In this divеrsity case, Union Pacific Resources (UPR) appeals from adverse declaratory relief granted to Musser Davis Land Company (Musser Davis) by the district court concerning the rights of each party under an oil and gas lease with respect to seismic exploration. The district court concluded that UPR, as assign-ee of a mineral lease with the exclusive right to enter upon and use the land of the lessor, Musser Davis, for the purpose of exploration for and production of oil and gas, does not enjoy the right to conduct seismic exploration of the leasеd premises. The district court also concluded that UPR had no right to sell or disseminate to third parties any seismic data gleaned from Musser Davis lands. Because we are of the opinion that the district court’s decision is contrary to the applicable state law as we believe it would be determined by the state’s highest court, the district court’s declaratory judgment is reversed and the case is remanded.
I. FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY
By assignments dated April 1, 1997 and October 17, 1997, UPR purchased a 72.1875 per cent interest in an oil and gas lease originally contracted between Mus-ser Davis (lessor) and Eagle Oil and Gas Cоmpany (lessee) on September 1, 1996.
1
Through the assignments from Eagle Oil
The lease covers 1066.46 acres — -all of Musser Davis’s lands in Beauregard Parish, Louisiana. In July 1997, UPR sought to obtain from Musser Davis a seismic permit before conducting a seismology survey of the lands and offered to pay in advance $7,290 for anticipated incidental property damages. Musser Davis refused and negotiations ensued. Musser Davis offered to condition its consent to the survey on UPR’s agreement not to transfer any seismic data to third pаrties. UPR rejected the offer and informed Musser Davis of its intention to conduct the survey under the lease without a special permit.
On February 24, 1998, Musser Davis obtained a temporary restraining order in Louisiana state court to prevent the seismic survey and the transfer of seismic data. UPR, upon the basis of diversity of citizenship, removed the action to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana on March 4,1998. The district court denied Musser-Davis’s motion to remand.
The district court dissolved the temporary restraining order when the parties agreed that UPR would be permitted to cоnduct the proposed seismic operations with the district court to determine the consideration to be paid Musser Davis pursuant to a declaratory judgment action. The parties also agreed that UPR would refrain from disseminating the seismic data pending a final decision in the litigation.
Musser Davis sought declaratory relief on two issues: (1) whether UPR has the right to conduct seismic operations on the leased premises solely by virtue of its rights under the mineral lease; and (2) whether UPR has the right to sell or disseminate to third parties any seismic data it develops pertaining to the Musser Davis properties. The district court held a bench trial on the existing record, briefs, and affidavits. By memorandum opinion dated May 20, 1998, the district court decided both issues in favor of Musser Davis and against UPR, concluding that (1) UPR does not enjoy under the terms of the oil and gas lease the right to conduct seismic operations without additional express consent of the lessor; Louisiana Revised Statute 30:217 proscribes as a criminal trespass geological surveys conducted by UPR without Musser Davis’s special, express consent; and (2) Musser Davis, as landowner, exclusively owns any seismic data developed by UPR from geophysical surveys of the leased lands.
II. ANALYSIS
We review the district court’s interpretation of contracts and conclusions of law de novo and under the same standards that guided the district court.
See Exxon Corp. v. Crosby-Mississippi Resources, Ltd.,
A. Right to Conduct Seismic Exploration
Under Louisiana law, the right to explore and develop one’s property for the production of minerals, and to reduce minerals to possession and ownership, belongs exclusively to the landowner.
See
La.R.S. § 31:6;
Frey v. Amoco Production Co.,
Under the Louisiana Mineral Code, Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 31, “[a] mineral lease is a contract by which the lessee is granted the right to explore for and produce minerals.” La.R.S. § 31:114. The Mineral Code preeminently, but not exclusively, governs the interpretation of mineral leases and was intended to prevail in any conflict between it and the Civil Code or other state laws. The Civil Code and other laws are applicable in the absence of an explicit or implicit Mineral Code provision.
