139 Minn. 234 | Minn. | 1918
Lead Opinion
Chapter 296, p. 416, Laws 1915, contains the last modification of such statutes. It provides that schools of certain designated classes, upon reaching certain specified standards “shall receive” certain stipulated amounts annually from the state. These statutes created -an obligation on the part of the state to the-school districts meeting the requirements, but an obligation not enforceable without further legislation, for these statutes carry with them no appropriation. Appropriations were made from time to time, but the appropriations made by the appropriation acts have not been as large as the obligations created by the other set of statutes. As a result, when the 1917 legislature convened, all appropriations made up to. that date had been used and still there was an amount unpaid accrued during the fiscal years ending July 31, 1915, and July 31, 1916, of $1,070,193.
Thereupon the House and Senate passed an appropriation bill, chapter 437, p. 664, Laws 1917. By the terms of this bill as passed by both houses, there was appropriated:
“For aid to * * * schools * * * available for the year ending July 31, 1917, $2,637,545.00.”
“For aid to * * * schools * * * available for the year ending July 31, 1918, $2,400,000.00.”
“For aid to * * * schools * * * available for the year ending July 31, 1917, only, $1,070,193.”
The last item was vetoed by the' Governor. The other two items stand in the appropriation bill as passed.
The defendants, state officers, now claim the right to pay the deficit of $1,070,193 arising prior to July 31, 1916, out of the $2,637,545, appropriated “for aid to * * * schools * * * available for the year ending July 31, 1917.” Plaintiff, a taxpayer, denies their right to do so, and claims this appropriation can be used only to pay amounts accruing during the year ending July 31, 1917. The trial court sustained this contention, overruled a demurrer to plaintifPs complaint and enjoined the use of this appropriation for payment of any deficit accruing prior to July 31, 1916.
The position of the defendants, stated more at length, is, that an appropriation of funds “available” for a certain fiscal year is not an appropriation for payment of obligations incurred or accruing during that year, but that it creates a fund which may in whole or in part be expended during that year “for the specified general object, irrespective of when the obligation was incurred,” and that an appropriation available for the fiscal year ending July 31, 1917, simply places the money so appro-. priated at the disposal of the state officers to be used for the specified general object without reference to time of accrual of the obligation paid, and may accordingly be used to pay obligations accruing during the prior fiscal years 1915 and 1916. We do not concur in this contention.
The construction indicated in the above paragraph is not negatived, but is emphasized by the circumstances and the history of the act.
The statutes creating the right to state 'aid provide in substance for an annual apportionment or pro rating of any appropriation made, if it is insufficient to'pay all demands in full. For example, G. S. 1913, § 2945, provides: “The state superintendent shall annually apportion to such semi-graded and common schools as he shall find- entitled to state aid, the amount appropriated for such schools, in equal amounts to all schools of the same class.” Section 2933 contains similar provisions for apportionment of amounts appropriated for high schools and gradéd schools. This requirement of an annual pro rating of the. appropriation is inconsistent with the theory that these appropriations are made at large and without limitation as. to particular year's, and is likewise inconsistent with the idea that the demands of any year are to be paid in full out of funds later appropriated if the annual appropriation is insufficient therefor.
This construction is also emphasized by the fact that the bill, as it
It is true, the item of $1,070,193 was included by the use of language substantially the same as used in the item of $2,637,545. But to this it may be said:- The ordinary meaning of the language in both cases, if taken alone, is to make an appropriation for the purposes of the year ending July 31, 1917. It may be that if the item of $1,070,193 had been approved by the Governor and so enacted into law, an intent could be found that the amount appropriated by it, being in the exact amount of the deficit, should be applicable to the payment of the deficit', but, if such result could be reached, it would be because the ordinary meaning of the language must be made to bend to a palpably plain purpose, shown by extraneous circumstances. We have no such impelling consideration in construing the items of $2,637,545.
There is some contention by defendants that the language of this appropriation is susceptible of a construction that the funds made available for a given fiscal year were to pay the aid “earned” during the prior school and fiscal year, so that funds available for the fiscal year ending July 31, 1917, were appropriated to pay aid earned in the school and fiscal year ending July 31, 1916. This contention is based, in part, on the fact that the aid earned during the year ending July 31, 1916, is not required to be certified by the state superintendent before the first day of October following, and partly on an alleged practical construction by which it is said state aid has been paid out on that principle in past years. Whether this practice was proper, under prior appropriation acts, is a question not before us, and we do not consider it. The language of prior acts differs in some particulars from this one. It is very apparent that no such construction of the 1917 act is possible. This act, in terms, makes express reference to distribution “for the school year beginning August 1, 1917,” that is, the year ending July 31, 1918. From this, it is clear that the appropriation was intended to cover the biennial period ending July 31,1918. Taking all these statutes together,
No statutory costs will be allowed.
Orders affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur with the Chief Justice.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
In my view of this controversy, the distribution of the money in question may safely be left to the high school board, to be made in harmony with the apportionment provided for by law. ' With the few new districts, those organized subsequent to and which have relied upon the school aid appropriation of 1917, properly taken care of, which readily may be done, it would seem of no special importance whether the money reaches the other districts under the label “deficiency appropriation” or “appropriation for the year 1917.” In either case the money will be devoted to the same purpose, namely, the advancement of the educational interests of the districts receiving the same. There may and probably will be a deficiency, but that will be a matter for future legislation. The order appealed from should be reversed and the cause remanded with directions accordingly.