir matively judgment established its as a opinion further asserts that the dissent law, Myers's matter of failure to frame his consti "incorrectly applies" this factor because Section argument particular tutional in a way does not XVIII(p) of the master relieve this duty court of its to review the record limits a rights transfer of enforcement and "is for unresolved issues of fact that bear silent on on settling whether a may assign Myers's claim. See Alaska R. Opinion Civ. funds." 56; P. Clark, American Group n. 29. Restaurant But this assertion assumes that a bar cf. conveyance rights of enforcement 1995) 889 P.2d has no 595, 598 (holding ef- party's fect on the particular character failure to call currently evidence to explained salable asset. fully As court's more attention "did in the text relieve the dissent, of this XVIII(p) Section apparently obligation court of its bars to examine the record transferring state from determining collect settle- before genuine that no issue of ma directly, consequently requiring existed"). terial fact

397 stream.4 the income receipt of AHFC's (non- itself agreement the settlement II(p) of purchase and express terms of the But the The state require. to fortuitously) seems Specif this conclusion. agreement belie sale curbing in if it succeeds less to receive stands in to enhance agreement strives ically, the revenues loss of settlement smoking, but its requiring the by explicitly vestor confidence smoking presumably will through decreased (1) things, to among other promise, and to by the economic offset than more be by required law may be through the as "take all actions gained benefits health public defend, maintain, protect efforts regulatory fully preserve, to successful inter long NTSC's] and as smoking. [AHFC's As confirm in and decrease caused state, then, (2) any action that will est[sl"; take belong [to] "not revenues future receive legal right adversely [their] affect ten- of irreconcilable possibility is no there (8) theoretically Assets"; "impair not to two the state's the Tobacco sion between until interests-maximizing its settle- of Bondholders" conflicting rights and remedies hand, protect- discharged"; and revenues, fully paid and the one "are the bonds ment citizens, on use its safety (4) of its and [to] and action ing [tol health "not take set- thus offers The settlement permit the other. reasonable efforts best situation. ... would by a "win-win" others tling states taken action to be amendment, sub hypothecation, in the result poten- disparity of interests sharp But a of, termination, discharge or ordination, or here, when, divorces tially arises of, the validity effectiveness impair the receiving future settlement in interest its (5) Decree"; to "imme or the Consent MSA public in interests vital from its revenues proceeds to the Trustee diately pay over transferring current safety and health by the State received any Tobacco Assets of third- group to a revenues future right to (6) each and error"; "exercise and seen, under have As we party investors. remedy under MSA." and every right agreement of the master terms benefits rights to receive itself, the state's relationship between the inverse Given assigned di- agreement cannot under future settlement settling state's of a size NTSC; those like party a third rectly to future success and the state's payments vicariously, since assigned can rights smoking, these public dangers of curbing the di- precludes their agreement and intolerable may well create promises settling anyone but enforcement rect the state's between tension irreconcilable reason, the terms For this state. maximize obligation to contractual led apparently agreement master non-delegable gov for bondholders state, oblige the NTSC AHFC and health duty protect ernmental pledge agreement, sale purchase and point, our At some safety citizens. of its powers within its lawful efforts to make all legisla necessarily cireumseribes constitution investors' maximize private contractual approve authority to tive place- if means even this stream-presumably, effect have arrangements ahead financial interests ing the investors' constitutionally executive's preempting duty protect governmental too, are con there so prerogatives;5 based citizens. safety of its health govern that no branch lines stitutional contracting to cross authorized for this potential dismisses The court powers governmental away core its own concluding that "Mlusory," conflict as kind of right to Hence, if the state's even duties.6 to take obligates the state ... "Inlothing income stream. steps to maximize under might oth- agreement master settlement interfere with only not to obligated (Alaska Alex, 211-13 P.2d State 6. Opinion n. 29. Cf. delegating its 1982) legislature from (precluding Court, Superior Agency v. Pub. associations). Defender private Cf. taxing power to 1975) (holding separation P.2d 947 ordering the judiciary precludes powers particular cases of prosecute attorney general to court). contempt of regarded erwise be asset, as a marketable priate State-Specified Account for such Set- tling State." concerns of preclude nature well