See
La.R.S. § 31:2 (“In the event of conflict between the provisions of this [Mineral] Code and those of the Civil Code or other laws the provisions of this Code shall prevail. If this Code does not expressly or impliedly provide for a particular situation, the Civil Code or other laws are applicable.”);
Frey,
Under the Mineral Code, the landowner-lessor and lessee “must exercise their respective rights with reasonable regard for those of the other.” La.R.S. § 30:11. Article 122 of the Mineral Code defines the lessee’s obligations: “A mineral lessee is not under a fiduciary obligation to his lessor, but he is bound to perform the contract in good faith and to develop and operate the property leased as a reasonably prudent operator for the mutual benefit of himself and his lessor. Parties may stipulate what shall constitute reasonably prudent conduct on the part of the lessee.” La.R.S. § 31:122. This article codifies Civil Code and jurisprudential principles that require every lessee to enjoy the thing leased as a “good administrator” and obligates a mineral lessee to act as a “reasonably prudent operator.”
See
La.Civ. Code art. 2710; La.R.S. § 31:122 and comment. The lessee’s obligation to develop or explore the leased premises, which springs from the obligation to act as a prudent operator, was first articulated by the Louisiana courts in
Carter v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company,
Because the Mineral Code expressly recognizes the principle of freedom of contract,
see
La.R.S. § 31:3, the reach of the term “exploration” may not be ascertained without reference to the oil and gas lease in which it appears.
See Frey,
Grant of Lease. Lessor hereby grants, leases and lets unto Lessee the exclusive right, subject to all the provisions hereof, to enter upon and use the land in Beauregard Parish, Louisiana, described in Section 2 hereof, for the purpose of the exploration for and the production of oil and gas, and derivatives therefrom, it being understood that Lessor reserves all other minerals in, under and appertaining to the land. Lessee’s rights shall include the reasonable use of the surface of the land in order to accomplish the exploration for and the production of oil or gas. It is specifically understood, however, that the Lessee shall be responsible for any damage done to Lessor’s property as more fully set forth hereinafter.
The lease does not define the term “exploration” or expressly provide whether seismic operations are contemplated by the parties. Thus the question before this court is whether a lease granting the lessee the exclusive right to explore for oil and gas without defining or limiting in any way the term “exploration” bestows upon the lessee the right to conduct seismic exploration to determine the presence of subsurface trapping mechanisms favorable to oil and gas production.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in
Frey v. Amoco Production Company,
recognized that mineral leases are construed as leases generally, and, wherever pertinent, the Civil Code provisions applicable to ordinary leases are applied to mineral leases.
60S
So.2d at 171 (citing
Succession of Doll v. Doll,
The purpose of interpretation is to determine the common intent of the parties. See La.Civ.Code art. 2045. Words of art and technical terms must be given their technical meaning when the contract involves a technical matter, see La. Civ.Code art. 2047, and words susceptible of different meanings are to be interpreted as having the mеaning that best conforms to the object of the contract. See La.Civ.Code art. 2048. A doubtful provision must be interpreted in light of the nature of the contract, equity, usages, the conduct of the parties before and after formation of the contract, and other contracts of a like nature between the same parties. La.Civ.Code art. 2053. When the parties made no provision for a particular situation, it must be assumed that they intended to bind themselves not only to the express provisions of the contract, but also to whatever the law, equity, or usage regards as implied in а contract of that kind or necessary for the contract to receive its purpose. La.Civ.Code art. 2054. To these basic concepts, we add one other. In Louisiana, a mineral lease is interpreted so as to give effect to the covenants implied in every such lease. See La.Rev.Stat. § 31:122.
Id. at 172.
Accordingly, the usages, words of art, and technical terms of the oil and gas industry should be taken into consideration in interpreting the lease exploration clause. A leading mineral law treatise defines mineral exploration operations, as the term is regularly used in the industry, as including aerial and geophysical surveys, geological studies, core testing, and drilling test wells,
see
8 Patrick H. Martin
&
Bruce M. Kramer,
William & Meyers Oil and Gas Law: Manual of Terms,
364 (1998); and a seismic survey as one of the principal methods of geophysical survey.
See
Martin & Kramer,
supra,
at 457-58.
2
In fact, two oil and gas treatises say that seismic operations are generally accepted as included in the methods of “exploration” even if they were not extant at the time of the lease or specifically referred to in the mineral deed or lease;
It now appears generally accepted that a mineral owner or lessee may engage in geophysical work including seismic operations and that he may conduct secondary recovery operations on the land even though the deed or lease did not specifically refer to such operations and even though at the time of the execution of the deed or lease such operations were uncommon or even unknown. The deed or lease in authorizing exploration for and production of minerals cannot reasonably be said to limit the methods employed for the exploration and production to those known at the time of the execution of the instrument.
