68 Ind. App. 544 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1918
This is an action commenced by appellee to recover on a policy of life insurance, issued by appellant on the life of one Grace Guller, now deceased, in the sum of $1,000, in which appellee’s wards, Mary M. Guller, John D. Guller, and Jewel N. Guller, were .named as' beneficiaries. The complaint is in a single paragraph in the usual form, a copy of such policy being made a part thereof by
The said first paragraph of answer contains the following special allegations, not found in either of the other paragraphs: “The defendant says, however, that the plaintiff ought not to have and recover in this action for the reason that said policy of insurance was issued upon, and contained as a part thereof, and as a part of a contract of the defendant with the said Grace Guller, certain terms and conditions in respect to the liability of the defendant to the beneficiaries thereunder, in the event of the death of the said Grace Guller, among which was the following express condition, namely: The company shall not be liable hereunder in the event of the insured’s death by Ms own act, whether sane or insane, during the period of one year after the date of the issue of this policy, as set forth in the provisons of the application endorsed hereon or attached hereto.”
The second paragraph of answer contains the following special allegations not found in either of the other paragraphs: “The defendant says, however, ■that the plaintiff ought not to have and recover in this action for the reason that said policy of insurance was issued upon, and in pursuance of, a written application therefor made to it by the said Grace Guller, a copy of which is hereto attached and made a part of this answer, marked ‘Exhibit A’; that a copy of said application was made a part thereof, and a part of the contract of insurance thereby evidenced, and said policy and said application became and constituted the entire contract between said defendant and the
The third paragraph of answer contains the following special allegations, not found in either of the other paragraphs: ‘ ‘ The defendant further says that the act of the said Grace Guller, in so submitting to said operation was in violation of law, and was grossly immoral; that a death so caused was not insured against by said policy; that by reason of the acts above stated, said policy has become, and is now, null and void; and that it is contrary to public policy to permit a recovery thereon.”
To each of said paragraphs of answer appellee filed a demurrer for want of facts, accompanied by a memorandum of the grounds on which the same was based. This demurrer was sustained as to each of said paragraphs, and an exception was duly reserved. Appellant refused to plead further, and thereby elected to stand upon its answer. Judgment was thereupon rendered against appellant upon the pleadings in the sum of $1,019 and costs. From this judgment. appellant prosecutes this'appeal, and has assigned the sustaining of appellee’s demurrer to each
The sufficiency of the first and second paragraphs of such answer involves the same question, and will be considered together. It will bé noted that the first paragraph is based on a clause of the policy, which provides against liability “in the event of the insured’s death by his own act,” while the second paragraph is based on a clause of the application, which provides against liability, “if such death occur by my own act. ” The question arises over the meaning of the words “death by his own act” and “death * * * by my own act.” Appellee contends that they mean death by suicide and nothing'more; that the death of the insured in the manner and from the cause alleged- was not death by suicide; and, therefore, such paragraphs are insufficient. Appellant contends that the words in question have a broader meaning than the term “suicide”; that they embrace every case of death by one’s own act, except death by accident, or from an act which, at the time it was entered upon, was not expected or intended to result in death; that death in the manner and from the cause alleged comes within their meaning; and therefore such paragraphs are sufficient.
As a general rule, the courts hold that under the
In regard to the latter class of policies, viz., those payable to designated third persons as beneficiaries,
The decided cases are not uniform in giving effect to the distinction between the two classes of policies as indicated. Thus decisions may be found which hold that a recovery- ought to be permitted on policies of the former class, viz., those payable to the insured or his legal representatives, where there is no provision against liability for death resulting from the causes stated. The line of reasoning usually relied on in such decisions is to the effect that the insurer
On the other hand, there are cases which would indicate that third party beneficiaries ought not recover, where death results from the causes under consideration, although the policy be silent in that regard. The line of reasoning usually relied on in such cases-is to the effect that death from such causes is not a risk intended to be covered, or which could legally have been covered by the policy; and, if such be the case, it cannot be construed to cover where death results from such causes in favor of any beneficiary whatsoever. Among the cases so indicating are. the following: Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Kelly, supra; Burt v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., supra; Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra; Northwestern, etc., Ins. Co. v. McCue, supra; Davis v. Supreme Council, etc., supra.
A careful consideration of the principles involved and authorities cited leads us to conclude that whether the insured die from suicide while sane, or as the result of some unlawful act, or by legal exe
Directing our attention to the policy in suit, as shown by the exhibit filed with the complaint, we find that it is payable to third party beneficiaries, viz., appellee’s wards, who are the children of the insured, with the right reserved in the insured to change such beneficiaries. The third paragraph of- answer alleges that the insured’s death resulted from a criminal act, concerning which the policy is silent. Under the conclusion we have reached, as stated above, it is clear that such answer is insufficient, provided the beneficiaries acquired a vested interest in such policy at the time it was issued, notwithstanding the right reserved in the insured to change the same. As -pertinent to this question we find the law to be well settled that a beneficiary in an ordinary life insurance policy has an absolute vested interest therein from the date of its issuance, delivery, and acceptance, where such policy does not authorize a change of beneficiary. Wilburn v. Wilburn (1882), 83 Ind. 55; Damron v. Penn, etc., Ins. Co. (1885), 99 Ind. 478; Masons’, etc., Ins. Assn. v. Brockman (1897), 20 Ind.
It is apparent that the beneficiaries acquired a defeasible vested interest in the policy in suit at the time it was issued. It might have been divested during the life of the insured by a change of the beneficiaries. There is no charge in the paragraph of answer uuder consideration to that effect. We must therefore assume that there was no such divesture, and that such interest continued up to the death of the insured and then became absolute. For the reasons stated we hold that the court did not err in sustaining appellee’s demurrer to the third paragraph of answer.
We find no error in the record. Judgment affirmed.
Note. — Reported in 119 N. E. 173. See under (2, 4) 25 Cyc 875.