"securitizing" these future revenues. purchase and sale seems to *12 parties

Because the superior recognize and the this court restriction evidently but at- develop tempts did not meaningfully by to skirt it requiring address this the state to issue, I believe that it create a trust warrants within its "State-Specified further con- Ac- count" having sideration on and remand. pledge payments to the account trustee upon deposit. their currently As presented, 5. Whether the sale mechanism does the details of arrangement this sketchy. are purports what it to do arrangement precisely is not described in parties' briefing or in every Not purports transaction is what it decision, court's and the agreement trust it- to be. And the constitutionality of the trans self apparently has not been included in the action at issue here ultimately must appellate record. But likely the most seenar- judged by does, what it purports not what it io seems to be that as soon as the state's to do. I therefore believe that it is crucial to payment deposited in the state- examine the mechanics of the state's sale of specified account, (the the account's trustee rights NTSC order to deter bank in which the deposited) funds are di- mine if actually immediately vides the according funds to the terms of the conveyed what purported to convey: "all purchase agreement, and sale disbursing for- right, title and interest of the State ... ty percent sixty percent NTSC and to the "forty and to" percent of the revenue ... general fund. that the State has a to receive from time to time under the MSA." There is rea The preliminary prospectus describing son to doubt that it did.7 NTSC's tobacco settlement asset-backed appears bonds to confirm interpretation, this already As mentioned, the master settle- emphasizingthat may "[the State convey not agreement ment appears preclude and has conveyed not to NTSC or the Series state from assigning to NTSC the state's any right Bondholders to enforce the right to receive the tobacco settlement funds terms of the MSA" declaring that the directly from the agent; MSA escrow agent MSA escrow "will disburse the [settle agreement require seems to the funds ment] funds to the Settling States." be held for the benefit of the MSA agent escrow payment due, until prospectus includes a flow chart they then be appro- "transferred to the lends support further to this reading. This Although accurately observes that because it channels through revenues inquiry help does not determining they dedicated state paid. fund as wheth- er the revenue stream is an asset, at 393, Opinion purchase 8. The agreement and sale contains an n. 29, the court's observation misconstrues ambiguous provision in which promises inquiry's point, which is not to determine wheth- (as to "cause Agent the Escrow defined in the er the revenue actually is an asset but to MSA) to deliver the directly Tobacco Assets precisely ascertain what that asset is and wheth- the Trustee for the Corporation." benefit of the specific er the conveyance manner of its violates Yet because the MSA require itself seems to payment anti-dedication clause. Nor is the court "State-Specified cor- into the Ac- count," that, asserting rect in and because it also because the makes the master state the settle- beneficiary sole payment, agreement likely it seems does not forbid the state simply designated the state has its bank as a revenues, its current interest in the future empowered trustee and it to divide and distribute "it is why irrelevant [to ask] chose agent's the MSA payments, escrow upon deposit, mechanism Opinion that it did." n. according purchase agreement's and sale text, 29. As detailed in although the master terms. -It possible is nevertheless that a different may preclude mechanism has been established. Because the revenues, sale of the state's agree- issue could importance be of central and has not ment's appear terms payout to dictate mecha- addressed, been I think that it needs to be devel- nism that constitutionally problematic oped on remand. the dedication precisely what flowing This payments depicts settlement chart all, the Alaska agent if the escrow After prohibits. the MSA account, simple where state-specified be cireumvented clause could Ac- revenue. as state received to be into appear depositing state expedient of chart, in the state receipt after cording the instead trust accounts prerestricted sepa- two into account, money is divided fund, the clause compliance with then general flowing to percent funds, forty rate accounting in- minor to a reduced would be state-pre- sixty percent NTSC convenience. The chart fund. general sumably to the payment forty percent Cook, NTSC's Director of labels Notably, Tamara Brandt revenues," that NTSC suggesting "pledged Legislative Af Legislative Services *13 by pay- direct monies acquire these precise does not and warned Ageney, foresaw fairs settlement, but instead the MSA from September danger in her ly this representing revenues from state payment Coghill Ad John Representative to memo re- the total forty percent share NTSC's appropria under dressing problem by the state. ceived anti-dedication than the clause rather tions set- then, the master Seemingly, because that, "because clause, commented Cook from the state prohibits agreement tlement to money is to flow "Tobacco Settlement settle- collect right to its assigning appropria an receipt without upon AHFC pay- requires settlement ment revenues un tion, may be vulnerable arrangement state-specified a deposited to ments to be IX, constitution." of the state see. 13 der Art. benefit, payments for account 9 state-specified ac- necessarily arrive at fact that The revenues. as state count wrinkle-that transactional This subtle into a deposited payments through routed must be than into rather account state-specified by the MSA being paid instead the state not, by certainly would fund general state's to NTSC-appears directly to agent escrow upon de- character itself, their basic change express non- settlement's be dictated revenue; how the it clear nor is posit as state aptly and as Cook provision; assignment pay- contractually alter the