1 Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, Williams & Meyers Oil and Gas Law, § 218.5 (1998); see also Kuntz, supra, at 351 (the mineral lessee has the implied right to make geophysical explorations by seismographic tests, even over the lessor’s protest, although the lease is silent regarding exploration and even though such methods were not known at the time the lease was granted). 3
Thus the industry usages and practices indicate that in Louisiana and elsewhere an exclusive right of exploration lease clause generally is understood to include the right to conduct seismic operatiоns. We have found no reported Louisiana court decision expressly holding that a mineral lessee (or assignee) with the exclusive and unqualified right to explore for oil and gas may, in the absence of a contrary contractual provision, conduct prudent and reasonable seismic operations on the leased premises. Nevertheless, we believe that the Louisiana Supreme Court would so hold if the question were squarely presented.
Several Louisiana cases contain assumptions, implicit holdings, or dictum to this effect.
See, e.g., IP Timberlands Operаting Co., Ltd. v. Denmiss Corp.,
The district court, without extensive discussion, cited three Louisiana courts of appeal decisions as authority for its conclusion that the land owner’s grant of the exclusive right to explore by a mineral lease does not include consent to conduct seismic operations:
Jeanes v. G.F.S.,
Musser Davis also argues that UPR’s attempts to obtain a “seismic permit” demonstrate that the mineral lease alone does not confer the right to conduct seismic exploration. This contention is without merit. Even when a mineral lease vests in the lessee exclusive right to explore for minerals, under industry usage and practice the lessee usually obtains a “seismic permit” from the landowner as an
B. Ownership of Seismic Data
The district court’s decision that Musser Davis owns the seismic data obtained by UPR was based directly upon its erroneous conclusion that UPR’s seismic operations without additional express consent by Musser Davis would constitute geophysical trespass under § 217. The district court cited
Layne Louisiana Co. v. Superior Oil Co.,
That a mineral lessee or permittee ordinarily acquires a valuable exclusive property right in data derived from its geophysical survey has been confirmed by criminal and civil litigation involving the misappropriation and right to sell such data.
See, e.g., Tidelands Royalty B Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
Accordingly, in the absence of a contrary provision in the oil and gas lease or other contract between the parties, we conclude that UPR would be entitled to the ownership of the seismic data it develops pursuant to its prudent and reasonable geophysicаl operations incidental to its exercise of the exclusive right to explore and produce oil and gas under the lease.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court judgment is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. On October 2, 1996, Eagle Oil and Gas Company assigned its interest in the lease— 50 per cent to Shield Petroleum Incorporated and 50 per cent to Hugoton Energy Corporation. By the April 1, 1997 assignment, UPR purchased a 46.25 per cent interest in the lease from Shield Petroleum; by the October 17, 1997 assignment, UPR purchased an additional 25.9375 per cеnt interest in the lease from Hugoton Energy.
. Definitional support is also provided by state and federal statutes.
See
La:R.S. §§ 30:208 and 209 (to "explore” the mineral resources of state lands the State Mineral
. These treatises each rely in part upon this court’s opinion in
Yates v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
. The court of appeal had held that, by virtue of the mineral lease, Tinsley, as lessee had a real right, the exclusive right to explore the leased premises for minerals, assertable in an action in tort for unauthorized seismic tests by a trespasser.
See Tinsley v. Seismic Explorations, Inc. of Delaware,
. In pertinent part, La.R.S. § 30:217 provides:
A.(l) No person shall conduct geological surveys for oil, gas, or other minerals by means of a torsion balance, seismograph explosions, mechanical device, or any other method whatsoever, on any land, unless he has obtained the consent of either the owner or the party or parties authorized to execute geological surveys, leases, or permits as provided in the Louisiana Mineral Code.
(2) “Owner” as used herein shall not include a person or legal entity with only a surface or subsurface leasehold interest in the property.
(3) Whoever violates this Subsection shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars nor more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned for not less than thirty days nor more than six months, or both.
. It is also telling that in a major mineral law treatise giving extensive treatment to the subject of “Reflections on Ownership, Protection and Transfer of Seismic Data,” there is no mention of even the possibility that the mineral lessees or permittees collecting seismic data on lands owned by others do not acquire ownership of that data. See 37 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. § 14. Rather, that treatise expressly refers to permitees as "data owners.” 37 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst., supra, at § 14.01.
