120 N.Y.S. 375 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1909
This action was brought to recover commissions on the sale of real property. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that there was no proof that the plaintiffs were the procuring cause of the sale of the property to the defendants.
Leon Mutchnick, one of the plaintiffs, testified that he was a real estate broker; that in October, 1901, he had á conversation with the defendant Charles. Friedman in relation to the property situate on One Hundred and Twelfth street 100 feet east of Second avenue; that plaintiff told. Friedman that the owner of the property wanted $39,000, but he would take less; Friedman said he would consider it; subsequently the owner told the plaintiff that he would sell the parcel for $36,000 net, but would not pay commissions ; that plaintiff told Friedman he would have to pay the commissions, as 'the vendor would not, when defendant said: “ I am satisfied; I will pay you the commission; that two days after-
The only ground upon which there can be recovery in this case is based upon the promise of the defendant Charles Friedman to pay the plaintiff a commission in case he bought the property. He and 1'iis brother ultimately did buy the property and I am inclined . to think that there was sufficient evidence of an express promise to go to the jury. The facts to. which the plaintiff testified are that he offered this property to the firm of' Friedman & Feinberg for $39,000, with a statement that the vendor would pay no commissions ; that Friedman & Feinberg offered $36,000 for the property; that subsequently plaintiff obtained an offer to sell it for $36,000, but that Friedman & Feinberg' refused to carry out the contract; that he subsequently offered the.property to the defendant Charles Friedman who promised him that if he purchased the property he would pay plaintiff the commission; that subsequently the property was purchased by Jankson & Stern and immediately afterwards purchased by the defendants, at an' advance of several thousand dollars and a building loan. This was evidence of a special contract that required the submission of the question to the jury.
The judgment should, therefore, be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs of the appeal to the appellants to abide the event.
Patterson, P. • J., McLaughlin, Laughlin and Claeke, JJ., concurred.
• Judgment and order reversed, new trial ordered, costs to appellants to abide event. .'