could state bearing on notes, has a crucial wrinkle revenue as state character ments' basic although the constitutionality. For the sale's creating a trust receipt by their the time of ad- might permit an anti-dedication after them that divides account within di- right collect to of the state's sale vance paid funds must be if the deposit. For their square- agent, it escrow rectly MSA from the benefit its exclusive the state for to selling NTSC to from the state ly prohibits account, it would state-specified in a received the future the state right to receive dedicate to decision that the state's appear itself will state revenues specificpurposes more one or account to agent. escrow from the MSA fund. a make it dedicated merely serves appropriation. Otherwise subject year added.) complete rendition (Emphasis A more an invalid lease creates that the is a risk there follows: is as Cook's remarks right conveyed to receive debt.... If my main concern have identified You contin- lease also, like the example, revenue financing used in mechanism respect of the revenue gent appropriation upon right to me that It seems HB 281. received, there purpose it is once revenues, regardless of future state to receive "To- However, because little be stream, problem. raise could of the the source AHFC money flow to is to Settlement" bacco usually implicated not issues ar- appropriation, receipt upon without an simply types assets of state other the sale of Art. may under rangement vulnerable be ap- application of the constitutional because be It could state constitution. 13 of the sec. gen- requirement It is avoided. propriation never receives urged that the defense money received recognized erally go it will because Settlement" the "Tobacco state, federal money from the received even therefore, and, be- it never directly to AHFC specific limit- sources government or other argu- appropriation. This subject comes functions, it appropriated before must be ed game a shell much like too ment sounds example, the state when spent.... For reassuring me. very leasel,] each payment of the rent a enters into That agreement master future settlement revenues as soon as the explicitly preclude does not states from state receives them. AHFC and NTSC thus transferring present their interests in future appear buying to be the fruit of the state's speaks only funds and instead tree, itself, years the tree restricting settling a "assign state's advance; yet the anti-dedication clause re convey any otherwise to enforce" the quires time, this fruit to year be sold one at a agreement's provisions hardly rescues ripens. as it transfer of future revenues from the point seems proscriptions. stressing again: worth clause's assignment anti-dedication clause of the looks to the character receive the state's conveyance as well timing. as its Be- paradigmat- the state is cause the agreement master settlement ically re- revenues; dedication of state it quires settlement funds to be held for the makes no constitutional difference that state, exelusive benefit settling re- purchase and sale conveys pres- quires paid those funds to be into the state- ent interest future revenue specified account, precludes stream if that stream through flows from transferring any right to enforce the reaching hands before NTSC's banks. agreement's provisions, appears that nei- While goes state, ther considerable NTSC nor the acting on NTSC's *14 lengths behalf, justify the transaction compel relying could ever a distribution of opinions on directly NTSC; instead, settlement funds attorneys various former gen- eral, the funds seemingly pass opinions must these persuasive lack NTSC force for through the state. if present Yet trans- same reason that both merely action conveys right to receive court's today's opinion decision and are un- through revenues the state when convincing. attorney general opinions eventually them, it receives then the state's all conceptual address the question of wheth- presently conveyed property interest is not er a right state's to receive future settlement what the state claims it to be: it is not an revenues can be valued and sold as asset. conveyance immediate of the state's title to But considering point, they simply the revenue present itself but a assume, faith, accept pledge to hand over the state's future reve- proposed actually sale convey will a share of accrue, they nues when through an airtight state's to receive the settlement mechanism structured to ensure that payment. None attorney of the general pledge will be honored. opinions take stock of the master settlement This form of sale-a proceeds dedication of agreement's anti-assignment provision or dis- from a source of future state revenue-would agreement's cuss the apparent nullification of impermissible whether characterized as a ability state's to sell rights its direct present current sale at promise value or as a collect the revenue. to sell in the may future.10 It be true that Attorney Former General Charles Cole's immediate "assetization" and sale of the letter Torgerson to Senator exemplifies the rights state's settlement possible makes it expressly omission: acknowledges state to "receive all of the tobacco settle money "once State, is received payments now, ment it is peri rather than over a 'public years." may od revenue' which But be dedicated constitutionally speaking, special purpose"; for a salient fact is that the but letter receives its then payment accepts immediate not in exchange state's for its characterization of the right to receive value, transaction at face assumes without from the agent, MSA escrow but in exchange examining point that the settlement mon- for irrevocably pledging to ey hand over its state, will not be received and thus Alex, 10. See 646 P.2d at 210. distinction involving between a transfer capital, is, benefit, produces an asset that and one Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206, 40 Cf. involving itself). income, or the benefit (1920) S.Ct. 189, 64 (using analogy L.Ed. 521 of a tree and important its fruit to illustrate the portrays the summary, the state's brief Con valid.12 will be that the sale

