Lead Opinion
Mutuаl Fire Insurance Company (“Mutual”) appeals from the judgment entered after a jury-waived trial in the Superior Court (Lincoln County, Bradford, J.) holding that Mutual had a duty under Thomas Hancock’s homeowner’s insurance policy to defend and indemnify Hancock, who, whilе in a state of alcoholic blackout, beat and raped Jane Doe.
On November 14, 1990, Hancock raped and brutally beat Jane Doe over the course of several hours. Prior to that night, Hancock and Doe had been living together and had no history of violence. The relationship was deteriorating, however, because Doe objected to Hancock’s basement marijuana cultivation. She had threatened to leave him if he did not give up his garden. That night, Hanсock was drinking and wanted to talk about their relationship; Doe was packing for a vacation with her family and did not want to talk. Her refusal to discuss their situation infuriated Hancock.
In the early evening, Hancock hit Doe for the first time. Over the next sеveral hours, he struck her repeatedly with a closed fist, breaking bones and inflicting permanent injuries, and raped her. At intervals during the beating, Hancock would demand that Doe mix him another drink; Doe complied. At
Mutual insured Hancock’s home under a so-called “homeowner’s policy.” The policy contained standard lаnguage, offering liability coverage for “occurrences” — i.e., “accidents,” and denying coverage for “bodily injury or property damage ... which is expected or intended by the insured.” When Doe brought a civil action against Hancock fоr injuries she sustained as a result of Hancock’s actions, Mutual defended Hancock, but requested a declaratory judgment that Hancock’s actions were not covered by the policy. The trial court heard the underlying civil action and thе declaratory judgment action together. Mutual contended inter alia that Hancock intended the injuries to Doe or at least the injuries were to be expected and therefore the policy did not provide coverage. The trial cоurt rejected Mutual’s assertion that Hancock’s undisputed actions established the requisite intent or expectation and ruled that because Hancock had been too intoxicated to “intend” the injuries, Mutual owed Hancock a duty to dеfend and indemnify. The trial court stated that Hancock’s “acts were not committed intentionally or knowingly. They were committed without any conscious awareness. His mental state was at best reckless.”
On appeal, Mutual challenges as clearly erroneous the trial court’s ruling that Mutual failed to “earr[y] its burden of proving that Hancock’s acts were intended or expected.” We agree with Mutual that the evidence before the trial court compelled the conclusion thаt Hancock intended or expected the harm to Doe. See Harmon v. Emerson,
Absent a rare admission by the party, a party’s intent can only be inferred from his physical acts. See State v. McEachern,
The entry is:
Judgment vacated.
ROBERTS, CLIFFORD, COLLINS and DANA, JJ., concurring.
Notes
. A fictitious name.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In finding that the tortious acts of Hancock “can оnly be intentional and the injuries resulting therefrom expected,” the Court not only fails to grant proper deference to the Superior Court in its factfinding rule, but also determines that as a matter of law the issue is precluded from litigation in the presеnt civil action. After considering the evidence, the trial court found that:
*1314 [T]he events which followed Hancock’s trip to the basement were acts committed while he was in a blackout from having consumed eight to ten drinks of equal parts of rum and coke as well as the added effects of smoking marijuana. His acts were not committed intentionally or knowingly. They were not committed with any conscious awareness. His mental state at best was reckless.
We will not overturn a trial court’s finding of faсt unless the finding is clearly erroneous, i.e., not supported by competent evidence in the record. Morin Building Products v. Atlantic Design and Construction,
In arguing to the contrary, Mutual relies on the fact that Hancock pleaded guilty to the offenses of gross sexual assault, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253 (Supp.1992), and aggravated assault, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 208 (1983). In Beale v. Chisholm,
Here, intent was not essential to Hancock’s conviction for either offense and, accordingly, neither conviction was predicated on a determination of that issue. The statute governing the gross, sexual assault charge recites that “[a] person is guilty of gross sexual assаult if that person engages in a sexual act with another person and ... [t]he other person submits as a result of compulsion.” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(A). “Compulsion” is explicitly defined as:
the use of physical force, a threat to use physical force or a combination thereof that makes a person unable to physically repel the actor or produces in that person a reasonable fear that death, serious bodily injury or kidnapping might be imminently inflicted upon that person or another human being.
“Compulsion” as defined in this paragraph places no duty upon the victim to resist the actor.
17-A M.R.S.A. § 251(1)(E) (Supp.1992). Notably missing from this statutory language is any requirement that the State prove that a defendant had formed any intent or even acted with аny degree of recklessness. This is in sharp contrast to the statutory definitions of such other Class A crimes as murder, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 201 (1983 and Supp. 1992) (requiring that the defendant act “intentionally or knowingly” or “with a depraved indifference to the value of human life”), kidnapping, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 301 (1983) (requiring that the defendant restrain another “knowingly”), and robbery in cases where force is used or bodily injury is inflicted, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 651(1) and (2) (1983) (requiring intent to overcome resistance or inflict injury).
The Legislature opted not to require intent in cases of gross sexual assault in order to fоcus the proof in such cases on whether the victim has been subjected to certain specified conduct by the defendant providing a specified state of mind in the victim without regard to the state of mind of the defendant. We have consistently held that no proof of mental culpability or specific intent is required to sustain a conviction pursuant to Section 253. See, e.g., State v. Taplin,
Nor does Hancock’s conviction for aggravated assault establish that Hancock aсted intentionally. The statute pursuant to which Hancock was prosecuted provides:
1. A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes:
A. Serious bodily injury to another; or
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C. Bodily injury to another under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of humаn life.
17-A M.R.S.A. § 208 (1983) (emphasis added). In her complaint against Hancock, the victim alleged that Hancock “intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently assaulted [the victim] under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life and causing serious bodily injury to her.” Thus, neither Hancock in his plea of guilty to the aggravated assault charge, nor the victim in her complaint against Hancock, admit or establish that Hancock’s conduct was intentional.
When an insurer seeks a declаratory judgment that it has no duty to defend or indemnify an insured, we have permitted the use of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel based on a criminal conviction when “the identical issue necessarily was determined by [the pri- or criminаl] judgment” and “the party es-topped had a fair opportunity and incentive to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.” State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bragg,
. The Court relies on State v. Reed,
. As the Court notes, the homeowner’s policy Mutual issued to Hancock excluded coverage for bodily injury or property damage that is "expected or intended by the insured.” It is clear that Mutual’s liability on any claim could have been limited by contract language explicitly excluding certain conduct, regardless of intent, pursuant to the policy of insurance.