concludes as a sale of the state's disputed transaction are unas observations the letter's ceptually, settle- receive a stream of tobacco incorrectly assume they Yet sailable. accepted superior court funds. The poten unexplained and of the truth disputed asset of the this characterization the "chose assertion tially unwarranted question, and so has the without serious here- is to be sold thing that in action"-the that this opinion. appears Yet it the settlement.13 right to receive is the state's reality may not reflect characterization the master Because express terms of the by the may be barred the state receive require that appears to agreement. The transac- master settlement anyone else first-before MSA accurately as might more be described tion a share not be in action chose does-the from the state right to receive sale of the such, mere but proceeds as of the reve- future settlement portion of the state's share. state's settlement ly a share receives them. as the state nues as soon purposes of freely trading in the is critical for This distinetion Creating and Moreover, it seems clause. might be in action kind of chose of this value might in- policy concerns possible that other entirely proper commonplace and recognizing the state's preclude dependently sphere But in the finance. private world as a to future settlement 7 of section article government, sale of that as- currently asset: marketable strictly forbid Alaska Constitution pit the state's contractu- potentially set could memo- Attorney Cole's General it. For and its bondholders obligations to NTSC al receipt by the "upon emphasizes, randum governmental fundamental against the state's before, State, 'proceeds' but not safety and welfare. duty to ensure 7 con- subject the Section money nor the ree- restriction"; appellate record "[olncee Neither stitutional *15 State, 'public provides suffi- it revenue' by superior court the received ord before special a these concerns to resolve may not be dedicated information cient which stand, currently I definitively. matters As purpose." right under state law the Therefore Attorney Cole's General pertinent text of 12. proceeds under the Tobacco follows: letter is as may be sold personal property which is state IX, Alaska Constitu- Section Article Furthermore, any property. as other tax proceeds of provides tion right future stream receive a any special dedicated to not be or license shall property personal seitlement under by Although provision is limited this purpose. value, in value to similar a which has tax proceeds "state of a express terms to the payments from right to receive license," although proceeds or property. personal real and other state sale of not, strictly speaking, do Tobacco right which property of current value It is this license, proceeds tax or derive from being contemplates legislation proposed 1982) Alex, v. 646 P.2d in State AHFC, proceeds of the sale and it is sold to prohibi- Supreme held that the Court Alaska pur- for a appropriated will be which any public encompasses sources "the tion payments. of future pose, the stream by upon receipt Accordingly, revenues." legislation proposed remove These features before, State, "proceeds" of the riot but prohibition in Article dedicated fund from the consti- subject Section 7 Section restriction. tutional However, unpaid right to receive future conclusory that its future assertion 13. The state's dis- is to be the settlement under installments begs ques- action" are "a chose in upon proceeds their re- tinguished from the this used to "sell" the mechanism tion whether money is received ceipt by Once the State. transfer of immediate effected an "chose" State, may not "public which revenue" it is reve- right the future to receive special purpose. On the a be dedicated agent. It is the MSA escrow nues future install- to receive hand, other wonder, regard, how the interesting State, property owned a ments is in a might sale mechanism view the same IRS property personal other real the same as parties: would it private law, between transaction At common owned State.... receipt as NTSC's income treat under the installments receive future the income would it tax revenues, "thing com- action," more the state? money received from NTSC monly a chose in action.... to as referred do not believe that the support record can

declaratory judgment par- favor of either ty. I would superior therefore vacate the judgment

court's and remand for further proceedings. reasons,

For these I dissent from the court's affirming decision court's judgment. NELSON, Appellant,

Charles L. Alaska, Appellee. STATE of No. A-8113. Appeals Court of of Alaska. April

Case Details

Case Name: Myers v. Alaska Housing Finance Corp.
Court Name: Alaska Supreme Court
Date Published: Apr 18, 2003
Citation: 68 P.3d 386
Docket Number: S-9941
Court Abbreviation: Alaska
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